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ABSTRACT 
The failure of Lehman Brothers (“Lehman”) in September 2008 resulted in the world’s 
largest ever insolvency proceedings.1  Almost eight years later, these have yet to be 
concluded.  Much of the work of the lawyers involved with the Lehman insolvency has 
concerned questions of the ownership of assets held by the various Lehman entities at the 
time of its failure.  Resolution of these matters has been no mean feat in view of the 
complex financial arrangements that Lehman had put in place.  Practitioners and judges 
have had to (amongst other things) legally deconstruct transactions, interpret transaction 
documents and correctly allocate assets amongst the parties claiming them.  The cross-
border nature of the Lehman business and the fact that most of the assets in question 
were intangible, intermediated securities complicated matters further.  These 
intermediated securities often formed part of the collateral used by Lehman for conducting 
its own business so that assets belonging to the ultimate investors became increasingly 
removed from their direct ownership.  This doctorate seeks to understand the 
consequences for investors of the law relating to the holding of intermediated securities in 
the event of the insolvency of an intermediary and to consider whether the existing rules 
that govern such arrangements are fair and effective.  Through an examination of selected 
English law and US Lehman cases, this Thesis explores the role of location in determining 
the law governing the proprietary effect of transactions involving intermediated securities 
and what, if any, conflict of laws issues arose as a consequence of the Lehman collapse.  
It concludes that, despite limited assistance from the case law in answering the question, 
the rules applied in the Lehman insolvency were, largely, both effective and fair to 
investors, albeit in the long term.  Nevertheless, issues concerning the cross-border 
recognition of rights to intermediated securities remain and, with them, the challenge of 
achieving further harmonisation in an increasingly complex and fragmenting world.  In 
view of the difficulties in imposing “top down” harmonisation or standardisation of laws 
across jurisdictions, the “bottom up” approach of the UNIDROIT Convention on 
Intermediated Securities provides the most realistic solution. 
 
 
                                                          
1 According to the Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Chapter 11 Proceedings Examiner Report it was “the largest 
bankruptcy proceeding ever filed” <https://jenner.com/lehman/VOLUME%201.pdf 1>accessed 17 February 
2016.  The FDIC also described the Lehmans failure as the “largest financial bankruptcy in US history” 
<www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/lehman.html> accessed 24 November 2015. 
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GLOSSARY 
 
Administrators: the joint UK administrators of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) 
Limited, PricewaterhouseCoopers. 
CCP: central counterparty. 
EMIR: the EU European Market Infrastructure Regulations on OTC derivatives central 
counterparties and trade repositories. 
Examiner’s Report: the Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc Chapter 11 Proceedings Examiner 
Report produced by Anton R Valukas and published in March 2010. 
FCARS: the UK Financial Collateral Arrangement (No 2) Regulations. 
FCD: the EU Financial Collateral Directive. 
FDIC: the US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 
Geneva Securities Convention: the 2009 UNIDROIT Convention on Substantive Rules 
for Intermediated Securities. 
LBHI: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.  LBHI went into US Bankruptcy Code Chapter 11 
Proceedings on 15 September 2008. 
LBI: Lehman Brothers Inc.  LBI went into SIPA Trusteeship on 19 September, 2008. 
LBIE: Lehman Brothers International Europe.  LBIE went into administration on 15 
September 2008. 
LBSF: Lehman Brothers Special Finance Inc.  LBSF went into US Bankruptcy Code Chapter 
11 Proceedings on 3 October 2008. 
Lehman: the Lehman Brothers Group. 
OTC: over-the-counter. 
SDNY: Southern District of New York. 
SFD: the EU Settlement Finality Directive. 
SFRS: the UK Settlement Finality Regulations. 
SIPA: the US Securities Investor Protection Act. 
SIPA Trustee: the US Trustee of Lehman Brothers Inc, James Giddens. 
SIPC: the US Securities Investor Protection Corporation Act. 
US court: unless otherwise distinguished, this means the US Bankruptcy Court of the 
Southern District of New York. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction and Context 
The question  
In his speech to the INSOL Europe Academics Conference held in June 2012, Mr Justice 
Norris2 outlined a number of issues faced by practitioners and which he considered 
deserved further inquiry from academics.  One of the questions that he raised is the 
subject of this Professional Doctorate.  The question was framed as follows: 
“In a digital age and where significant assets may consist of de-materialised 
instruments, are our existing rules sufficient to provide a fair and effective regime 
governing the location of assets?”3 
The question was asked in the light of the financial crisis that began in 2007 and which led 
to the insolvency of a number of financial institutions including the international 
investment bank Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008.4  Prior to its demise, Lehman 
was an extremely complex financial institution providing services to clients which included 
the execution, clearing and settlement of both securities and derivatives trades as well as 
custody, financing, foreign exchange, stocklending and valuation services.  In the UK, the 
majority of the entities with proprietary interests in the assets held by, or on behalf of 
LBIE on its insolvency were its prime brokerage clients.5  The consequences of insolvency 
for the bank’s global financial arrangements were almost overwhelming; the LBHI 
bankruptcy in the US has been described as “disorderly and costly”6 and resulted in 
“disruptions in the swaps and derivatives markets and a rapid, market-wide unwinding of 
trading positions for those financial markets not subject to the automatic stay in 
bankruptcy”.7  The effects of the demise of Lehman were felt across many countries and 
the UK was particularly hard hit. 
 
                                                          
2 <www.ntu.ac.uk/PSS/Nottingham%20Law%20School/Publications/132264.pdfntu.ac.uk/nls> accessed 6 
October 2015. 
3 Norris J (n 2) 3. 
4 Hereafter “Lehman”.  LBIE was the main UK operating company and went into administration in England; LBHI 
was the US holding company and went into US Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Proceedings.  As to the timings of these 
processes see, for example, Lomas & Others v JFB Firth Rixson [2010] EWHC 3372 (Ch), [2010] All ER (D) 248 
[30] for the details assumed by the English court. 
5 Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in administration) (No2) [2009] EWHC 2141 (Ch), [2009] All ER 
(D) 36 [6].  Prime brokerage is discussed in Chapter 3. 
6 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ‘The Orderly Liquidation of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc under the 
Dodd-Frank Act’ (2011) 5 FDIC Quarterly 2, 1. 
7 FDIC (n 6). 
8 
 
Inevitably, many important issues arose as to the ownership of the assets held by Lehman 
institutions, spawning litigation in a number of jurisdictions.8  Many of the issues were 
specifically considered in the English courts, resulting in a significant body of 
jurisprudence, some of which will be considered in this Document 5 (the “Thesis”).9  What 
is of particular interest to this study is the nature of the assets involved in the Lehman 
insolvency and the fact that they did not consist of tangible, real or personal property, but 
intangible, ethereal financial assets existing only as computerised book entries; the “de-
materialised instruments” referred to by Norris J.  So what are the rules relating to the 
location of these kinds of assets and what happens when a large financial institution such 
as Lehman becomes insolvent?  Understanding these rules will ultimately enable a 
determination as to whether they support a fair and effective regime on insolvency, 
although further questions will be begged on the way to any such conclusion, including a 
consideration of “fair to whom?” a question identified in Document 4.  For the reality is 
that, as the Cork Report10 identified in 1982,  
 
“the effects of insolvency are not limited to the private interests of the insolvent 
and his creditors… other interests of society or other groups in society are vitally 
affected by the insolvency and its outcome.”11 
 
Although it was initially the author’s intention to consider the question of “fair to whom” 
in this Thesis, it has become clear that it is beyond its scope to do so in any detail; any 
serious consideration of this issue must be a matter for further study.  Some preliminary 
points may be made on the question of fairness and effectiveness more generally, 
however.   
 
Document 2 considered the purpose of English corporate insolvency law and explored 
some of the US insolvency literature, recognising that there has been limited discussion of 
the philosophy behind the English system.12  The objectives of the English system are 
                                                          
8 The progress reports produced by the administrators of LBIE between 14 April 2011 and 15 October 2015 
variously list litigation in Luxembourg, Germany, the US (New York), Hong Kong, Athens and Seoul 
<www.pwc.co.uk/services/business-recovery/administrations/lehman/lehman-brothers-international-europe-
in-administration-joint-administrators-14th-progress-report-12october2015.html> accessed 24 November 
2015. 
9 The list of cases is set out at Appendix 1. 
10 Insolvency Law and Practice, Report of the Review Committee June 1982 Cmnd. 8558.  The Cork Report led 
to the development of the current English regime. 
11 Cork Report (n 10) para 198 (i). 
12 Document 2, 30 -34. 
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perhaps best articulated by Goode, who lists the first objective as the maximisation of 
returns to creditors and the second objective as ensuring a fair and equitable means of 
ranking claims.13  These reflect the aims of a good modern insolvency law, as outlined in 
the Cork Report.  The Cork Report also refers to the importance of ensuring that the 
process of process of realising and distributing assets is undertaken honestly and 
competently and should be undertaken with the minimum of delay and expense.14  This 
brief analysis indicates the importance in an insolvency process of ensuring both 
substantive fairness to creditors (through the maximisation of returns and the fair and 
equitable ranking of claims) and procedural fairness (in ensuring that the process is 
conducted honestly and competently).   Thus any assessment of fairness will require a 
consideration of these matters.  The question of effectiveness is distinct from that of 
fairness, but is connected in that it can be assessed by understanding whether the 
creditors obtained the maximum returns available to them and whether they did so in a 
timely manner and with minimum expense.  
 
In his speech, Norris J observed that academics have a role in assisting practising judges 
and suggested several ways in which academics could usefully support the judiciary 
through their research.  These were, first, by identifying relevant principles; second, by 
explaining the inter-relationship of those principles both within and across national legal 
systems; third, by comparing problems and solutions across systems of law; and fourth 
by collating and analysing data.15  This Thesis will provide a response to the question 
raised by Norris J, taking account of his suggested approach to the research process.  It 
will build on the work undertaken in Documents 2, 3 and 4 much of which has already 
addressed the identification of relevant principles and how they operate both on a national 
and a cross-border basis.  Similarly, it will reflect upon a number of cross-border problems 
and solutions in this arena that have already been identified and considered at a 
preliminary level.  At this stage, no data has been collated and analysed as the work to 
date has provided the groundwork for exploring the question by reference to a case study, 
which will form part of the Thesis.  In order to give this proper context, it makes sense 
briefly to refer to Document 1 and reiterate the findings of Documents 2, 3 and 4. 
 
                                                          
13 Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (4th edn Sweet & Maxwell 2011) 58. 
14 Cork Report (n 11), para 198 (g) and (e). 
15 Norris J (n 2) 2. 
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Document 1 
Document 1 introduced the project and analysed the concept of assets held as 
dematerialised instruments, concluding that the assets in question were uncertificated 
debt and equity securities held through an intermediary or series of intermediaries and 
whose ownership was identifiable through digital (computerised) accounting records.16  
Document 1 also recognised that such securities could fall within the definition of financial 
collateral under the FCD17 and the FCARS.18  Work undertaken in subsequent documents 
has led to the conclusion that these assets are most correctly described as “intermediated 
securities” and this term will be used throughout the Thesis.19 
Document 1 sought to look beyond issues of mere classification and to begin to understand 
the philosophical basis for this type of property interest.  The starting point for the 
discussion in Document 2 was then identified and derived from Rudden’s paper “Things as 
Thing and Things as Wealth” in which he observed that “there has been a profound, if little 
discussed evolution by which the concepts originally devised for real property have been 
detached from their original object, only to survive and flourish as a means of handling 
abstract value”. 20   
Findings from Document 2: “Epistemology and identity – literature review and conceptual 
framework” 
Document 2 explored the history and development of English property law in order to 
understand the nature and classification of intermediated securities within that branch of 
the law.  It was important to understand this as a first step, before an understanding of 
their treatment on insolvency could be considered at a later stage in the study.  As an 
epistemological enquiry, Document 2 sought to justify knowledge as true belief through a 
literature review and a discussion of relevant jurisprudence.  Beginning with a 
consideration of different types of property, including abstract property rights in Roman 
law, the paper outlined a number of milestones in the history of English property law21 
                                                          
16 See Document 1; Uncertificated Securities Regulations 2001 SI 2001/3755 reg 3; Joanna Benjamin, Madeleine 
Yates and Gerald Montagu The Law of Global Custody (2nd edn Butterworths LexisNexis 2002) 15; Joanna 
Benjamin Interests in Securities (OUP 2000). 
17Council Directive 2002/47/EC of 6 June 2002 on financial collateral arrangements [2002] OJ L168/43 as 
amended by Council Directive 2009/44/EC of 6 May 2009 [2009] OJ L146/37. 
18Financial Collateral Arrangements (No 2) Regulations 2003 SI 2003/3226. 
19 Louise Gullifer (ed) Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (5th edn Sweet & Maxwell 2014). 
20 Bernard Rudden ‘Things as Thing and Things as Wealth’ (1994) OJLS 14, 1. 
21 For example, the fragmentation of interests in land in feudal times; the development of the trust; the 
emergence of intellectual property as a “new” form of property in the eighteenth century; the creation of the 
floating charge and security interests in assets other than land in the nineteenth; and, ultimately, the twentieth 
century concept of intermediated securities. 
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enabling a conclusion to be reached that intermediated securities are a form of intangible 
property (distinct from intellectual property) and are consequently choses in action and 
that the developmental milestones identified went some way towards supporting Rudden’s 
thesis.22 
Document 2 also outlined the conceptual framework for the study and drew on the work 
of Locke and Hohfeld.  Locke’s theory of “original acquisition” was explored and deemed 
to be relevant to the study to the extent that it provides a basis on which to consider 
whether property is held legitimately or illegitimately (even if his theory is otherwise 
flawed).23  This is a critical question for any lawyer in the context of a corporate insolvency, 
as the legitimacy of any proprietary rights claimed in respect of the assets of the insolvent 
party must be established before property can be transferred to the claimant.  The work 
undertaken by Hohfeld24 in analysing the different legal relationships that may be held in 
respect of property also has relevance to the study; intermediated securities are not held 
by their owner, but through a chain of third parties each of which will have a different 
legal25 relationship to the underlying asset. 
In addition to seeking a philosophical justification for the rules of property and corporate 
insolvency law that exist today, Document 2 also contemplated at a meta-level how those 
rules came into being.  Teubner’s theory of autopoiesis and the concept of legal evolution 
was considered and analysed.26  Whilst there is an underlying truth in the concept that the 
law gives itself legal validity through one legal operation giving rise to another, Document 
2 concluded that this theory alone does not explain how the law has developed in this 
area.  There is little UK jurisprudence that addresses the development of English corporate 
insolvency law; much of what is written comes from the US.  One idea that has resonance 
for the English system, however, is the idea that the development of the property and 
corporate insolvency law rules that we have today has been largely pragmatic.  This has 
been touched on by a number of corporate and insolvency law academics including 
                                                          
22 Although the application of real property concepts may possibly not have gone far enough for some; two years 
before Rudden’s article, Fidelis Oditah had observed that the underdevelopment of personal property law and 
the absence of a doctrine similar to the real property doctrine of estates had led to curious results in priority 
claims involving personal property in ‘Assets and the Treatment of Claims in Insolvency’ (1992) LQR 459, 486. 
23 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government (1690) Chapter V “Of Property” 
<www.gutenberg.org/files/7370/7370-h/7370-h.htm> accessed 24 January 2014; see the discussion by Alison 
Clarke and Paul Kohler in Property Law; Commentary and Materials (CUP 2005) 91. 
24 Wesley Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as applied in Judicial Reasoning (Yale University Press 1919). 
25 The term “legal” is used generically here as, under English law, many of these interests would be described as 
equitable. 
26 Gunter Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System (Blackwell 1993) 2. 
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Whincop,27 Armour28 and Goode.29  The pragmatic development can be seen at least in 
part as a consequence of practitioners flexing and manipulating the law in trying to resolve 
the legal problems of their time; rights became substantive when judges accepted their 
legal validity. 30  The recent remarks of Calnan, a City practitioner, add weight to this view: 
“One of the great advantages of the common law is that it has been flexible enough 
to adapt to changing commercial situations.”31 
A note of caution must be exercised here, in that it is contended that the notion of 
“pragmatism” described here probably owes more to pragmatism in its colloquial sense, 
described by Bix as worrying about “what works”,32 than to the school of philosophical 
pragmatism or the legal pragmatism of the early twentieth century.33  
Document 2 also required an understanding of the importance of “identity” when 
approaching any question.  What pre-conceptions does the writer have?  What standpoint 
does he or she take to the matter in hand?  It may never be possible to be truly objective, 
but an awareness of identity may at least help the writer to question certain assumptions 
he or she may otherwise make.  It is also the case that a question may be addressed from 
a number of perspectives and so the standpoint ultimately chosen for any study must be 
carefully considered.  As this professional doctorate seeks to resolve a question raised by 
a legal practitioner in a commercial context, it seems appropriate that the standpoint of 
this Thesis should be that of a commercial legal practitioner.   
Findings from Document 3, Research Project 1 
Document 3 developed the discussion of intermediated securities, exploring questions of 
ownership and possession.  It analysed the distinctions between proprietary and 
contractual rights and between legal and equitable proprietary interests, exploring the 
English law construction that intermediated securities are held on trust by intermediaries 
for their investor owners.  Critically, it identified the limitations of an English law analysis 
                                                          
27 Michael J Whincop, An Economic and Jurisprudential Genealogy of Corporate Law (Dartmouth Publishing 
Company 2001), 26. 
28 John Armour, ‘The Chequered History of the Floating Charge’ (2004) 13 Griffiths L.Rev. 25. 
29 Goode (n 13) 69. 
30 See, for example, Millar v Taylor (1769) 98 ER 201 (intellectual property); and Holroyd v Marshall (1862)10 
HLC 191, 220 and re Panama New Zealand and Australian Royal Mail Co (1870) 5 Ch App 318 (the floating 
charge). 
31Richard Calnan, ‘What Makes a Good Law of Security?’ in Frederique Dahan (ed) Research Handbook on Secured 
Financing in Commercial Transactions (Edward Elgar 2015) 465. 
32 Brian Bix Jurisprudence: Theory and Context (5th edn Sweet & Maxwell 2009) 279. 
33 As considered by writers such as Roscoe Pound (see Chapter Seven). 
13 
 
in the “real world”.  Intermediated securities are bought and sold in the market place and 
such transactions are often international in nature.  The owner may be based in one 
jurisdiction, the intermediary in another and neither may be England or Wales.  Questions 
of asset location and ownership become far less clear cut in these circumstances.  When 
the markets are functioning well and the solvency of trading partners is not in issue, the 
legal analysis of ownership and the jurisdictional rules that underpin any given transaction 
involving intermediated securities are likely to be of little or no concern to the parties 
involved.  Where problems arise in the performance of contracts involving dematerialised 
assets and cause loss to be suffered, however, the parties will look to their legal rights 
and obligations either to recover their property or to seek recompense for what is owed to 
them.  To the extent that these problematic contracts involve the movement of assets 
across borders, so will jurisdictional limits be tested: it may well be the case that the 
English law analysis is not recognised in the jurisdiction of a non-English counterparty.  
This then begs the question first, as to whether the ultimate owner’s property rights will 
be recognised and upheld and second, if they are, what is the legal basis for doing so? 
Findings from Document 4: Research Project 2 
In the process of writing Document 3 it became evident that more work was needed to 
understand how intermediated securities are used in financial transactions.  Understanding 
the precise nature of the intermediary’s relationship to the securities it holds at any given 
moment is critical; in the event of the insolvency of the intermediary (as happened when 
Lehman ailed), questions are likely to arise both as to the allocation and to the ownership 
(or not) of assets held by the intermediary.  The proprietary or contractual basis on which 
assets are held by an intermediary in such a situation must be understood before the 
correct allocation of assets to the correct counterparties or other creditors can be effected.  
Document 4 therefore considered types of financial collateral transactions and the potential 
negative consequences of rehypothecation.  Where a client’s intermediated securities are 
used as financial collateral and then re-used by an intermediary in a transaction with a 
counterparty, the intermediated securities are no longer available for that client, thus 
suggesting that the client’s proprietary interest in the asset has been reduced to a 
contractual right to be compensated for the value of the asset by the intermediary.  This 
is unlikely to be a problem for the client if the intermediary is solvent, but it becomes a 
problem if the intermediary is not.  Whilst sophisticated parties may accept such a risk 
both by allowing rehypothecation and by factoring it into the pricing of transactions, the 
14 
 
wider risk remains that financial contagion might result from chains of transactions 
involving reused collateral.34 
The second part of Document 4 took a comparative approach (as had been envisaged in 
Document 2) and explored the civil law approach to property and ownership with reference 
to a number of European jurisdictions.  The EU and US position was also analysed in 
respect of intermediated securities.  The complexity of trying to determine the lex situs of 
intermediated securities became apparent.  Inevitably, this comparative critique only 
scratched the surface of the issues (the extent of the discussion being limited by the scope 
of the doctorate), but some important themes emerged and provided background to the 
discussion that followed on the appropriate choice of law for intermediated securities.  This, 
in turn, led to an analysis of the Geneva Securities Convention35 as the culmination of the 
work that has been done, to date, on this important topic.  Of particular relevance in this 
context, is the effort made in the Geneva Securities Convention to overcome what Gullifer 
has described as the “shortfall” problem (where there are insufficient securities available 
for allocation to their ultimate owners) and the “identification” problem (where it is not 
clear which securities belong to which client).36  Broadly, the Geneva Securities Convention 
(the only current signatory of which is Bangladesh) 37 anticipates that an intermediary will 
always hold the same number of securities as are credited to its account holders38 as well 
as providing for pro-rata sharing in the event of a shortfall.39 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
34 A problem recognised in Recital 8 of Council Regulation EU/2015/2365 of 25 November 2015 on transparency 
of securities financing transactions and of reuse OJ L337/1. 
35 The 2009 UNIDROIT Convention on Substantive Rules for Intermediated Securities. 
36 Louise Gullifer, ‘Ownership of Securities: the Problems Caused by Intermediation’ in Louise Gullifer and Jennifer 
Payne (eds) Intermediated Securities; Legal Problems and Practical Issues (Hart Publishing 2010) 22-26.  There 
are other issues outlined by Eva Micheler in ‘Custody Chains and Asset Values: Why Crypto-Securities are Worth 
Contemplating’ CLJ 74 [2015] 505 for example, relating to the reduction of investor rights the more parties there 
are in a chain (511) which are noted, but cannot be discussed in detail here. 
37 According to the UNIDROIT website in the 91st Session of the Governing Council in Rome 7-9 May 2012 at 
page 2 www.unidroit.org/english/governments/councildocuments/2012session/cd91-05bc-e.pdf> accessed 24 
November 2015). 
38 Article 24 (n 35). 
39 Article 26 (n 35). 
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Looking forward: the Thesis 
Having set out the background to the Thesis, the question posed by Norris J now needs to 
be addressed.  One concern at the outset is whether, as there is so much to discuss, 
30,000 words will be sufficient to discuss it.  As this already seems highly unlikely to the 
author, it is important to reflect that any doctrinal study is a starting point40 and, if done 
well, will end with a new beginning.  With that health warning in mind, it now makes sense 
to consider the structure and subject matter of this Thesis in more detail.  What needs to 
be examined to answer the question and how should that examination be conducted? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
40 As I have been assured by my colleague, Professor Rebecca Parry. 
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Chapter Two 
The Thesis: questions, research method and structure 
 
The questions for the Thesis 
The original question posed for this Thesis was whether “our existing rules [are] sufficient 
to provide a fair and effective regime governing the location of assets” when those assets 
are in dematerialised form.  This study therefore seeks to understand the consequences 
for investors of the law relating to the holding of intermediated securities in the event of 
the insolvency of an intermediary.  In particular, the study seeks to test the proposition 
that complex conflict of laws issues arise in the event of an intermediary’s insolvency on 
the basis that intermediated securities issued in one jurisdiction might be held in a second 
jurisdiction, whilst the investor is located in a third jurisdiction and so forth; something 
which could result in “real world” problems for investors in getting their money back.   
 
From the outset, the study has explored Norris J’s question against the backdrop of the 
financial crisis.  The question has been interpreted on the basis of two main assumptions.  
First, that the courts have been faced with complicated questions as to the law governing 
the location of assets following the insolvency of financial institutions which hold 
intermediated securities (such as Lehman); and second, that these questions have arisen 
as a direct consequence of the unravelling of complex, cross-border financial transactions.  
But are these assumptions correct?  The fact that the question was asked by a senior legal 
practitioner might suggest that practitioners are uneasy about the law relating to the 
location of intermediated securities as it currently stands, a premise supported by the 
2010 remarks of Moss: 
 
“Many of us see the field of intermediated securities as an area where sufficient 
certainty is lacking, particularly in relation to insolvency situations.  The massive 
Lehman litigation currently under way rather proves my point”.41   
 
It is important to note at the beginning that the first assumption is predicated on a third 
assumption, which is that the question of location is actually important; implicit in the 
discussion thus far is the idea that location matters when determining the proprietary 
                                                          
41 Gabriel Moss ‘Intermediated Securities: Issues Arising from Insolvency’ in Louise Gullifer and Jennifer Payne 
(eds) Intermediated Securities; Legal Problems and Practical Issues (Hart Publishing 2010) 68.   
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effect of a transaction involving intermediated securities.  But is this third assumption 
borne out in reality?  It is clear that further interrogation of these initial assumptions is 
essential. 
 
Questions one and two 
The challenge for the Thesis is to determine the extent to which “real world” practical legal 
problems have occurred because of difficulties in establishing the law that governs the 
location of intermediated securities following the failure of sophisticated financial 
institutions.  Before going further, however, the phrase “the law that governs the location 
of intermediated securities” requires further consideration.  The reference to “location” 
formed part of the original question posed by the judge, quite possibly as a shorthand 
reference to the lex situs rule.  As discussed in Document 4, the lex situs rule is the rule 
that applies where the question to be resolved concerns proprietary rights, so that the 
applicable law is that of the place where the asset is situated.  There are, however, 
difficulties in applying the lex situs to intangibles because they do not always have a 
location and so attributing one will depend on the circumstances.42  The specific question 
is, therefore, better framed by reference to “the law governing securities” although 
establishing an understanding of the relevance of location from primary legal sources will 
form part of the wider discussion of this Thesis. 
 
In order to demonstrate whether or not these difficulties actually arose in the aftermath 
of the financial crisis, the following matters need to be explored.  First, whether, following 
the insolvency of an intermediary that holds intermediated securities, the law governing 
securities was an issue in the decided cases that caused “real world” problems; second, if 
the law governing securities was in issue, to what extent did it result in the testing of 
jurisdictional limits in establishing the ultimate ownership of those assets; and third, what 
principles were applied across jurisdictions in achieving the proprietary effect (the 
ownership outcome) that was achieved?  Having answered these questions it would then 
be possible to consider the question of the fairness and effectiveness of the regime 
affecting rights to intermediated securities on insolvency may be addressed.  Collectively, 
these sub-questions form question one. 
 
                                                          
42 Document 4, 36-38. 
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It is entirely possible that the investigation into question one may conclude that the issues 
as to the governing law of intermediated securities did not pose as big a problem in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis as might first have been thought.  If this is so, then 
question two will be about analysing the reasons why this was so.  In addressing these 
questions, it will be necessary to understand from the cases not just whether there were 
difficulties in establishing the location of intermediated securities for the purposes of 
determining the applicable law, but also what the term “location” is understood to mean 
in the case law.  Ultimately, the answers to questions one and two will lead to a conclusion 
that there is either an actual or a theoretical “real world” problem associated with 
establishing the applicable law relating to assets in the form of intermediated securities, 
which will lead into questions three and four.  
 
Questions three and four 
Questions three and four will, inevitably, be linked.  Question three will require a 
consideration of the legal frameworks that currently exist for determining conflict of laws 
issues to see (in the light of the outcome of question one) how far they helped to resolve 
the practical issues thrown up by the Lehman case study.  Alternatively, in the event of 
having to address question two, they will need to be explored to understand how they 
might help to resolve theoretical practical problems that might arise on the insolvency of 
a large financial institution in future.  The analysis will require a wider consideration of the 
extent to which the regimes examined can be considered to be fair and effective. 
 
Insofar as the current law is found wanting, question four must consider what alternatives 
or improvements might be offered to the existing regime.  The preliminary assumption as 
to the importance of location will need to be addressed to the extent that it remains 
ambiguous: is it in fact the case that the law of the location of intermediated securities is 
relevant in establishing the proprietary effect and validity of transactions involving 
intermediated securities?  The analysis will necessarily include a reflection upon the 
coherence of the existing system of rules and an exploration of the application of the 
Geneva Securities Convention to theoretical problems. 
 
Research method 
The only way to determine whether the courts have been faced with issues concerning the 
law governing intermediated securities as a consequence of the unwinding of complex, 
cross-border financial transactions is to examine decided cases to see what issues arose.  
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This necessitates a systematic and rigorous evaluation of these cases through the adoption 
of a doctrinal research methodology coupled with an historical comparative element as 
was envisaged in the framework Document 2.43  But which cases should be examined and 
in which courts and jurisdictions?  Document 4 touched on the historical development of 
property law in a civil law context (with reference to France, Germany and the 
Netherlands) as well as the US.  Tracing the author’s understanding of the English, US and 
civil law positions into a real world, financial institution failure in each of these jurisdictions 
would provide the most comprehensive answer to the question posed.  Although this 
approach would be ideal, it is not feasible within the limitations imposed by the Thesis.  As 
a systematic review of all relevant case law is required, it is necessary to have full access 
to all the relevant case reports, in English.  Whilst it would be possible to locate relevant 
case law in at least one of these civil law jurisdictions, if not all, it would be difficult for the 
author to be certain that all the relevant information had been isolated and also that any 
case law was accurately translated into English.  It is also critical to the Thesis to evaluate 
the case law from those jurisdictions which are predominant in the global financial 
markets; although the European civil law jurisdictions identified are important, in this 
context, the US is also relevant.  As the US market is significant in global terms and as US 
materials will not require translation, the best compromise for the Thesis is to consider 
the English law and US positions.  A consideration of the issues from a civil law perspective 
must be a matter for further study.  
There are several possible models that could be used to identify relevant cases for 
examination but, as part of the original contribution made by this Thesis, Lehman will be 
used as a case study for the following reasons.44  As has already been discussed, Lehman 
was a global, systemically important financial institution which was involved in dealing 
with intermediated securities in cross-border transactions on a daily basis prior to 
becoming insolvent.  It immediately falls within the parameters of the enquiry on the basis 
of its investment banking functions.  Reference has already been made to litigation in both 
the English and US courts, which indicates that there is an existing body of jurisprudence 
that is likely to provide fertile ground for exploring this question.  Whilst the case study 
                                                          
43 “Epistemology and identity; critical review of the literature and development of a conceptual framework” so 
satisfying the necessary robustness required in the research process; Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan 
‘Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal Research’ Deakin Law Review 1 (17) 83, 111-112.  
44 The word limit prevents a detailed discussion of possible models of enquiry other than to note that this approach 
has been anticipated in earlier documents.  Although others have reviewed some of the Lehman cases (most 
notably Joanne Braithwaite in ‘Standard Form Contracts as Transnational Law: Evidence from the Derivatives 
Market’ (2012) 75 (5) MLR 779 and ‘The Impact of Crises by Way of the Courts’ (2014) 3 JIBFL 147) there has 
been no over-arching review. 
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approach may seem ideal, a note of caution should be sounded as it is not without 
limitations.  First, it is possible that parties affected by the Lehman collapse may simply 
have accepted the consequences of the bank’s failure and continued to run their 
businesses without taking further action or, to the extent that issues concerning conflict 
of laws were raised, chose to settle them out of court.  Second, although this approach 
has the advantage of providing a specific number of cases for review, a disadvantage is 
that it can only provide an indicative answer to the question posed (that is, as to the extent 
to which the problem being examined is likely to arise in practice); after all, what can be 
demonstrated for this institution may not be demonstrated for others.45  The size of the 
Lehman insolvency may, however, go some way to mitigate this disadvantage on the basis 
that if such issues are likely to arise, they are most likely to arise in this instance.46  In an 
effort to widen the scope of the review, the Thesis will also briefly consider the MF Global 
case as a second example of an investment bank failure.  MF Global was a far smaller 
institution than Lehman and did not fail until the autumn of 2011 (approximately three 
years after Lehman), but it may prove instructive.47  
 
The Thesis will therefore examine the cases involving Lehman entities heard in the English 
courts after 15 September 2008 and glean additional information from the progress 
reports produced by the UK administrators of UK Lehman entities.48  Similarly, the Thesis 
will consider relevant US cases heard after this date and supplement any findings with 
information obtained from the Examiner’s Report.49  It is important to review the case law 
in both these jurisdictions to understand whether, if the law governing the location of the 
assets was an issue in the English courts, it was also an issue in the US.  The key 
institutions for the purposes of this study are likely to be the main holding companies in 
each jurisdiction LBHI (in the US) and LBIE (in the UK).  Understanding the principles 
applied by the courts of these two jurisdictions when reaching their determinative 
outcomes is likely to be instructive for the purposes of eliciting principles that may be of 
                                                          
45 Such as a central counterparty, for example. 
46 Examiner’s Report, FDIC (n 1).  
47 MF Global Inc. went into Chapter 11 proceedings in the US on 31 October 2011 and MF Global (UK) Limited 
went into special administration in the UK on the same day <https://home.kpmg.com/uk/en/home/media/press-
releases/2011/10/administrators-appointed-to-mf-global-uk-limited-and-mf-global-uk-services-limited.html> 
accessed 29 April 2016. 
48 PricewaterhouseCoopers (n 8). 
49 The US Trustee of LBHI was directed by the US Court to nominate an Examiner to report on a number of 
specified matters under its Order Directing Appointment of an Examiner Pursuant to section 1104(c)(2) of the 
US Bankruptcy Code, Docket No. 2569, In Re Lehman Brothers Holding Inc. Case No. 08‐13555 (Bankr S.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 16, 2009); Examiner’s Report Volume 1 <https://jenner.com/lehman> accessed 21 February 2016, 28. 
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global benefit, bearing in mind that these jurisdictions are home to two of the world’s most 
important financial centres.  
 
Methodology for identifying relevant English law cases 
LBIE was the chief operating company of Lehman in the UK and its ultimate parent 
company was LBHI.50  Each of these companies went into insolvency proceedings 
(administration and Chapter 11 respectively) on 15 September 2008.51  Only cases after 
this date have therefore been catalogued as being relevant to the bank’s insolvency 
proceedings. 
 
A LexisNexis database search of the term “Lehman” on 8 July 2015 produced 184 results.  
Of these, 127 results related to cases that arose after 15 September 2008.  The search 
was repeated on 19 November 2015 and 192 results obtained of which 134 related to the 
bank’s insolvency.  Of the relevant results, multiple entries for the same case appeared 
on the database where, for example, the same case had been reported in more than one 
set of law reports.  For the purposes of the Thesis, only the case transcripts were reviewed.  
A schedule of cases with a brief summary of the issues raised in each case was produced. 
 
In order to confirm that the schedule was accurate, two additional database searches were 
undertaken.  First, a LexisNexis database search of the terms “Lomas” and then “Pearson” 
on 8 July 2015.  This was on the basis that some cases involving Lehman entities were 
taken in the name of the lead administrators.  Of the cases identified, only one case was 
not listed under the “Lehman” search and the schedule was updated accordingly.  Second, 
a search of the term “Lehman” was undertaken against the Westlaw database on 19 
November 2015 and the cases listed double-checked against the schedule.  No omissions 
were found, so on this basis, the final list of 46 cases was deemed to be complete.   
 
The list of the 46 Lehman cases identified and a précis of the issues they considered is set 
out in Appendix 2.  These cases are further categorised in Appendix 3, following a 
preliminary review of the cases which enabled them to be placed into one of five (very 
general) categories as part of the process of establishing which cases were the most 
relevant to the Thesis.  The classifications are as follows: 
                                                          
50 See the 2007 structure chart <http://jenner.com/lehman/docs/barclays/LBEX-LL%202165164-2165176.pdf> 
accessed 12 July 2015. 
51 Firth Rixson (n 4). 
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1. Cases concerning matters of contractual or statutory interpretation; 
2. Hearings on minor matters; 
3. Cases relating to schemes of arrangement or other settlements; 
4. Pension cases; and 
5. Cases on priorities. 
 
A similar exercise was undertaken using the term “MF Global” identifying cases from 1 
November 2011 onwards.  Ten cases were identified on the LexisNexis database.  The 
schedule of MF Global cases appears at Appendix 4. 
 
Methodology for identifying relevant US cases 
As discussed, LBHI was the ultimate parent company of LBIE52 and went into Chapter 11 
proceedings on 15 September 2008 in the US Court.53  Only cases after this date have 
been catalogued as being relevant to the bank’s insolvency proceedings. 
 
A search of the LexisNexis international database of the term “Lehman” on 25 February 
2016 produced 65 results.  The cases were identified through a search of the category 
“Federal Court Cases Combined” and the search further refined to include only US 
Bankruptcy court cases.  This seemed a surprisingly low number of returns when compared 
to the number of results obtained from the equivalent UK search.  In view of this, a search 
of the term “Lehman” was undertaken on the Westlaw international materials database, 
searching “All Content/ US Materials/ Cases/Federal Bankruptcy Courts/New York”.  This 
produced 290 results.  As the Westlaw database had produced a far greater number of 
hits, this source was considered to be more reliable than the LexisNexis database and was 
used as the basis for identifying relevant Lehman cases.   
 
Of the 290 hits, 171 related to cases heard after 15 September 2008.  These 171 cases 
were examined by reference to the description of the case that appeared on the database.  
Where the information was insufficient to determine whether the case was likely to be 
relevant for the Thesis, the link to the case transcript was followed and the case reviewed.  
A schedule of cases with a brief summary of the issues raised in each case was produced.   
 
                                                          
52 2007 structure chart (n 50). 
53 Firth Rixson (n 4). 
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This enabled the cases to be placed in one of three categories.  The first consisted of cases 
where the search term “Lehman” appeared in the case or the case report but did not relate 
to the investment bank’s Chapter 11 proceedings.  There were 51 of these cases and they 
required no further consideration.  The second category of cases were those which either 
cited one of the cases in the Lehman litigation or otherwise referred to the Lehman 
bankruptcy.  There were 73 cases in this category.  The final category of cases directly 
involved LBHI or LBI (a US subsidiary of LBHI).  There were 48 cases in this category and 
these were cross-referenced to the cases listed in the LexisNexis search; this only 
illustrated that there were gaps in the LexisNexis list and so the Westlaw list was 
definitively relied upon. 
 
The cases in the second category were reviewed to determine whether any were relevant 
to the Thesis either because of a cross-border issue or an issue involving intermediated 
securities.  Of these cases, ten related to MF Global, one of which was identified as 
requiring further analysis.  The remaining cases in the second category were deemed not 
relevant.  A précis of the 48 LBHI and LBI cases in the third category is set out in Appendix 
4. 
 
The LBHI and LBI cases were further classified in Appendix 5.  A preliminary review of the 
cases placed them into one of three (very general) categories as part of the process of 
establishing which cases were the most relevant to the Thesis.  The categories chosen 
were: 
1. Cases with a cross-border element and/or which considered issues relating to 
intermediated securities; 
2. Claims hearings on non-relevant matters; and 
3. Cases relating to settlements and administrative matters. 
 
To ensure that all relevant MF Global cases had been considered in addition to the ten MF 
Global cases produced as part of the Lehman search, a separate search was made of the 
term “MF Global” on the Westlaw database and a total of 51 cases were identified.  These 
are listed in Appendix 6.  A review of the 51 cases found only one likely to be relevant; 
this was the case identified as part of the Lehman search.   
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Structure 
The Thesis will follow the structure that flows from the questions identified.  The English 
Lehman cases that are deemed most relevant to the Thesis will be considered and any 
issues relating to the location of assets identified.  This will enable a conclusion as to the 
extent of the problems associated with the location of assets in the “real world” to be 
reached.  The MF Global case will be briefly reviewed as part of that discussion to provide 
an element of comparison and contrast.  The US position will then be considered before 
exploring the effectiveness and fairness of the existing regime and postulating how 
improvements to it might be achieved. 
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Chapter Three 
A critical review of the English case law  
 
Introduction 
The focus of this section is on the Lehman’s litigation with the MF Global cases being 
considered at the end of the discussion to see whether they can provide any insights not 
obtained from the Lehman’s study.  As it is not possible to consider the detail of the 46 
scheduled Lehman cases in this Thesis, only those identified as being most relevant to the 
question can be discussed.  A preliminary review of the cases enabled them to be placed 
into five, broad categories (see Appendix 3) of which the most important category for this 
Thesis is that of “cases concerning matters of contractual or statutory interpretation” 
(“Category 1”).  The remaining categories either concern specific issues (which at most 
have a tangential, rather than direct, relevance to the Thesis) or reflect relatively minor 
concerns.  The reasons why these cases have been distinguished for the purposes of the 
Thesis will be briefly considered. 
 
Discounted cases in categories 2-5  
The second category of cases comprised “Hearings on minor matters” and included 
applications on a number of issues such as costs, time extensions and stays.  Matters 
addressed were procedural rather than substantive and so these were quickly excluded.  
This same cannot be said for the cases in the remaining three categories, which have 
resulted in some important jurisprudence.  The third category “Cases relating to schemes 
of arrangement or other settlements” is not entirely irrelevant to the discussion insofar as 
the position of secured creditors was considered in the context of a proposed scheme of 
arrangement.  In Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in administration) (No2)54 
the administrators asked the court to consider whether the court could sanction a Part 26 
Companies Act 2006 scheme of arrangement between LBIE and the scheme creditors.  The 
proposed scheme was an attempt by the administrators to achieve a speedy resolution 
and a degree of certainty for a group of clients for whom it held property on trust.  The 
reason why the case is not relevant for the Thesis is because it was not disputed that the 
clients had a proprietary interest in the assets (intermediated securities) in question.  The 
administrators wanted to vary or extinguish certain property rights under the proposed 
scheme for reasons of expediency.  The court (quite correctly) held that the court had no 
                                                          
54 [2009] EWHC 2141 (Ch), [2009] All ER (D) 36. 
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jurisdiction to do this under Part 26; a decision subsequently affirmed by the Court of 
Appeal.55 
 
The fourth and fifth categories consisted of the pension cases and the cases on priorities.  
Both these groups of cases are irrelevant to the Thesis as they do not consider issues of 
location or proprietary effect.56  The final category of cases, being the priorities cases, is 
probably most interesting for the fact that, in 2015, seven years after Lehman became 
insolvent, it became apparent that certain subordinated unsecured creditors might receive 
a dividend payment.  This seems a remarkable outcome given the magnitude of the 
Lehman insolvency.  The cases considered, amongst other things, the position of claims 
against LBIE.57 
 
Refinement of Category 1 cases 
Having dispensed with the cases in categories 2-5, it became necessary to further refine 
the classification of cases within Category 1.  Some cases in Category 1 dealt with a 
particular issue (sometimes beyond the court of first instance) whilst other cases covering 
similar issues could, logically, be grouped together.  As a result, the Category 1 cases were 
sub-categorised as follows: 
 
1. The anti-deprivation case; 
2. The CASS rules cases; 
3. The RASCALs case; 
4. The ISDA Master Agreement cases; and  
5. The Extended Liens case. 
 
The classification has been used to pin-point those cases where issues that were critical 
to the resolution of the Lehman’s administration were considered.  Having done this, it 
                                                          
55 Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in administration) (No2) [2009] EWCA Civ 1161, [2010] 1 BCLC 
496. 
56 Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the jurisprudence from the pension litigation was extremely important.  
The question arose as to whether compliance with a Financial Support Direction served under the relevant 
pensions legislation should fall to be an administration expense for the relevant Lehman entities or should be 
treated as a provable debt.  Treatment as an administration expense would have benefited the members of the 
pension scheme but would have been extremely disadvantageous for the unsecured creditors.  Ultimately, the 
Supreme Court concluded that it was a provable debt.  See Nortel GmbH (in administration); In re Lehman 
Brothers International (Europe) (in administration) [2013] UKSC 52, [2014] AC 209. 
57 In re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in administration) (No 4) [2015] EWCA Civ 485, [2015] 3 WLR 
1205. 
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then becomes possible to distil the specific issues and isolate those most relevant for 
discussion in the Thesis. 
 
It is worth undertaking a brief analysis of the 46 cases identified at this point.  37% of the 
cases (seventeen cases) turned on matters of contractual or statutory analysis.  A further 
37% of the cases were categorised as “minor” cases and the remaining 26% (fourteen 
cases) turned on specific matters that were considered not to be directly relevant to the 
Thesis.  This might lead to an initial hypothesis that there will be little assistance gained 
from the Lehman litigation in answering the questions asked in this study.  This could be 
surmised on two grounds.  First, that only seventeen of the cases might possibly be 
relevant and second, the nature of the issues that arose in those seventeen cases.  The 
cases in Category 1 are linked by the fact that they appear to have dealt with the 
interpretation of English law contracts and statutes.  It is not immediately apparent that 
any questions as to the location of intermediated securities arose; to the extent that they 
have, they appear to have been addressed through the application of existing contractual 
rules.  The question as to which law should determine the proprietary effect of a particular 
transaction does not, at first blush, appear to have been in dispute at all.  
 
This hypothesis necessarily needs to be tested through a deeper examination of the cases.  
A number of the Category 1 cases raised issues of such complexity that they required 
consideration in the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court.  All of the cases in Category 
1 require further analysis to establish whether they raised any issues relating to the 
location of intermediated securities and, more specifically, whether they raised any conflict 
of laws issues in the determination either of the location of the intermediated securities in 
question or the proprietary effect of a particular transaction involving intermediated 
securities.  At the outset of this analysis, it is important to examine the jurisprudence to 
obtain an understanding of how Lehman ran its business; how and when were assets 
transferred between parties and, at any given moment, who was their legal owner?  Having 
completed this exercise, the Category 1 cases can then be examined, by class, in more 
detail. 
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Context: shortfall and identification problems in the early cases 
In terms of establishing the context of the enquiry, the early post administration cases are 
useful for understanding how Lehman carried out its business operations and managed its 
client accounts.  They also illustrate the immediate problems faced by its clients following 
its insolvency; unsurprisingly, shortfall and identification problems quickly arise. 
 
It is clear from the very first case that the location of the assets held by insolvent Lehman 
entities was a significant issue for its clients.  Within a few days of LBIE’s administration, 
RAB Capital Plc had applied to the court for directions to be given to the LBIE 
administrators that assets held by LBIE under custodian arrangements should be returned 
to it.  The judge (quite correctly) refused to make the order on the grounds that dealing 
with claims in the administration was a matter for the administrators rather than the court.  
He also noted that this was not a matter that could be quickly addressed, since LBIE was: 
 
“not the de facto custodian of the relevant assets.  Those assets are in New York 
where the sub-custodian is an American company in liquidation.”58 
 
In fact, the American company had been asked to return the assets, but at the date of the 
court hearing had not done so.  The cross-border nature of the custodian arrangements 
put in place by Lehman therefore became an immediate concern on its insolvency.  Typical 
questions for any company in this position would be: what if the insolvent American 
company did not have their assets (the shortfall problem) or, even if it did, failed to 
recognise the English company’s ownership (and therefore priority) and determined to 
apply the assets elsewhere in the insolvency?   
 
The cross-border implications of the Lehman prime brokerage arrangements also need to 
be considered.  These arrangements were explained in the second case in the 
administration, Four Private Investment Funds v Lomas and Others59 which also illustrates 
the extent of the authority granted to LBIE to use client assets for its own purposes.  The 
following extract from the case details the intercompany arrangements.  Clients placed 
securities with LBI: 
 
                                                          
58 RAB Capital Plc v Lehman Brothers International (Europe) [2008] EWHC 2335 (Ch), [2008] BCC 915 [6]. 
59 [2008] EWHC 2869 (Ch), [2009] BCC 632. 
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“as their “prime broker” as security for the payment and performance of their 
obligations and liabilities to any Lehman Group Entity.  LBI… transferred the 
securities to LBIE which was authorised under the contractual arrangements to 
make loans to the [clients] and provide other services….  LBIE was authorised to 
lend the securities to itself or others, and to pledge, re-pledge, hypothecate and 
rehypothecate them.”60 
 
Thus the prime brokerage clients were also exposed to the real possibility of a shortfall in 
the recovery of their assets particularly where rehypothecation by LBIE may have passed 
their assets beyond LBIE’s ownership.  In Four Private Investment Funds, the applicants 
wanted the court to direct the LBIE administrators to provide them with more information 
about their securities.  The issue for the investment funds was not so much about requiring 
immediate repayment, but more about satisfying themselves that their assets were still 
available so that they could update their own investors and ensure that confidence was 
maintained in their own institutions.  The judge (again, quite correctly) refused to make 
the order on the basis that administration was a collective process and the administrators 
were required to perform their functions in the interests of the creditors as a whole; it was 
not for the court to interfere with the day to day running of the administration in a case 
such as this, where there was no suggestion that the administrators were behaving 
improperly. 
 
The judgment is more important here, however, for explaining how Lehman entities held 
securities on behalf of clients.  In the UK, LBIE held securities lodged by clients by way of 
collateral in a pooled client account, so that assets belonging to a number of different 
clients were mixed.61  In the US, it was not just client monies that were mixed: 
 
“US securities traded, received or held by LBIE for its clients or for its own account 
were generally held in a single “omnibus” account at the Depositary Trust Company 
(the “DTC”) in the United States managed by LBI.”62 
 
The particular issue raised for clients with securities in the omnibus or pooled accounts 
was that of the “identification” problem; how did they know which securities were theirs?  
                                                          
60 Ibid [6]. 
61 Ibid [20]. 
62 Ibid [22]. 
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This problem was potentially worse for clients in the US, since both client and LBIE monies 
were mixed.  Inevitably, the collective nature of the administration in the UK and the US 
Chapter 11 proceedings would at best mean a delay for clients in retrieving their assets 
and at worst mean that their assets might not be available at all (the “shortfall” problem 
once again). 
 
This preliminary work provides the backdrop against which the Category 1 cases can now 
be considered.  Understanding the processes and mechanisms that supported the Lehman 
financial operations is critical to the Thesis as it will be necessary to determine whether 
the movement of intermediated securities between the various parties involved in any 
transaction under scrutiny has a contractual or a proprietary effect.   
 
The Category 1 cases: anti-deprivation63  
The first case for analysis is the anti-deprivation case (“BNY Trustee”).  It came to court 
in England in November 2009 and was ultimately determined in the Supreme Court in July 
2011.  A superficial examination of its facts suggests that it is a relevant case for Thesis 
because it addressed issues relating to the location of collateral held by a custodian in a 
securities account.  In fact, although location was an issue, the case ultimately turned on 
the drafting of certain contractual terms under a complex structured finance arrangement, 
which will be briefly explained. 
 
LBIE had set up a programme designed to provide credit insurance for Lehman entities; 
essentially, this was a credit default swap.  The model involved the issue of loan notes to 
investors by a Lehman company issuer which was incorporated in a tax efficient 
jurisdiction.  The cash generated from the loan note issue was used by the issuer to buy 
government bonds and other securities (the “collateral”).  The collateral was lodged with 
a trustee which held it on behalf of the issuer.  At the same time, the issuer entered into 
a swap arrangement with a Lehman entity (in the present case, Lehman Brothers Special 
Finance Inc (“LBSF”)) as its swap counterparty.  LBSF received the yield on the collateral 
and in return paid the issuer the equivalent amount of the interest and capital due to the 
noteholders.  The collateral was charged in favour of the trustee as security for the issuer’s 
obligations to the noteholders and to LBSF.   
                                                          
63 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd [2009] EWHC 1912 (Ch), [2009] 2 BCLC 400.  
Note that the abbreviation of this case has been chosen for consistency rather than convention as, ultimately, 
Belmont rather than Perpetual pursued the litigation to the Supreme Court. 
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This might appear straightforward, but there was a catch in the security entitlement 
arrangements which was the issue in this case.  In the event of the insolvency of LBSF,64 
the respective priorities of the noteholders and LBSF were reversed, so that the 
noteholders, rather than LBSF, were to be paid out first.  Following the insolvency of LBSF, 
the representatives of the noteholders brought a claim against the trustee demanding that 
the collateral be realised to redeem amounts outstanding on the notes in priority to any 
claim of LBSF.  Unsurprisingly, this position was contested by LBSF.  On the face of it, this 
was a simple contractual dispute between two parties as to the true construction of the 
documents. 
 
At this point, it becomes necessary to introduce the US aspects of the case and the basis 
on which LBSF contested the noteholders’ position.  Although the transaction documents 
were governed by English law,65 the parties to the transaction were not all based in 
England.  LBSF, for example, was a US company incorporated in Delaware with its principal 
office in New York.  LBSF did not accept that the noteholders had priority and brought a 
complaint against the trustee (which held the collateral) in the US court.  Although the 
trustee was a subsidiary of a US bank, it was incorporated in England and so based in 
England rather than the US. 
 
Thus began two different strands to the case, one running in the US court and one in the 
English court.  In the US, LBSF contended that the noteholders were prohibited from 
relying on the priority provisions set out in the transaction documents as they had the 
effect of modifying the interest of a debtor as a consequence of the bankruptcy filing and 
that this was in breach of the protection afforded by Chapter 11.66  In the UK, LBSF 
contended that the noteholders could not rely on the contractual terms giving it priority 
over the collateral on insolvency, since it was against public policy to contract out of the 
mandatory provisions of the Insolvency Act 1986, following the British Eagle case.67  At 
first instance, the Chancellor held that the British Eagle principle was not engaged by the 
terms of the transaction documents.68  LBSF appealed, but lost in both the Court of Appeal 
                                                          
64 LBSF went into Chapter 11 proceedings on 3 October 2008, BNY Trustee (n 63) [3]. 
65 With the exception of those relating to the purchase of collateral, which was irrelevant. 
66 BNY Trustee (n 63) [4]. 
67 Ibid [6], following British Eagle International Airlines v Compagnie Nationale Air France [1975] 1 WLR 758. 
68 BNY Trustee (n 63) [65]. 
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and the Supreme Court.69  The Supreme Court concluded that the contractual agreement 
to reverse the priorities in the event of the insolvency of LBSF was not contrary to public 
policy.  Where there was no intention to evade the insolvency legislation, the courts 
should, it was held, give effect to the contractual arrangements of the parties involved. 
 
Although the BNY Trustee case was significant for its consideration of the scope of the rule 
that is variously described as the “anti-deprivation” rule or the rule from British Eagle, it 
does not obviously assist in answering the questions posed by this Thesis.70  Despite this, 
there is one aspect of the case that merits an observation.  In January 2010, Judge Peck, 
sitting in the US Court, held that the same contractual provisions that were upheld in 
England were in breach of the US Bankruptcy Code.71  Despite this and the subsequent UK 
Supreme Court affirmation of the conflict between the approaches of the English court and 
the US court, there the US litigation of this case ended.  Why?  The Perpetual noteholders 
and LBSF settled their dispute, although the Belmont noteholders did not.  (It has not been 
possible to find any details of the terms of the settlement on the record that might shed 
light on the discussion, but it is plain that the Perpetual noteholders were not represented 
in the Supreme Court proceedings.) 72   
 
It is possible that the reason why LBSF chose not to pursue proceedings in the US was 
because the collateral was held by an English incorporated trustee situated in England.  As 
a practical matter, if the collateral was determined as being located in England, its 
relocation to the US would have required LBSF to obtain a US judgment to the effect that 
LBSF was entitled to the collateral and for the English court then to recognise and enforce 
that judgment in England.  Even if LBSF had obtained a US judgment, the opposing 
approach to the anti-deprivation principle taken by the English court might suggest that 
difficulties would have arisen with recognition and enforcement of the US judgment, which 
would have led to cost and delay.  So it is possible that the location of the collateral was 
                                                          
69 Belmont Park Investments PTY Limited v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 1160, [2009] 
All ER (D) 87; Belmont Park Investments PTY Limited v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd [2011] UKSC 38, 
[2011] All ER (D) 259. 
70 It has been argued that the Court of Appeal conflated the anti-deprivation principle and the pari passu rule in 
this case (see, for example, Davies J ‘The Nature and Scope of the Anti-Deprivation Rule in the English Law of 
Corporate Insolvency – Part One’ International Corporate Rescue, Special Issue (Chase Cambria Company 
(Publishing) Ltd 2011).  The two rules are distinct: the anti-deprivation rule determines the size of the pie, 
whereas the pari passu rule determines how much of the pie each party will get. 
71 Re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc 422 BR 407 (US Bankr SDNY 2010). 
72 Orrick, Herrington and Sutcliffe LLP ‘Lehmans reaches settlement with Perpetual in Dante case’ 
<www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=e999cbae-b6a4-410b-b8e7-3bcfdf1e1ff8> (accessed 5 February 
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a factor in the outcome of the litigation, even if it the question of location was not an issue 
in the case. 
 
Category 1 cases: the CASS rules cases 
Four cases concerned the so-called “CASS rules”.73  The CASS rules were issued by the 
Financial Services Authority (“FSA”) in its capacity as regulator of the financial services 
industry in the UK and set out the basis on which client money should be held by financial 
institutions.  All of these cases dealt primarily with determining whether cash held by LBIE 
fell within the scope of the CASS rules and belonged to secured creditors or formed part 
of the general assets available to unsecured creditors. 
 
The first of these cases was the International Prime Brokerage Agreement (“IPBA”) charge 
case.74  LBIE had taken on prime brokerage arrangements for a number of hedge funds 
under standard form documentation in the form of the IPBA charge.  In this capacity, LBIE 
had entered into two types of arrangement with its counterparties: title transfer 
arrangements and security transfer arrangements.  Under the former arrangements, LBIE 
had absolute ownership of the assets whilst under the latter, LBIE held the assets as 
custodian, an arrangement that would be understood as a trust as a matter of English law 
(as discussed in Documents 3 and 4).   
 
As a practical consequence of LBIE’s work as a prime broker, it received cash in respect 
of the securities that it held as custodian.  There were various reasons for these cash 
receipts, for example, where securities were redeemed in exchange for cash or LBIE 
received dividend payments and so forth.  The difficulty for the beneficiary under the 
custodian relationship was that the IPBA charge specifically excluded any cash receipts 
from the custodian relationship.  Any cash sums were simply non-segregated and did not 
form part of the client money.  Whilst this arrangement might seem surprising in hindsight, 
it was not specifically prohibited by the provisions of the CASS rules and reflected the 
commercial reality of the market place.  This was that, as prime broker, LBIE had a right 
of use over the counterparty’s assets for its own ends and profit subject to certain 
                                                          
73 The CASS rules were the rules set out in the Client Assets Sourcebook.  At the time, these gave effect to 
Council Directive 2004/39/EC of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments [2004] OJ L 145/1.  
74 In the Matter of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in administration) and RAB Market Cycles (Master) 
Fund Limited [2009] EWHC 2545 (Ch), [2009] All ER (D) 313. 
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contractual obligations to the counterparty. 75  These were to provide the counterparty 
with equivalent securities and, failing that, a cash sum.76   
 
Nevertheless, the legal effect of this arrangement was that a beneficiary under a custodian 
arrangement whose intermediated securities were turned into cash, lost its beneficial 
proprietary interest in the securities and found it replaced with a lesser contractual right 
to prove for the debt in LBIE’s insolvency.  The judge had no difficulty in determining that 
the holding of securities as custodian amounted to a trust under the IPBA charge,77 but it 
was less clear that the cash held by LBIE after its insolvency was subject to the same 
protection.  The judge held that it was, on the ground that the parties, had they put their 
minds to it, would have implied such a term into their agreement; the alternative was that 
cash receipts were a windfall to LBIE on its insolvency.78   
 
This case is instructive for the fact that it addresses issues of fairness. The judge 
considered that it was imperative for the administrators to pay the beneficiaries under the 
custodian arrangements the necessary cash sums to reflect the amounts due in respect of 
their securities.  This was the only way to “remedy the injustice which the retention of that 
windfall [by LBIE] would otherwise bring about.” 79  Although it is not possible to explore 
this point in greater detail in the Thesis, it could be considered that there are two types of 
fairness in issue in this context.  Here, it was considered unfair by the court that LBIE 
should obtain a windfall.  This idea appears to be rooted in the concept of unjust 
enrichment, yet, technically, a sophisticated party who has contracted to allow its assets 
to be rehypothecated could have no legitimate expectation to be anything other than an 
unsecured creditor in the circumstances that transpired in this case.  In contrast, a party 
who has contracted on the basis that its assets are held on trust would be treated unfairly 
if the trust arrangement was not honoured.  
 
The issue in the second CASS rules case (which went to the Court of Appeal and the 
Supreme Court) was slightly different.80  In that case, LBIE had failed to identify client 
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76 Ibid [38]. 
77 Ibid [72]. 
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80 Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in administration) [2009] EWHC 3228 (Ch), [2010] 2 BCLC 301; 
Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in administration) [2010] EWCA Civ 917, [2010] All ER (D) 15; Re 
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money and, as a consequence, failed to segregate it as was required under the CASS rules.  
This meant that money that should have been held on trust for clients in the period prior 
to its insolvency, was not.  It also meant that it was unclear whether those clients whose 
monies had not been segregated could benefit from the client money pooling 
arrangements and the pari passu application of those funds that existed under the CASS 
rules.  The pooling arrangements and pari passu application were specifically intended to 
address the possibility of a shortfall in the client monies held by LBIE in the event of its 
insolvency.  LBIE’s failure to segregate monies was significant: US$3 billion worth of client 
money claims were brought in respect of an actual holding of US$2.16 billion.81 
 
It would be wrong to suggest that this second CASS rules case was not extremely 
important; it was.  There was an enormous amount of money at stake and, at first instance 
alone, more than 70 separate issues were raised by the administrators and considered 
both in extensive written submissions and in the course of twelve days’ oral argument.82  
The fact that the case was subsequently appealed is a further indication of its importance, 
as is the fact that there was no consensus on certain points either in the Court of Appeal 
or in the Supreme Court.  Despite this, the case does not assist in answering the questions 
that are the subject of this Thesis other than, perhaps, to raise a question of fairness.  The 
case is useful for its consideration and reiteration of the English law of trusts and for its 
brief consideration of the application of the CASS trust as a matter of Scottish law, but 
that is all.83  The legal analysis relating to the English law of trusts remains unchanged.  
Without the creation of a trust, segregation of funds alone would not be sufficient to give 
a party priority over those funds for the purposes of UK insolvency law.84   
 
In order to understand the possible “fairness” issue, the outcome of the case should be 
briefly outlined.  The case turned on the construction of the CASS statutory trust.  In the 
Supreme Court it was unanimously held that the statutory trust arose on receipt by LBIE 
of the money.85  The Supreme Court also had to consider two additional issues first, 
whether the pooling arrangements (whereby funds belonging to secured creditors would 
                                                          
81 EWHC 3228 (n 80) [2]-[4]. 
82 EWHC 3228 (n 80) [13]-[14]. 
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85 Ibid [62] (Lord Walker). 
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be pooled and shared pari passu) applied to client money held in its general, non-
segregated “house” accounts and second, whether the monies in the pool should be shared 
out on a “claims” or a “contributions” basis.  The “claims” basis anticipated that monies in 
the pooled accounts should be shared amongst all those clients whose funds should have 
been segregated at the time of LBIE’s insolvency, whilst the “contributions” basis would 
allow the pooled funds to be shared only with those clients whose funds had been 
purposely segregated under the CASS rules.  It was ultimately held that the claims basis 
applied.  This was upheld on the basis that distribution under general trusts law could be 
distinguished from the CASS trust, which envisaged a particular model of distribution.  The 
approach taken in construing the CASS rules was a purposive one; the intention of the 
CASS rules was to protect those who had deposited monies with the firm.86  Whilst this 
approach does seem fair, bearing in mind that the failure of LBIE to segregate monies had 
resulted in both a shortfall and an identification problem for its clients, it is not without 
controversy.  On a purposive interpretation, the CASS distribution rules provided a 
mechanism to share fairly the limited assets available amongst all the relevant parties 
regardless of whether they had been properly protected by LBIE or not.  Nonetheless, this 
conclusion flew in the face of a standard trust arrangement which would only have 
recognised as beneficiaries those parties who had made contributions. 
 
Category 1 cases: the RASCALS case 
RASCALS was the acronym used for the LBIE working group on the Resettlement and Safe 
Custody and Global Settlement of securities.  This group had been put in place to address 
specific regulatory problems arising as a consequence of having a “hub” company dealing 
with the acquisition, sale and lending of securities in a particular geographical area. 87  
There were two RASCALS mechanisms, one automatic and the other manual.  The 
mechanisms applied to the trades undertaken between LBIE as a “hub” company and third 
party clients (colloquially referred to as “the street”) in which LBIE used assets beneficially 
owned by certain of its affiliates.  The transactions were title transfer arrangements 
effected by book entries.  As far as the world was concerned, LBIE was the title holder for 
the purpose of dealing with the street, even if the beneficial interest in the assets it held 
in fact lay with one of LBIE’s affiliates.  Sums due as between LBIE and the affiliates were 
approximated with each leg of the title transfer arrangement leading to a rough off-setting 
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of amounts due between the parties.  Final settlement between LBIE and the affiliate took 
place, automatically, at the point at which the securities were sold back to the street.88  
 
The problem was that, following LBIE’s insolvency, the automatic processes did not stop 
and carried for just over a week.  When the automatic process was stopped, the 
outstanding title transfer arrangements had their second leg scheduled for that day.89  
LBIE claimed all the securities that it held for itself whilst the affiliates claimed that they, 
in fact, were beneficially entitled to the securities. 
 
Once again, the case turned on whether the affiliates could demonstrate that LBIE held 
the securities on trust for them.  At first instance, it was held that the RASCALS programme 
amounted to an intention by the parties that LBIE held the beneficial interest of the 
“rascalled” securities on trust for the affiliates.  This was because the programme had been 
created to enable certain global functions of the bank to take place and this required LBIE 
to contract with the street on behalf of various affiliates.  Thus the RASCALS programme 
established the necessary certainty of intention to establish a trust.  The judge, relying on 
Hunter v Moss90 was satisfied that the necessary certainty of subject matter existed to 
give effect to a valid trust even though the securities in question were held in various 
pooled accounts.91  It is important to note that, quite correctly, the judge did not consider 
that any title transfer arrangements in place prior to the RASCALS programme would have 
created a trust.  This is entirely consistent with general trusts law.  The Court of Appeal 
approved this decision.92   
 
Once the existence of the trust was established, a second question arose as to whether, 
at the time of LBIE’s insolvency it held the beneficial interest in the securities for itself or 
for its affiliates.  The Court of Appeal dismissed LBF’s appeal, holding that LBIE held the 
interest for itself.  This turned on whether, in acquiring securities from the street as the 
first leg (the “on-leg”) of the title transfer, the various off-setting approximations 
amounted to payment by LBIE; LBIE claimed beneficial ownership on the basis that it had 
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paid for them without receiving the benefit of the second leg (the “off-leg”) part of the 
transaction. 93 
 
The judgments are instructive for readers who are not investment bankers.  The 
discussions in the case included some extremely interesting background information as to 
how LBIE and the wider Lehman entities ran their business.  The analysis of the case here 
has been greatly simplified and a number of specific issues not considered (the nuances 
associated with manual RASCALS, for example, have not been discussed).  Other than 
addressing the necessity of establishing certainty of intention and subject matter in 
establishing a trust, this case offers little material that will assist in answering the 
questions raised in this Thesis.  One point that was picked up by Mr Justice Briggs in both 
this case and the RAB Market Cycles case was the importance of the decision in Hunter v 
Moss94 in establishing certainty of subject matter for those with interests in pooled funds 
following the analysis of beneficial co-ownership.95 
 
Category 1 cases: The ISDA Master Agreement cases 
Before the ISDA Master Agreement (“Master Agreement”) cases are considered in any 
detail, it is necessary briefly to explain the development of the Master Agreement and its 
place in the financial markets.  This will inform the discussion of the transactions that were 
in issue in this group of cases, so that, where necessary, the proprietary effect of particular 
transactions can be properly understood. 
 
The Master Agreement is, essentially, a standard form document used in the financial 
services industry that was developed by the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association (“ISDA”) in the early 1990s and has from time to time been amended (most 
relevantly for the Lehman cases, in 2002).  Its intention is to provide legal certainty and 
reduce credit risk in the swaps and derivatives markets, largely through ensuring the 
enforceability of arrangements for the provision of collateral as well as the enforceability 
of netting arrangements.96  The Master Agreement standard terms form part, but not the 
whole, of any particular swap or derivative contract between the parties; the whole 
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contract comprises the Confirmation, the Master Agreement and the Schedule with the 
contract being interpreted by reference first the Confirmation, then to the Schedule and 
lastly to the Master Agreement.97 
An examination of the cases illustrates that the issues at stake related to the interpretation 
of specific clauses in the Master Agreement.  In Firth Rixson,98 the issue was whether 
LBIE’s default under certain swap arrangements (which was caused by its insolvency) 
meant that its swap counterparties were obliged to pay sums due to LBIE under the swap 
agreements.99  It was held at first instance and in the Court of Appeal that they did not.  
For as long as there was an uncured event of default, the non-defaulting counterparties 
had no obligation to pay LBIE.100   
 
The facts in Carlton101 were broadly the same as those in Firth Rixson and so both cases 
were appealed together.  In the Court of Appeal, the question from Carlton arose as to 
whether section 2 of the Master Agreement engaged the anti-deprivation principle.  This 
was on the basis that the suspension of the non-defaulting party’s obligation to make 
payments under the swap whilst the event of default was continuing, prevented the 
recoverability of assets belonging to the bankrupt’s estate.  This would, therefore, 
disadvantage creditors.  The Court of Appeal had the advantage of being able to apply the 
Supreme Court decision in BNY Trustee102 and was satisfied that the anti-deprivation rule 
was not engaged.  On the facts, there was no intention to avoid the insolvency legislation 
and whilst the outcome might be “criticised as imperfect… it cannot be said to be 
uncommercial”.103 
 
The last three cases for consideration in this category address a number of technical 
points.  The Commodity Services case concerned the interpretation of a letter of credit 
governed by English law and a Master Agreement governed by New York law. 104  The 
parties sought a determination as to whether Calyon could set-off sums due from Lehman 
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Brothers Commodity Services against its own obligation under the letter of credit.  It was 
concluded that Calyon could do so.  In contrast, in Anthracite, the court had to consider 
the meaning and effect of the early close out provisions in two derivatives contracts that 
incorporated the 1992 Master Agreement.105  This required a highly technical analysis of 
the terms of both agreements (requiring the judge to refer to principles of contractual 
interpretation).  Anthracite had issued loan notes and had protected the principal sum by 
entering into derivatives contracts (credit default swaps) with Lehman Brothers Finance 
SA (“LBF”) to ensure that in the event of early redemption, it would have the necessary 
cash available to repay them in full.  LBF was eligible for certain regular payments under 
the arrangement and, recognising that these may be reduced in the event of early 
repayment, entered into an agreement with Anthracite that it would be compensated by 
way of an early termination cash settlement amount.  Ironically, LBF’s insolvency caused 
a default in the derivatives agreement and triggered an early redemption event.  
Anthracite claimed against LBF whilst LBF denied the claims and claimed the early 
termination cash settlement amount.  It was held that LBF was not entitled to receive the 
early termination sum.106  The judge considered the mechanisms for calculating the loss 
suffered by the parties concluding that the “value clean” principle applied. 
 
The “value clean” principle was given further consideration in the Lehman Brothers Finance 
case in the Court of Appeal. 107  In this case, the court had to determine whether a Side 
Letter formed part of the Master Agreement for the purpose of determining certain close 
out amounts on the termination of various intercompany swaps and derivatives contracts.  
These contracts had been entered into between LBIE and other Lehman entities and had 
been recorded electronically as intercompany accounting entries rather than by way of 
paper transaction confirmations.  In the Court of Appeal the issue arose as to the place of 
the Side Letter in determining the value of a replacement contract when it came to 
determining the close out losses.  Should the contractual terms of the Side Letter be 
assumed to be terms in any replacement contract?108  LBIE claimed that these were 
material terms whilst LBF claimed that the valuation required the Side Letter to be 
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excluded on the basis that a “value clean” approach required an assumption that conditions 
had been fulfilled.  Overturning the judgment at first instance, the Court of Appeal held 
that the Side Letter should be taken into account.  At first instance, the judge had 
considered that taking the terms of the Side Letter into account would be inconsistent with 
the value clean approach.  The Court of Appeal disagreed, largely because the 
jurisprudence until that time had referred to the 1992 Master Agreement and in this case, 
the 2002 Master Agreement had been used.  The same approach could not be taken to 
the 2002 Master Agreement since it was worded differently to the 1992 Master Agreement. 
None of these cases raises any issues that relate to the location of assets nor did they 
consider any issues as to the proprietary effect of any particular transactions.  
 
Category 1 cases: The Extended Liens case109 
Although this is the last case in this category, it is one of the more interesting cases for 
the purposes of the Thesis.  It was a wide ranging judgment that addressed issues of:  
 
“the interpretation, characterisation, validity and present effect of what may loosely 
be described as security provisions in two standard form documents.”110 
 
At the outset, the judge referred to two unusual features of the case.  The first of these 
was that the security interest was described as a “general lien”.  This seemed an 
incongruous term in the context, since, as a matter of English law, liens are best described 
as arising by operation of law and so they are generally not considered to be a consensual 
form of security; further, a general lien is a form of legal lien that works to protect trade 
creditors.111  A legal lien is a possessory security interest which most usually arises where 
a bill for the provision of services is unpaid, enabling the provider of services to refuse to 
release the property until the bill is paid.112  As the judge observed, the general lien in this 
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case had the usual associated rights of retention and sale, yet was used to create a security 
interest in intermediated securities.113   
 
The second unusual feature was that the security interest was not just intended to secure 
the debts owed by LBF to LBIE, but also to secure LBF’s debts to an imprecisely defined 
group of LBIE’s affiliates within the Lehman Group.  In addition, the terms on which the 
general lien was established were unclear.114  This second issue was dealt with quite 
quickly; it was held that it was not conceptually impossible for such an arrangement to 
exist in that there was no requirement for a chargee (here LBIE) to be a fiduciary or trustee 
of the creditor (here the creditors were LBIE’s affiliates).  Briggs J held that it was enough 
for the chargee to have an enforceable right to be able to appropriate the charged assets 
in respect of the specified obligation.115   
 
Thus the first point for consideration was the characterisation of the interest created.  
Preliminary discussion considered the nature of a lien, but it was quickly determined that 
this was not relevant as the arrangement was most obviously characterised as a floating 
charge.116  As discussed in Document 4, this was relevant because the securities were 
used in transactions which fell within the definition of security financial collateral 
arrangements under the FCARS.117  Transactions under the FCARs are exempt from 
formalities, including registration requirements.  The rationale for eliminating formalities 
in financial collateral transactions was explained in the underlying FCD.118  The approach 
was designed to promote the efficiency of the financial markets.  As a matter of English 
law, the registration of company charges (including floating charges) is essential, since 
failure to register them in accordance with the provisions of Part 25 of the Companies Act 
2006 renders them invalid as against an administrator, liquidator or creditor of the 
company.119  The process of registration is, however, time consuming and impractical in 
the context of securities transactions as is any requirement for formal, written transaction 
documentation; dispensing with these formalities is perceived to be advantageous for 
market efficiency.  What is required under the legislative provisions is that the collateral 
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is under the collateral holder’s “possession and control”.  It was this aspect of the case 
that generated the most discussion. 
 
The case considered, in great detail, the development of the FCD.  This included a review 
of the travaux preparatoire.  The particular issue was what amounted to “possession and 
control” in the context of holding financial collateral.  Did the fact that the collateral 
provider could deal with the financial collateral held by the collateral holder (LBIE) mean 
that LBIE could not demonstrate the necessary possession and control for the charge to 
fall within the scope of the financial collateral arrangements?  If this was the case, then 
the floating charge would be invalid.  It was ultimately concluded that LBIE’s floating 
charge did not fall within the definition of a security financial collateral arrangement for 
the purpose of the FCARS.120  The judge concluded that, although LBIE held assets 
belonging to LBF that were subject to the charge in favour of LBIE and the affiliates, prior 
to the crystallisation of the charge these assets were held by LBIE as custodian.  The fact 
that LBF had not dispossessed itself of these assets, meant that they could not be regarded 
as being under LBIE’s possession or control for the purposes of the FCARS.121  
 
Analysis: answering question 1 
The first challenge for this Thesis was to find out whether practical legal problems have 
arisen because of difficulties in determining the law governing the location of intermediated 
securities following the failure of sophisticated financial institutions.  An analysis of the 
Lehman cases heard in the English courts would suggest they have not.  As the review of 
the cases in the previous section indicates, much of the discussion has concerned the 
contractual interpretation of complex financial documentation.  To the extent that the 
cases covered issues relating to the proprietary effect of particular transactions, these 
cases concerned transactions governed by English law and so principles of English law 
were applied.  There was much reiteration of the basis on which intermediated securities 
are held by intermediaries for their underlying beneficiaries as a matter of English law; 
namely on trust with the beneficiary retaining the equitable proprietary interest.  There 
have been no conflict of laws issues raised whereby one jurisdiction claimed that the 
proprietary interest in specified securities was determined by their law rather than the law 
of a different jurisdiction; the only case where location may have had an impact was the 
BNY Trustee case, but the question of location was not litigated.  The conduct of the 
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administration appears to have been both substantially and procedurally fair; as discussed 
at the beginning of the chapter, even unsecured creditors have received a dividend and 
the thoroughness of the legal argument undertaken suggests a rigorous process has been 
followed in determining claims.  The only major criticism that can be made as to the 
effectiveness of the process is in terms of the delays to creditors in receiving payments, 
but it is hard to see how this could have been avoided in view of the complexity of the 
financing arrangements in place. 
  
It was suggested at the outset of the analysis that what might be the case in one 
investment bank insolvency (albeit that the Lehman insolvency was the biggest the world 
has seen) may not be true for another.  So it could be the case that just because issues 
of location did not arise in the Lehman case, they may have arisen in other cases involving 
insolvent financial institutions which dealt with intermediated securities.  The only other 
investment bank insolvency that has happened in recent years is that of MF Global group 
which went into administration in the UK and Chapter 11 in the US in November 2011. 122 
 
The MF Global cases 
A database review of MF Global cases from November 2011 onwards, revealed ten cases.  
These cases were analysed to determine whether, unlike the Lehman cases, they had 
raised issues relating to the proprietary effect of certain transactions as a consequence of 
issues relating to the location of intermediated securities.  Following this analysis, it was 
clear that they did not.  The MF Global cases (perhaps unsurprisingly in view of the nature 
of the business undertaken by both institutions) covered similar issues to those raised in 
the Lehman litigation and only one case went beyond the court of first instance (and was 
not on an issue material to this Thesis).  Of the cases that touched on proprietary interests, 
two cases considered the CASS rules and followed the Lehman decisions123 and one was a 
request from the client money trustee for directions to enter into a settlement 
agreement.124 
 
 
                                                          
122 In fact it went into special bank administration under the Investment Bank Special Administration Regulations 
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45 
 
Conclusion 
The analysis supports a conclusion that the UK administration was fair and was as effective 
as it probably could have been in the circumstances.  The jurisdictional issues that might 
have been thought to arise on the failure of Lehman in relation to the location of 
intermediated securities and the proprietary effect of particular transactions did not, in 
fact, arise in the English cases.  This question now needs to be explored from the 
perspective of the US litigation to see whether the same conclusion can be drawn for that 
jurisdiction.  Following the US analysis, it will be necessary to identify the reasons why 
these theoretical issues did not arise. 
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Chapter Four 
A critical review of the US case law 
 
Introduction 
The initial hypothesis made before the process of reviewing the US Lehman cases began, 
was that few, if any, would prove to be relevant.  This was on the basis first, that the 
Lehman bankruptcy judge had entered into a cross-border protocol with a number of 
jurisdictions (the UK was not a party to this protocol) that enabled him to obtain: 
 
“a series of bi-lateral agreements that became essential building blocks for 
Lehman’s consensual plan”125 
 
which (it was assumed) reduced the number of complex issues going to trial (the “Lehman 
Protocol”).  Ultimately, two settlement agreements were entered into in April 2013; the 
first amongst the LBI Trustee, LBIE and the LBIE administrators126 and the second between 
the LBI Trustee and the LBHI entities.127   
 
A further reason for the hypothesis that few US Lehman cases would prove to be relevant 
was that litigation in the UK had not resulted in any relevant cases.  In many respects, the 
Lehman entities in the UK and US were similar in that they both used trans-national 
documentation, such as the Master Agreement, and this was either governed by English 
or New York law depending upon the jurisdiction of the relevant entities.  This suggested 
that, to the extent that issues arose in the US in the context of swaps and derivatives 
transactions, they were likely to be similar to those in the UK and to relate to matters of 
construction and interpretation.   
 
As the methodology for identifying the relevant US case law has already been explained, 
the cases derived from that exercise will now be explored.  Appendix 5 sets out the 
classification of the US Lehman cases, of which only cases in the first category, being 
“Cases with a cross-border element and/or which considered issues relating to 
intermediated securities” were deemed to be relevant to the Thesis.  Only one of the MF 
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Global cases scheduled in Appendix 6 was deemed to be fall into the same category,128 
resulting in a total of nine US cases for analysis.   
 
The ipso facto clause cases as they apply to jurisdiction 
The first US case with a cross-border perspective was heard in January 2010 when the US 
court made its determination of the matter that was also in issue in the English law BNY 
Trustee case.129  As previously discussed, the US court held that the “flip” clause was an 
unenforceable ipso facto clause, that any enforcement of the clause would be in violation 
of the automatic stay and that priority lay with LBSF.130  This was in direct contrast to the 
position established by the English court, which was that the contractual provisions were 
valid, effective and enforceable as a matter of English law and so established noteholder 
priority.  The US court reached its decision having considered the nature of the contract 
between the parties, concluding that it was an executory contract (being one where an 
element of performance remains due on both sides) and therefore one which could not be 
modified or terminated by an ipso facto clause under section 365(e) of the US Bankruptcy 
Code.131  Although this decision has been criticised in the US, it has not been the subject 
of an appeal.132 
 
It is worth noting at this point that the US court also considered the effect of the Safe 
Harbour provisions in section 560 of the US Bankruptcy Code in this case.  Bank of New 
York had contended that priority should be given to the noteholders on the grounds that 
they were in the position of a non-defaulting swap counterparty and were therefore 
protected by the Safe Harbour provisions.  The Safe Harbour provisions were important, 
because if they were deemed to apply, they would have enabled the contract to be 
terminated precisely because of the debtor’s (LBSF’s) insolvency.  Essentially, the Safe 
Harbour provisions protect the rights of a non-defaulting swap participant either to 
liquidate or terminate a swap transaction or to offset or net off any payment amounts due 
under the swap agreement in a case where the defaulting counterparty has become 
insolvent or entered into bankruptcy proceedings.  The US court held that there was no 
                                                          
128 In re MF Global Inc. 492 BR 407 (US Bankr SDNY 2013). 
129 In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.422 BR 407 (US Bankr SDNY 2010). 
130 Ibid 11. 
131 Ibid 7, 8. 
132 See, for example, the discussion in In the matter of Lehman Brothers Australia Limited (in Liquidation) NSD 
2102 [2011] [37]. 
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evidence that the noteholder priority arrangements formed part of the swap agreements 
in place.  This meant that they could not be protected under the Safe Harbour legislation.133 
 
In August 2015, the issues that arose in the BNY Trustee case were almost replicated in 
the Shield case,134 although the focus of the court in Shield was on the nature of the court’s 
jurisdiction.  LBSF claimed that Shield’s actions outside the US had a sufficient effect upon 
the position of LBSF within the US that the court was entitled it to exert its in personam 
jurisdiction over Shield.  Failing that, LBSF claimed that the court was entitled to exert its 
in rem jurisdiction, on the grounds that the proceedings concerned a dispute over property 
belonging to the LBSF estate.135  Needless to say, the transaction in question was complex. 
 
Shield was a Guernsey based company, whose ultimate parent was French.  It was the 
beneficial owner of a US $40 million note issued by an Irish company, “Ruby”.  Ruby had 
granted security over the US $40 million worth of assets to a Trustee to hold on behalf of 
the noteholders.  The assets themselves were held by a custodian based in England.  At 
the same time, Ruby had also granted a security interest over the same assets in favour 
of LBSF (involved in the transaction as Ruby’s counterparty in a credit default swap).  This 
was under the same style of ipso facto, or “flip”, clause that had been seen in the BNY 
Trustee case.  All the transaction documents were governed by English law and the forum 
and choice of law clauses required any disputes to be heard in England and governed by 
English law.136 
 
When LBHI went into insolvency proceedings, the default enabled Shield to terminate the 
swap.  Shield directed the Trustee to liquidate the collateral and make a distribution to 
Shield, which it did in May 2009.  In September 2010, LBSF began proceedings to contest 
the application of the collateral in favour of Shield.137 
 
Shield claimed that the US court had no in personam jurisdiction over it as it did not have 
minimum contacts with the US and the US court agreed138  The US court nonetheless 
asserted its in rem jurisdiction, based on the premise that it had “exclusive jurisdiction of 
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all the property, wherever located, of the debtor as of the commencement of such case 
[ibid] and of property of the estate”.139  According to the court, the property of the estate 
comprised the transaction documents as well as LBSF’s security interest in the assets held 
by the custodian. 
 
The approach of the US court to jurisdiction was reaffirmed in the ANZ Nominees case140 
where the facts and issues were similar to the Shield141 case.  ANZ Nominees was an 
Australian bank and the sub-custodian of collateral held as security in respect of certain 
notes issued by a company incorporated in the Cayman Islands.  The transaction 
documents were governed by either New York or Australian law and contained a flip clause 
under which the collateral would either go to LBSF (as swap counterparty) or the 
noteholders.  Following LBSF’s default, ANZ Nominees paid the noteholders and LBSF 
contested this on the basis that the ipso facto clause was unenforceable.142  Although 
counsel for ANZ Nominees successfully argued that the fact that it had not yet been proved 
that the ipso facto clause was unenforceable meant that LBSF could not claim a proprietary 
interest in the distributed funds for the purposes of establishing the court’s in rem 
jurisdiction, the court relied on both BNY Trustee and Shield for establishing that LBSF had 
a proprietary interest in the transaction documents and collateral.143 
 
The Shield and ANZ Nominees cases are useful for affirming the extent of the US court’s 
jurisdiction.  The cases make it explicit that the US bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction is far 
wider than that of other US courts which may “only exercise in rem jurisdiction over 
property physically within the court’s jurisdiction at the time of the suit”.144  Despite this, 
the cases are less instructive for the Thesis than might have been hoped.  Although all 
three cases have disputed the question of “who gets the assets on insolvency?” there has 
been no dispute as the location of those assets. 
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The ipso facto clauses in other contexts 
The BNY Trustee case was also considered in two other relevant US Lehman cases, the 
Ballyrock145 case and the Michigan State Housing Development Authority (“MDHSA”)146 
case.  The decision in BNY Trustee was followed in Ballyrock, where a swap agreement 
entered into by Ballyrock and LBSF was terminated on LBHI’s bankruptcy.  The issue arose 
as to whether a clause in the agreement which deprived LBSF of the right to collect a 
termination payment because of LBHI’s insolvency was an unenforceable ipso facto clause.  
It was held that the clause was unenforceable, directly applying the decision in BNY 
Trustee; the judgment also reiterated the point that such clauses were not entitled to 
protection under the Safe Harbour provisions.147 
 
In the MSHDA case, the decisions in BNY Trustee and Ballyrock were distinguished.  
MSHDA had entered into various interest rate swaps with a subsidiary of LBHI which were 
governed by an ISDA Master Agreement.  The issue arose as to whether a term in the 
contract which required certain liquidation procedures to be implemented in the event of 
LBSF’s bankruptcy that were more favourable to the non-defaulting party (here MSHDA), 
constituted an unenforceable ipso facto clause.148  It mattered to LBSF because, if LBSF 
could have used a different method for calculating the sums due under the swap (which it 
could have done if its bankruptcy filing were to be disregarded), it would have recovered 
a lot more money.   
 
The court considered the scope of the provisions of sections 365(e) and 560 of the US 
Bankruptcy Code.  In this case, it was the bankruptcy of LBSF which determined the choice 
of method to be used to calculate the settlement amount under the swap agreement.  The 
Safe Harbour provisions under section 560 specifically exclude swap agreements from the 
general rule that disallows ipso facto clauses, enabling any contractual right to liquidate a 
swap transaction to be exercised.  The court went on to explain how the MSHDA case could 
be distinguished from BNY Trustee and Ballyrock.  In BNY Trustee, the flip clause was in a 
supplemental agreement that was not part of the swap agreement and, in any event, it 
did not deal with issues of liquidation so fell outside the scope of section 560.  This was 
also the case in Ballyrock, where the provision in issue similarly changed the priority of 
payment rather than addressing the liquidation of amounts of due. 
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Although these cases deal with broadly the same issue, other than the cross-border aspect 
that arose in BNY Trustee, they add little directly to the questions being considered in this 
Thesis.  Critically, what has become clear from these cases, is the importance of the Safe 
Harbour rules and their importance in protecting swap transactions.   
 
Miscellaneous cases  
The Safe Harbour rules were also considered in the Swedbank case.149  The case was 
considered worthy of review for its cross-border aspects.  LBHI had held a deposit account 
with a Swedish bank, Swedbank, in Sweden.  LBHI had entered into various transactions 
with Swedbank including acting as guarantor in respect of various ISDA governed swap 
arrangements and had entered into a Master Agreement with Swedbank governed by 
English law.  At the date on which the LBHI Chapter 11 proceedings commenced, there 
were approximately 2 million Swedish Krona in the account.  By November 2009, the 
amount in the account had increased to approximately 83 million Swedish Krona (roughly 
US$11.7 million).  Swedbank sought to set off this sum against the sum of US$32 million 
which it claimed was owed to it by LBHI.  LBHI contended that Swedbank was in breach 
of the automatic stay and should release the funds in the account to LBHI. 
 
Swedbank claimed that it could rely on the Safe Harbour provisions governing swap 
transactions to net off the sums owed between the parties.  The US court nevertheless 
held that it could not do so, because there was no mutuality in the set-off claimed.  Much 
of the money that was in the account had been deposited post-petition and the debts and 
credits could not be said to be in the same right and between the same parties in the same 
capacity as was required under US law.150 
 
The difficulty here for the US court was that the money was not within the jurisdiction and 
so it would have required the assistance of the local Swedish court to recognise and enforce 
the US judgment and have the funds released.  Although there was a cross-border aspect 
to this case, as with the BNY Trustee litigation, the issues it raised are not of direct 
relevance to the Thesis. 
 
The second case that falls into the “miscellaneous” category is the Bank of America case, 
which similarly concerned set-off and provides a cautionary tale for anyone responsible for 
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drafting security documents.151  It was analysed less for its cross-border aspects than for 
its exposition of the behaviour of other banks towards the Lehman entities in the period 
before the group became insolvent.   
 
Bank of America was one of Lehman’s principal clearing banks.  Whilst it expected 
temporary negative balances to occur during the course of the banking day, in July 2008, 
it discovered that Lehman had a US $650 million overnight overdraft in one of its accounts.  
As a consequence, it negotiated a security agreement with LBHI that required LBHI to 
lodge cash collateral as protection against the intra-day overdraft risk it posed. 
 
After LBHI’s bankruptcy proceedings commenced, Bank of America removed funds from 
the cash collateral account to set against other obligations owed to it by LBHI, in breach 
of the automatic stay.  Bank of America contended that it was permitted to do this under 
the terms of the security agreement and claimed that this action was exempt from the 
automatic stay.  (As a matter of English legal practice, the Bank of America contention 
might be understood as arguing that a transaction specific covenant to pay clause in a 
debenture was intended to work as an all monies clause; it is unlikely that an English court 
would have accepted this argument.)  The issue was one of construction and the US court 
held that the security agreement did not cover indebtedness beyond the overdrafts and 
did not apply to obligations owed by LBHI to Bank of America under derivative agreements.  
Ultimately, the security agreement only protected the overdraft amounts; an irony that 
was not lost on the US court which referred to Bank of America “asking for more and 
getting less”.152  Bank of America had wanted additional protection for its position, yet had 
failed to draft a definition of “indebtedness” that would enable funds in the account to be 
applied as part of a general right of set-off.  Bank of America was required to return the 
funds. 
 
Although this case adds little directly to the questions being consider in the Thesis, it 
resonates with a number of the English law judgments that had to determine how certain 
complex transaction documents should be construed in the light of inadequate drafting. 
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The SIPA customer cases 
Three of the cases identified (two Lehman cases, the other the MF Global case) were 
considered potentially relevant for their discussion of repo transactions and the nature of 
possession.  All the cases revolved around the definition of who is a “customer” of a 
bankrupt broker-dealer for the purposes of protection under SIPA.153  The SIPC trust fund 
will compensate SIPA customers up to a specified amount for losses incurred by those 
customers as a consequence of having entrusted securities or cash to a broker-dealer 
which has become insolvent.154  The particular issue of whether claims constituted 
“customer” claims had arisen in a number of Lehman cases155 and, in the first Lehman 
case considered here, the representative claimants were three banks, described in the 
judgment as “typical of the class of claimants” asserting such rights (the “Three Banks” 
case).156   
 
The claimants had entered into various repo transactions governed by an industry standard 
Master Repurchase Agreement.157  The nature of these transactions has been discussed in 
Documents 3 and 4, but it makes sense briefly to outline a typical repo transaction (as 
described in the case) to put this case in context.  Essentially, there are two stages to a 
repo contract which are generally described as a “repo” from the seller’s perspective and 
a “reverse repo” from the buyer’s perspective.  Stage one requires the seller to transfer 
securities to a counterparty buyer in exchange for cash.  The buyer simultaneously agrees 
to transfer the securities back to the seller in exchange for cash at an agreed future date.  
At stage one, the value of the securities transferred is generally higher than the cash paid 
(this serves as protection against any market fluctuations) and when the original seller 
buys the securities back (stage two), the price will include a fee (the effect being equivalent 
to the payment of interest on a loan).158   
 
In the Three Banks case, the claimants were held not to be customers entitled to SIPA 
protection on the grounds that there was no property of the claimants in the claimants’ 
accounts with LBI on the date of its bankruptcy.  Appreciating this decision requires an 
understanding of the three types of delivery possibilities in these transactions.  The first 
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is the bilateral arrangement, whereby the securities are delivered against the payment of 
cash; the second is the “hold-in-custody” arrangement, whereby the purchased securities 
remain in a blocked account of the seller for the buyer until the repo ends; and third is the 
tri-partite arrangement whereby the buyer and seller enter into a contract with a third 
party which acts as intermediary between the counterparties.159   
 
In this case, the arrangements were all bilateral.  When assessing whether the claimants 
had “entrusted cash or securities” to the broker-dealer for the purposes of SIPA,160 the 
court had to look at whether or not there was “actual possession” of the cash or securities 
by the broker-dealer; explaining the term “entrustment” as “receipt, acquisition or holding 
of” the relevant asset and that the parties’: 
 
“contractual expectations and retained interests [were] insufficient in themselves 
to establish the key possessory elements that are needed to establish 
entrustment”.161   
 
On the facts, although LBI had set up delivery versus payment accounts for the various 
counterparties, it did not hold any assets in them.162  Because no customer property was 
entrusted to LBI, the claimants were not entitled to customer protection under SIPA.  The 
problem for the claimants was, of course, that LBI failed to meet its contractual obligation 
to return the securities to them under stage two. 
 
A similar issue arose in the US in the MF Global insolvency, only this time in the context 
of bilateral TBA contracts to buy and sell mortgage-backed securities.163  These kind of 
futures contracts work so that, during the period between the trade and settlement date 
(which can be several weeks) the parties enter into two contracts to obviate the need to 
actually deliver securities on the settlement date.  Under the first contract, A agrees to 
buy a specified number of securities at a specified price from B on the settlement date and 
under the second contract, A agrees to sell the same number of securities, at a different 
price to that specified under the first contract, to B on the settlement date.  On the 
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settlement date, it only then becomes necessary to pay the difference in the price between 
the paired contracts and this is done on a delivery versus payment basis.  This means 
that, during the period between the trade and the settlement dates, the parties continue 
to hold the property to be exchanged and the broker-dealer, which acts as intermediary, 
does not hold the property of either of the contracting parties.  It is clear from this that, 
at no time during the course of a TBA contract, are securities “entrusted” to the broker-
dealer for the purpose of SIPA.  Unsurprisingly, the claimants were held not to be SIPA 
“customers” and were not entitled to SIPC compensation.  The difference between this 
case and the Three Banks case was that, here, no securities had been transferred; rather 
MF Global had failed to make the payment due at the end of the contract. 
 
Both these cases illustrate that a party wishing to benefit from SIPC compensation could 
only do so in a case where it had lodged securities with a broker-dealer and where those 
securities were actually in the possession of that broker-dealer at the time of the 
insolvency.  This was reiterated in the final case in this category considered here and which 
involved interest rate swaps. 
 
In the second of the Lehman SIPA cases164 FirstBank had posted collateral with LBSF under 
a Master Agreement.  The Master Agreement allowed LBSF to appoint a custodian and, 
accordingly, it appointed LBI.  The Master Agreement also allowed LBSF to use the posted 
collateral.  The arrangements between LBSF and LBI were governed by a Master 
Repurchase Agreement (the “MRA”) under which the title to the posted collateral was 
deemed to pass to LBI.  LBI then used the posted collateral (that is, the collateral originally 
provided by FirstBank) to enter into various repo transactions, as it was entitled to do 
under the MRA.  LBSF was not obliged to repurchase the posted collateral, so the MRA 
included a close-out provision that required the immediate payment by LBSF of the agreed 
purchase price.  The LBSF-LBI repos were documented in the relevant stock ledger.  The 
failure of LBHI triggered an event of default under the swaps and terminated LBSF’s right 
to use posted collateral.  On the event of default, LBSF repurchased a number of its 
positions from LBI, but some remained outstanding.  LBSF ultimately failed to pay the 
amount necessary to repurchase the posted collateral.  The posted collateral had been 
used by LBI for a number of repo transactions that it had entered into with Barclays.  When 
Barclays purchased LBI’s assets in the days after its bankruptcy filing, it was agreed that 
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the repo transactions between Barclays and LBI would terminate.  The LBI assets were 
subsequently sold and the sale included the posted collateral.   
 
FirstBank’s claim that it was a SIPA customer failed for two reasons.  First, because the 
court held that LBI had not been “entrusted” by FirstBank (the relationship was one of 
“mere delivery”) and second, because LBI did not hold any of FirstBank’s posted collateral 
on the filing date (because it had been purchased from LBI by Barclays under a separate 
repo agreement).165 
 
What is interesting about these three cases for the Thesis is that they all addressed the 
issue of possession and, in the FirstBank case, the issue of location.  In FirstBank, the 
claimant argued that: 
 
“the modern indirect holding system for securities… is grounded on… interests in 
securities positions… and not on the physical location of securities.”166 
 
The court, it is submitted correctly, rejected FirstBank’s claim that its securities position 
should have been protected by the indirect holding system.167  This was on the grounds 
that LBSF was contractually entitled to rehypothecate the collateral that had been posted 
by FirstBank.  LBSF had then exercised its contractual rights by selling FirstBank’s 
collateral to LBI.  As LBI was not in a contractual relationship with FirstBank, so no claim 
could be made by FirstBank against it.168   
 
FirstBank’s claim is not supported by the law as it has been discussed in Documents 3 and 
4.  As with the Three Banks case, the FirstBank case demonstrates a real example of the 
“shortfall” problem, described earlier.169  At law, an absolute transfer of title had taken 
place and it was the location of the securities (which were then in the hands of LBI) that 
mattered for the purposes of determining ownership.170  FirstBank could identify the series 
of transactions through which its securities had passed, but had no right to reclaim them, 
                                                          
165 Ibid 9. 
166 Ibid. 
167 Ibid. 
168 A little like the old-fashioned game of “pass the parcel”.  If the music stops (default) and you are holding the 
parcel (collateral), it is yours.  If you have handed it on to someone seconds before the music stops, you have 
nothing.  Small children instinctively understand these rules and abide by them even if they seem unfair at times. 
169 Outlined at p7. 
170 Interestingly, the quotation from FirstBank refers to the “physical” location of the assets, albeit that they are 
intangible. 
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since the new absolute owner was LBI; FirstBank’s proprietary interest in the securities 
had been downgraded to a personal right to claim for their value. 
 
This example raises the question of the “fairness” of the rules, which is pertinent to the 
Thesis.  Was it unfair that FirstBank could not reclaim its securities from LBI and 
subsequently Barclays?  The court appeared to give short shrift to FirstBank’s arguments, 
stating that: 
 
“The loss FirstBank incurred was not due to the failure of its broker-dealer, but by 
its own failure to submit a claim against its counterparty or credit support 
provider”.171 
 
There are a number of questions raised by this statement.  Why did FirstBank not bring 
personal and proprietary claims against all those who might be potentially liable to it?  Was 
this a failure on the part of its legal counsel to give it good legal advice or was FirstBank 
acting on its own initiative?  Second, is the law in this area deficient?  Was FirstBank right 
to feel aggrieved that its property had been taken from it and passed on to someone else?  
Or was it enough to say that the law offered it alternative means of redress through a 
personal claim against LBSF and that the court knew, that, had it done so it would either 
have recovered in full, or had a greater chance of recovering in full? 
 
Conclusion on the US Lehman and MF Global cases 
Having completed a review of the US Lehman and MF Global cases, it is apparent that the 
hypothesis outlined in the introduction to this chapter was not entirely correct: the location 
of assets was an issue in some of the SIPA customer cases, albeit that it was not raised 
from a cross-border perspective.  An exploration of the US cases has identified that the 
theoretical shortfall problem caused by an intermediary having used a party’s securities in 
repo transactions for its own ends was a real world problem.  Although only two of the 
three SIPA customer cases discussed here involved a “loss” of securities as a consequence 
of them having been rehypothecated by the intermediary, there were two other SIPA 
customer cases listed in Appendix 4 which were not considered (due to the methodology 
adopted) but which may have been brought for the same reasons, bearing in mind Judge 
Peck’s remarks in the Three Banks case, that it was “the latest in a series of similar 
                                                          
171 FirstBank (n 164) 9. 
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proceedings”.172  It is clear that the SIPA customer claims were being pursued in order to 
obtain compensation from SIPC with a view to maximising the claimants’ chances of full 
recovery in the insolvency. 
 
Otherwise, there was little discussion in the cases as to the location of assets.  Where 
cross-border disputes have arisen, the law governing the location of the assets has not 
been disputed by the parties, rather they have disputed the question as to whom the 
assets in a particular jurisdiction belong.  In many of the cases, this has turned on the 
question of contractual interpretation and whether a clause will be determined to be an 
unenforceable ipso facto clause.   
 
Two further points are worthy of comment. It must be noted that, as a matter of US law, 
the US bankruptcy court has global jurisdiction.  This was reiterated in ANZ Nominees 
where the court cited section 431(a) of the US Bankruptcy Code and section 1334(e) of 
title 28 of the United States Code as confirmation that the US Congress “explicitly gave 
bankruptcy courts global reach over the debtor’s property”.173  This means that (in theory 
at least) location does not matter for US purposes; a US claimant can simply assert 
entitlement to its assets wherever they are in the world and the US bankruptcy courts will 
uphold the US claimant’s rights.  Clearly, as was noted in ANZ Nominees, local (practical) 
assistance is required for any such claim to be effective within the jurisdiction where the 
assets are to be found (in ANZ Nominees, for example, LBSF will still have to enforce the 
judgment of the US court in Australia).174  The raises the issue of cross-border judicial co-
operation which will ultimately determine whether the approach of the US bankruptcy 
court in claiming global jurisdiction in the application of US insolvency laws is effective and 
produces fair outcomes for all parties (and not just US based claimants).  This is essentially 
a matter of comity; will the US claimant’s interest be upheld by the local court?  (Although 
a more interesting question might be as to whether the US bankruptcy court would uphold 
a non-US claimant’s claim to contested property in the US).  Much work has been done in 
seeking to establish a universal approach to the recognition of parties’ rights on insolvency 
through the implementation of initiatives such as the UNCITRAL Model Law,175 but cases 
such as BNY Trustee illustrate that gaps remain. 
                                                          
172 Three Banks (n 156) 380. 
173 ANZ Nominees (n 140) 41. 
174 Ibid. 
175 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency 1997 United Nations. 
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The second point of note is that all the parties involved in these cases (other than in the 
SIPA customer cases) either understood or took for granted the rules relating to the 
location of assets, to the extent that they were relevant to understanding the rights of 
disputing parties’ to those assets, where those assets were intermediated securities.  The 
Safe Harbour provisions provided some comfort for those engaged in swap transactions 
by enabling their positions pre-default to benefit from close out netting.  This might 
suggest that the regime in place is effective, although this requires further consideration, 
as does the question as to whether the regime is fair.  FirstBank, it is submitted, did not 
think that the regime was fair, although the court considered that FirstBank was the author 
of its own misfortunes.176  The court’s view may well be correct; it seems likely that 
FirstBank was a sophisticated institution and would have been in a position to contract for 
the best terms ex ante.  This would indicate that the US approach was essentially fair. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
176 As will be seen in Chapter 6, approved unsecured claims against LBI received a dividend, even though 100% 
recoveries are not anticipated at the time of writing. 
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Chapter Five 
The Examiner’s Report 
 
Introduction 
The US case law has indicated that the shortfall problem was more than a theoretical one, 
as is evidenced by cases where certain institutions sought to establish that they were SIPA 
customers; they did this in order to be eligible for SIPC compensation, it is contended, to 
make good their losses.  For a fuller understanding of the wider US Lehman position, brief 
mention must be made to the Examiner’s Report produced by Anton R Valukas and 
published in March 2010.177  The broad purpose of the Examiner’s Report was to determine 
whether there were any “colorable” (that is, plausible) legal claims that could be brought 
against Lehman entities, executives or certain third parties.  The claims were referable to 
three heads: first, claims arising from Lehmans’ financial condition and failure; second, 
administrative claims or claims for preferences or voidable transfers; and third, claims in 
respect of specified transactions.178  Inevitably, much of the content of the Examiner’s 
Report (which ran to nine volumes) had no direct relevance to the Thesis.  Despite this, 
there were two elements of the Examiner’s Report that merit further discussion.  
 
Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) 
One of the issues that the Examiner’s Report specifically considered was whether any 
colorable claims could be brought against Barclays as a consequence of the transfer to 
Barclays of securities belonging to LBHI affiliates by LBI in the immediate aftermath of the 
Lehman’s collapse (see the FirstBank179 case above).  The Examiner concluded that no 
claim could be brought against Barclays for losses suffered by the LBHI affiliates on the 
grounds of an improper transfer.180  For FirstBank, this was a different issue from that 
discussed in the SIPA customer case, where FirstBank had sought to bring a claim against 
LBI.  This was about trying to establish whether the LBHI affiliates could bring a claim 
against third parties which had acquired their assets. 
 
The Examiner’s conclusion was based on an analysis of the conflict between state law 
(which generally determines the property interests in a debtor’s estate for the purposes 
                                                          
177 In re Lehman Brothers Holding Inc. (n 49). 
178 Examiner Report (n 49) Volume 1, Section I. 
179 FirstBank (n 164). 
180 Examiner’s Report (n 49) Volume 5, 2064ff. 
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of the US Bankruptcy Code)181 and the law governing the transaction, in this case, New 
York (“NY”) law which had enacted the revised Article 8 of the UCC on securities and 
securities entitlements.182  Under NY UCC section 8-110(b), it was the jurisdiction of the 
securities intermediary (here LBI) that governed whether the LBHI affiliates could bring a 
claim against LBI as securities intermediary for transferring assets to Barclays.  In order 
to bring a case against a third party, it had to be shown that Barclays had not only provided 
valuable consideration for the securities but also controlled them and further, that Barclays 
had colluded with LBI for the purposes of violating LBI’s obligations.183  On the facts, there 
was no evidence of collusion.  The discussion is relevant to the Thesis as the Examiner’s 
Report outlined the law that determines whether or not a proprietary claim could be made 
against a third party.  There was no dispute over the location of the assets in this instance; 
the parties agreed that Barclays had the necessary control over the assets to establish 
this. 
 
Specifically, the Examiner noted,  
 
“Article 8 substantially limits the right of “entitlement holders”, such as the LBHI 
affiliates to recover from third parties losses resulting from wrongful transfers of 
their securities by a securities intermediary”.184 
 
Thus the rights of the party which views itself as the ultimate beneficial owner of the 
intermediated securities has rights that are lesser than ordinary property rights.  Article 8 
specifically prohibits the entitlement holder from bringing a proprietary claim under the 
common law against the third party unless the securities intermediary has colluded in 
making an improper transfer.  Specifically, for FirstBank and any other parties whose 
securities had been sold on, there was no possibility of tracing into the hands of Barclays 
on the basis of a constructive trust as this was specifically prohibited by the statute.185  
Like the FCD, the policy objective is to smooth commercial transactions; in this case to 
ensure that third parties will only be pursued in cases where a strong claim can be brought 
                                                          
181 7632 11 U.S.C. § 363(b), 541(a) (2006) (US) available at https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/11/541 
(accessed 21 February 2016). 
182 Available at http://codes.findlaw.com/ny/uniform-commercial-code/ucc-sect-8-110.html (accessed 21 
February 2016).  The issue of jurisdiction under the UCC was discussed in Document 4. It is assumed that the 
Barclays securities were in a US account. 
183 NY UCC § 8-503 (US). Available at https://www.law.cornell.edu/ucc/8/8-503 (accessed 21 February 2016). 
184Examiner’s Report (n 49) Volume 5, 2067. 
185 NY UCC § 8-503(e) (US). 
62 
 
against them.  As has been observed in earlier documents, this policy objective is a 
manifestation of the tension between the protection of the ultimate investor and the 
requirements of an efficient market. 
 
As was seen in the FirstBank case, the rehypothecation of FirstBank’s assets (by first LBSF 
to LBI and then by LBI to Barclays) took effect under the contractual arrangements in 
place between the parties.  LBSF failed to pay the necessary funds to LBI for it to re-
transfer collateral to LBSF as part of FirstBank’s securities entitlement but as the transfers 
could not even be classified as “wrongful” there were no means for FirstBank to establish 
a claim.  In the absence of fraud or wrong doing, therefore, there is little that the ultimate 
investor in the position of FirstBank can do other than to contract for better ex ante 
protection, or failing that, claim in the insolvency and hope that the dividend will be as 
close to 100% as possible.  The only other possibility for a claimant in this position is that 
the state will intervene.  In the US, this has happened through the protections afforded to 
SIPA customers, but such protections do not apply to all circumstances as the FirstBank 
situation illustrates. 
 
Repo 105186 
The second matter of interest in the Examiner’s Report is the section of the report that 
considers the “Repo 105” issue.  Although on the face of it this can be construed purely as 
a matter of accounting, a closer inspection takes it to the heart of understanding the role 
that property interests play in determining the effects of particular transactions.  In 
addition to the property law issue that it throws up, it also forces the reader to reflect upon 
the ethical considerations associated with effecting legal transactions through the provision 
of legal opinions and whether the intervention of lawyers can have an effect on the 
“fairness” of an outcome in the event of insolvency.  As the Repo 105 matter concerned 
an English law legal opinion, this issue is relevant to the Thesis bearing in mind its 
identified standpoint of the practising lawyer. 
 
The discussion in Chapter 4 of repo and reverse repos illustrated that they are, essentially, 
a mechanism for borrowing and lending either cash or securities that equates to a secured 
lending transaction.187  Their purpose is to make money grow; rather than having cash or 
                                                          
186 There were, in fact, two schemes, Repo 105 and Repo 108, which were collectively referred to as Repo 105.  
See Examiner’s Report (n 49) Volume 3 fn 2847. 
187 Chapter 4, 49. 
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securities sitting idly in an account, they are put to use to generate an income stream by 
enabling the lender to charge the borrower for the use of the cash or securities in question.  
Because these transactions lead to a transfer of ownership, they can also be construed as 
outright sales.  The perspective taken on a particular transaction can affect how it is 
treated for accounting purposes.  Loans will appear on the balance sheet of the company 
in question, whilst inventory that has been sold will not. 
 
Under the Repo 105 agreements, Lehman borrowed tens of billions of US dollars which it 
used to pay down its debts.  Whilst its balance sheet showed a reduction in leverage as a 
consequence, it did not show the corresponding obligation on the balance sheet to repay 
the debt.  It used the Repo 105 transactions in the periods before it was required to 
produce a public report on its financial situation and used them increasingly during 2007 
and 2008.  It never publicly disclosed either its use of these methods, or its accounting 
treatment of them.188  Further, Lehman actively misrepresented its treatment of the 
transactions by claiming in its financial statements that all repos were treated as financing 
arrangements rather than sales for accounting purposes.189  This lack of transparency 
makes it difficult to see how the Lehman approach to the undertaking of these transactions 
was anything other than deliberately deceptive.  
 
This submission is supported by the fact that when Lehman first began to use Repo 105 
transactions in 2001, it could not get a US legal opinion to support their construction as a 
“true sale” for US accounting purposes.  Instead of running the Repo 105 transactions 
through the US business, LBSF and LBI therefore transferred their securities inventory to 
LBIE, which executed the transactions on their behalf, relying on the basis of a legal 
opinion that characterised the transactions as true sales which was issued by Linklaters, 
an English law firm. 190   
 
It is not surprising that an English law firm characterised these transactions as sales since 
that is the correct English law analysis.191  As Kershaw and Moorhead acknowledge, 
however, English counsel were not asked whether the Repo 105s constituted a sale for the 
purposes of US accounting requirements, rather they were asked whether, as a matter of 
                                                          
188 Examiner’s Report (n 49) Volume 3, 733-734. 
189 Ibid 735. 
190 Ibid 740.  Linklaters is one of the most influential and successful global law firms based in the City of London. 
191 See Documents 3 and 4. 
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English law, the transaction constituted a sale.192  Despite this, the legal opinion provided 
by Linklaters helped to support an accounting treatment in the US that clearly did not 
reflect what would be expected either of an English company’s balance sheet in terms of 
providing a “true and fair view” of the company’s financial position193 or of a company 
complying with US generally accepted accounting principles.194  This is something that 
should give practising lawyers, as reflective practitioners, pause for thought.  It has been 
submitted that the development of English corporate law has been essentially pragmatic; 
the flexibility of English law has enabled lawyers to adapt it to resolve legal problems to 
meet the needs of clients wishing to do business.  Arguably, the lawyers in question may 
have thought that was all that they were doing here (if they questioned what they did at 
all) and, in any event, the opinion that they delivered was correct as a matter of English 
law and it is not clear what, if anything, they knew about the wider transaction.  But 
looking beyond the face value of the transaction, were any other considerations at play?  
Were they simply following a client’s instructions to make a transaction work that 
otherwise would not work (and thus enabling the march of commerce and economic 
progress) or were they choosing not to consider the possible consequences for investors 
(at best, potential financial losses and at worst insolvency) of issuing a legal opinion that 
would support a questionable accounting policy?  Should lawyers make transactions work 
at any cost?  The Repo 105 mechanism was ultimately duplicitous, but it was given validity 
through judicious forum shopping for the right legal opinion.   
 
Conclusion 
Having reviewed the English and US Lehman and MF Global cases as well as the Examiner’s 
Report, no major cross-border issues arose that related to the law governing the location 
of the securities.  Nonetheless, both the identification and shortfall problems do appear to 
have arisen in in the context of the Lehman companies’ dealings with intermediated 
securities.  This means that the problems thrown up in the event of the insolvency of an 
intermediary are “real world” problems and not merely theoretical.  What is interesting is 
                                                          
192 David Kershaw and Richard Moorhead ‘Consequential Responsibility for Client Wrongs: Lehman Brothers and 
the Regulation of the Legal Profession’ (2013) 76(1) MLR 26-61, 36. 
193 Section 396 Companies Act 2006. 
194 The US position was complicated by the tension between US GAAP and compliance with Statements of 
Financial Accounting Concepts (“SFAC”) and Standards (“SFAS”).  Lehman focused on the compliance 
requirement for SFAS 140 which required certain over-collateralisation requirements to be met as a means of 
establishing a loss of control over an asset enabling it to be equated as a sale.  Examiner’s Report Volume 3, 
755 -756; in the Examiner’s Conclusions (963-4ff) it was noted that technical compliance was not enough; the 
courts required an accurate reflection of the company’s overall financial status. 
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that the problems do not appear to be evidenced in the cases in quite the same way on 
both sides of the Atlantic.   
 
There were clearly issues with the identification of assets held by intermediaries in the 
English law cases as was evident from Lehman’s failure to comply with the CASS rules; 
had Lehman complied with its obligations to segregate client assets it would have been far 
more straightforward for the administrators to identify and return assets than it was.  This 
is illustrated in the second CASS rules case discussed where the failure properly to 
segregate client monies had resulted in a shortfall and the Supreme Court had to adopt a 
purposive “claims” rather than “contributions” basis for distributing funds.195  This issue 
does not arise in the US Lehman cases identified. 
 
In the US, two of the SIPA customer cases discussed provide evidence for the proposition 
that the use of an investor’s securities for the intermediary’s own repo transactions can 
result in a shortfall for the investor in the event of the intermediary’s insolvency.  The 
same result was not evident from a reading of the English law cases, but this is probably 
because the shortfall problem was exposed in the US because the investors sought 
compensation from an alternative source (the SIPC fund).  Absent the SIPC fund, the 
shortfalls experienced by these US investors would, presumably, have been hidden 
amongst the other claims in the insolvency.   
 
It is also clear that, in the absence of fraud, the ultimate investor’s proprietary interest in 
the securities it has lodged with an intermediary is extinguished when they are transferred 
to a third party under a repo transaction.  The investor’s proprietary interest is replaced 
with a personal claim.  The investor is specifically prohibited from claiming that a 
constructive trust in its favour exists over the securities held by the third party under UCC 
Article 8 803(e). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
195 Second CASS Rules case (n 80).  
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Chapter Six 
Analysis and evaluation: answering questions one and two 
 
Introduction 
As has been discussed in Chapter 2, the original question posed for this Thesis was whether 
“our existing rules [are] sufficient to provide a fair and effective regime governing the 
location of assets” when those assets are in dematerialised form.  The question was asked 
in the fall out from the financial crisis which had led to serious losses being suffered by 
many sophisticated financial institutions through their financial market activities involving 
electronically held securities.  The crisis affecting financial institutions had a significant 
social impact, resulting in the insolvency of businesses and a decline in the standard of 
living for many citizens across the US and the EU.196  It therefore matters whether the 
rules that deal with intermediated securities are fair and effective, not only for investors 
but because of the repercussions for society that result from the insolvency of financial 
institutions and the impact of their failure on the financial markets.   
 
The two particular areas of concern for the ultimate investors of intermediated securities 
in this context are first, actually being able to identify their assets where they are held in 
a pooled account and second, determining whether all their assets are actually available 
for return (the “identification” and “shortfall” problems discussed in Chapter 1) which 
becomes a matter of applicable law.  The shortfall problem must be distinguished from the 
problem of a reduction in market value.  In any insolvency, the value of a company’s 
assets will be diminished, whether they are sold on a going concern basis or as part of a 
fire sale.  The shortfall problem arises where the intermediary holding a pool of assets for 
investors has insufficient assets available to go around; a situation which might arise 
where securities have been rehypothecated.  The investor protections against the 
consequences of a shortfall caused by rehypothecation on insolvency were deemed worth 
of further consideration, since the effect of a shortfall is that an investor loses its ownership 
right in the asset and replaces it with an in personam claim for the monetary equivalent, 
which is of limited or no value on the intermediary’s insolvency. 
 
                                                          
196 The negative consequences of the global financial crisis for the EU are implicit in the European Commission’s 
Green Paper Building a Capital Markets Union, COM (2015) 63 final, Brussels, 18.2.2015. 
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Preliminary work on the Thesis question had indicated that addressing this question in an 
insolvency context could raise complex conflict of laws issues.  Chapter 2 identified a 
number of questions that needed to be answered in order to determine whether this was 
the case.  Question one required an examination of the Lehman case law to elicit answers 
on the following points: first, whether, following the insolvency of Lehman, the law 
applicable to intermediated securities was an issue in the decided cases that caused “real 
world” problems; second, if the law was in issue, to what extent did it result in the testing 
of jurisdictional limits in establishing the ultimate ownership of those assets; and third, 
what principles were applied across jurisdictions in achieving the proprietary effect (the 
ownership outcome) that was achieved?  Once these questions were answered it would 
then be possible to consider the question of the fairness and effectiveness of the regime 
affecting rights to intermediated securities on insolvency. 
 
Was the law governing the location of intermediated securities an issue in the cases? 
The findings from the cases and the Examiner’s Report have illustrated that, whilst the 
question of location was considered in some (very few) of the cases, it was not considered 
from the perspective of the law governing the location of the assets in question and was 
rarely considered in a cross-border context.  This finding largely rebuts the first two 
assumptions made in Chapter Two when interpreting the question for the Thesis.  A third 
assumption that needed to be challenged was the extent to which location actually matters 
when determining the law that governs the proprietary effect of a transaction involving 
intermediated securities.  This requires a consideration of what “location” might mean in 
the context of intermediated securities.   
 
The nature of intermediated securities was considered in Document 4 and the particular 
difficulties of determining the lex situs of intangibles noted.  There are those who contend 
that intermediated securities are not property and that they are obligations and there are 
yet others who contend that they are sui generis.197  Although, as a matter of English law 
intermediated securities and interests therein are considered to be property,198 there have 
been difficulties associated with the application of the lex situs rule.  In which jurisdiction 
                                                          
197 See, for example, Eva Micheler ‘The Legal Nature of Securities: Inspirations from Comparative Law’ in Louise 
Gullifer and Jennifer Payne (eds) Intermediated Securities; Legal Problems and Practical Issues (Hart Publishing 
2010) 131. 
198 The term “proprietary” is used with caution here.  As Yeowart and Parsons note, referring to the existence of 
proprietary interests in intermediated securities in the international domain is not necessarily helpful as other 
jurisdictions may consider the same interests to be contractual or falling within a different category.  Geoffrey 
Yeowart and Robin Parsons Yeowart and Parsons on the Law of Financial Collateral (Edward Elgar 2016) 319. 
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should they be located?  Ooi has observed that determining situs by reference to the 
location of securities certificates, issuer records or the jurisdiction of a company’s 
incorporation is unsatisfactory as none of these serve as a suitable “connecting or localising 
element” for the purpose of identifying the investor as the holder of the securities.199  
Establishing the correct choice of law rules is important, however, because it is critical to 
reducing risk in financial markets by increasing certainty of outcomes.   
 
As discussed in Document 4, the lex situs question has been addressed in the context of 
the settlement of securities transactions200 and in transactions involving financial 
collateral201 through the use of PRIMA (Place of the Relevant InterMediary Account).  UCC 
Article 8-110(b)(1) (also discussed in Document 4)202 has a similar effect in that it is the 
jurisdiction of the securities intermediary that determines whether an investor has a 
“securities entitlement” against the intermediary.  In his consideration of this issue, 
Haentjens has noted the slight differences in the ways in which the intermediary’s account 
is established in each case.  For the purposes of the SFD, the relevant account is the place 
where securities are registered; for the FCD it is the place of the securities account whilst 
under UCC Article 8-110, the parties are free to choose the applicable law.203  Whilst these 
approaches could be argued to be an attempt to apply the lex situs rule to intangibles, as 
Haentjens remarks, in reality, the UCC approach has little connection with this rule.204  It 
is submitted that Haentjens is correct to suggest that: 
 
“to consider the intermediary’s location a ‘place’ in the sense of the traditional 
situs rule would be confusing or at least highly artificial… it is controversial if 
intangibles actually have a situs at all.”205   
 
                                                          
199 Maisie Ooi ‘The Choice of a Choice of Law Rule’ in Intermediated Securities: Legal Problems and Practical 
Issues (2010) Hart Publishing, at p220. 
200 Council Directive 98/26/EC of 19 May 1998 on settlement finality in payment and securities settlement 
systems [1998] OJ L166/45, implemented in the UK as the Financial Markets and Insolvency (Settlement Finality) 
Regulations 1999 (as amended by Council Directive 2009/44/EC of 6 May 2009 amending the financial collateral 
and settlement finality directives [2009] OJ L146/37).  Council Directive 2001/24/EC of 4 April 2001 on the 
reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions is also slightly different again in that under Article 24, the 
enforcement of proprietary rights in financial instruments is governed by the law of the Member State in which 
the register is located. 
201 FCD (n 17) (as amended by Council Directive 2009/44/EC of 6 May 2009 amending the financial collateral 
and settlement finality directives [2009] OJ L146/37) Art 9. 
202 Document 4, 39. 
203 There are slight variations between all three systems, as noted by Matthias Haentjens, in The Law Applicable 
to Indirectly Held Securities: the Plumbing of International Securities Transactions SDU Uitgevers (2006), 21. 
204 Ibid. 
205 Ibid. 
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This effectively rebuts the third assumption made at the outset of Chapter 2; it seems that 
place, or location bears little real relevance to the determination of the proprietary effect 
of a transaction involving intermediated securities. 
 
So what was said about location in the cases?  In the SIPA customer cases (where the 
parties were apparently all in the same jurisdiction) location was equated with possession, 
defined in the Three Banks case as “receipt, acquisition or holding of”206 the asset for the 
purposes of the SIPA legislation.  (It is submitted that this suggests equivalence with the 
English law requirement of “control” of financial collateral, since the concept of 
“possession” of intangibles is otherwise an artificial one).207  A second facet to the notion 
of location (and one that goes beyond the concept of jurisdictional location) came from 
the Examiner’s discussion of “off balance sheet” location in the Repo 105 transactions.208  
For accounting purposes, it did not matter where the assets actually were, as long as they 
were not ascribed as a liability on the balance sheet of the relevant US Lehman entities. 
 
What, if any, relevant issues arose from the cases reviewed? 
It has been concluded that neither the English law nor the US litigation raised any 
significant conflict of laws issues that related to establishing ownership rights in respect of 
intermediated securities.  The English law cases discussed the proprietary effect of a 
number of transactions in cases such as (but not exclusively) the Extended Liens case and 
a number of the cases involving the CASS rules.  Ultimately, most of the cases revolved 
around who owed what to whom and on what basis assets should be paid out.  It seems 
that this was also the case in the US litigation.  To the extent that a clearing house or 
custodian held Lehman assets, they either sought directions from the court as to whom 
the assets should be paid, as in The Options Clearing Corporation (“OCC”) v Barclays 
Capital Inc et al where OCC sought directions as to which of four banks should be paid 
monies it held under various letters of credit;209 or they were directed by the court to 
                                                          
206 Three Banks (n 156) 388. 
207 The Extended Liens case concluded that it was not possible to take a lien over an intangible as well as 
considering the issue of “possession and control”.  The reasoning in the Extended Liens case relating to the 
requirement for more than mere administrative control was recently approved by the ECJ in Private Equity 
Insurance Group SIA v Swedbank AS (Case C-156/15).  Yeowart and Parsons have argued that the concept of 
possession is not irrelevant in the context of intangibles, as it is possible to have possession of a negotiable 
instrument. 
208 Examiner’s Report (n 49) Volume 3, 732. 
209 See the Trial Pleading (US Bankr SDNY 2008) WL 5187894; 445 BR 143 (US Bankr SDNY 2011). 
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transfer monies to a particular party, as in a number of the US ipso facto cases discussed 
in Chapter 4.   
What the US cases usefully illustrate is that the shortfall problem caused by 
rehypothecation was a real and not just a theoretical one.  This is evidenced in the Three 
Banks and FirstBank cases where intermediated securities belonging to the claimants had 
been used as collateral by LBI under repo transactions and had passed into the hands of 
third parties and so was unavailable for re-transfer at the relevant time.  The fact that this 
problem was not evidenced in the English law cases in the same way does not necessarily 
mean that similar shortfalls did not occur in transactions involving Lehman’s UK clients; 
clearly they were anticipated by the claimants in the English Four Private Investment Funds 
case.  The US evidence for the shortfalls came to light because the claimants brought SIPA 
claims for compensation.  These claims were only litigated where the SIPA Trustee for LBI 
did not recognise the claimants as SIPA customers or otherwise wanted directions on the 
point.  SIPA claims were, therefore, largely dealt with out of court.  In fact, these claims 
were not just made by US based claimants.  An examination of the Administrators’ 
webpages provides the necessary evidence to show that SIPA claims were made as part 
of an Omnibus claim by the Administrators on behalf of customers of LBIE  
 
“whose cash, securities or other assets were (or should have been) held by LBI on 
the Filing Date.”210 
 
Whilst it is not possible to identify the circumstances that caused each of the LBIE 
customers to experience a shortfall, it seems likely that at least some of the individual 
customer losses can be attributed to the re-use of financial collateral along the lines 
experienced by the US claimants.  Having established this link, it makes sense to try and 
understand the quantum of the SIPA claims as this will go some way to illustrating just 
how serious the shortfall problem was for the purpose of understanding its “real world” 
impact.   
 
It is difficult to obtain a precise understanding of the true value placed on the Omnibus 
claim by the SIPA Trustee.  According to the Client Asset Updates issued by the 
Administrators, the SIPA Trustee initially agreed to allow Omnibus claims worth US$6.2 
                                                          
210<www.pwc.co.uk/services/business-recovery/administrations/lehman/lehman-client-money-and-assets-
update-200109.html accessed 26 April 2016. 
71 
 
bn.  This was later increased to US$8.3 bn,211 illustrating that the size of the SIPA claim 
made through LBIE alone was considerable, albeit that this was not the final figure as the 
method used for the valuation of the claim was a matter of dispute between the 
Administrators and the SIPA Trustee.  The Administrators contended that only by 
understanding the contractual and historical course of dealings of each customer would it 
be possible to determine the correct sum due, whereas the SIPA Trustee preferred to 
calculate the sums due on an aggregate basis.212  In February 2012, the Administrators 
lodged a formal objection to the SIPA Trustee’s approach.213  A year later, LBIE and the 
SIPA Trustee entered into a Settlement Agreement, the details of which are not a matter 
of public record.214 
 
Whatever the true figure attributed to the value of the Omnibus claim, it must be treated 
with caution.  The figure does not necessarily equate to the value of the shortfall 
attributable to LBIE customers’ rehypothecation claims.  The classification of LBIE 
customer claims was not straightforward and there were other factors that could have led 
to a customer experiencing a shortfall in addition to that caused by repo transactions 
(illustrated above by LBI’s inability to re-deliver securities).  These included problems with 
unwinding open trades and problems in transferring prime brokerage account property.215  
 
According to the Trustee’s Realization Report published in 2015, the remaining outstanding 
shortfall on the SIPA claims was valued at US$15.2 billion.  The causes of the losses are 
attributed to three factors: first, the sale of certain LBI assets to Barclays; second the high 
valuations attributed to securities pledged as collateral at the time of the Lehman 
insolvency; and third, the high number of claims brought by its affiliates against LBI for 
assets which had plummeted in value. 216  The assets attributable to particular categories 
of shortfall claim were as follows:217 
                                                          
211www.pwc.co.uk/services/business-recovery/administrations/lehman/lehman-client-asset-21072011.html 
accessed 26 April 2016. 
212 LBIE maintained omnibus accounts with LBI, but the securities held were on an aggregate, rather than 
customer, basis.  See LBI Trustee’s Preliminary Investigation Report and Recommendations 25 August 2010 (the 
“Trustees Investigation Report”) <http://dm.epiq11.com/LBI/Project> accessed 23 April 2016; Four Private 
Investment Funds (n 59). 
213<www.pwc.co.uk/services/business-recovery/administrations/lehman/lehman-client-assets-update-
210312.html> accessed 26 April 2016. 
214 Statement regarding approval of LBI Agreements with LBIE and LBHI 16 April 2013 
<http://dm.epiq11.com/LBI/Project> accessed 2 May 2016. 
215 Trustee’s Investigation Report (n 212) 74 paras 159 – 164, 3. 
216 Trustee’s Preliminary Realisation Report dated 23 February 2015 (the “Trustee’s Realisation Report”) 
<http://dm.epiq11.com/LBI/Project> accessed 23 April 2016. 
217 Trustee’s Realisation Report (n 216) 6 (table reproduced here). 
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Assets (In Millions) Net realized 
Versus Filing Date 
Securities on Hand 981 
Proprietary Cash Book Entries (150) 
Receivables 95 
Trade Unwind and Close Outs (958) 
Barclays Repurchase Agreement (4,500) 
Clearing Bank Collateral Liquidations (1,895) 
Due From Affiliates (including 
RACERS) 
(5,961) 
Equity Value of Subsidiaries / PIK 
Note 
(1,700) 
Goodwill, Fixed Assets and Other (780) 
Post-Petition Income 2,150 
Excess Customer Property 2,201 
TOTAL  (15,204) 
 
There is little detailed guidance to explain these figures, but it is reasonable to assume 
that part of the shortfall in the Proprietary cash book, Trade Unwind and Close Outs, 
Barclays and Affiliates accounts was attributable to repo transactions.218  From the limited 
information available and for the purpose of determining whether the location of 
intermediated securities led to real world problems, it seems reasonable to conclude that, 
when used in repo transactions where the re-delivery leg was not completed, the resulting 
shortfall was in the region of billions of US dollars. 
 
Having said that, it must be stressed that, whilst these sums are large, the completion of 
the major settlement agreements between LBI and LBIE as well as LBHI in 2013 would 
suggest that most customer claims were addressed to a reasonable degree of satisfaction; 
losses would have been suffered during the period, nevertheless, as customers did not 
have access to their funds for investment purposes until the point of settlement.  The 
Trustee’s Realisation Report recognises that unsecured creditors will not make a full 
recovery, but notes that LBI customer claims were satisfied in full and that US$ 114.7bn 
has been distributed.219  Similarly, recoveries made in the LBIE administration have been 
better than might have been anticipated at the outset of the insolvency.  Senior creditors 
have received 100% of their unsecured claims and projections indicate a surplus prior to 
the payment of post-administration interest, non-provable claims, subordinated debt and 
shareholder claims.220  
                                                          
218 Trustee’s Realisation Report (n 216) 9-14. 
219 Trustee’s Realisation Report (n 216) 3. 
220 Administrators 15th Progress Report, April 2016, 9 <http://www.pwc.co.uk/business-
recovery/administrations/lehman/lbie-15th-progress-report.pdf> accessed 2 May 2016. 
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Why was the law applicable to intermediated securities not in issue in the cases? 
As has already been noted, the law governing the location of the assets was not raised as 
an issue in the cases.  This is interesting because the Trustee’s Investigation Report does 
refer to difficulties in recovering property from what were described as  
 
““good control” locations in foreign jurisdictions” [and noted that] “obstacles 
attributable to differing laws or insolvency regimes present formidable challenges.”221   
 
There is little elaboration on this point other than in a footnote which commented that: 
 
“Other LBI custodians or depositories around the world exhibited varying ranges of 
acceptance of the Trustee’s powers.”222 
 
It is also clear that LBIE’s failure to comply with the English CASS rules caused shortfall 
problems for LBI.  LBIE held accounts with a number of foreign clearing houses and 
exchanges which were meant to hold property belonging to LBI customers; as previously 
discussed, at the time of LBIE’s administration, it had failed to segregate cash sums due 
to its customers and those of LBI and, therefore, they were not available to be handed 
back.223 
 
So why were these cross-border issues not manifest in the case law?  There are probably 
two main reasons for this.  First, as was anticipated in the introduction to Chapter Four, 
the Lehman Protocol played a significant part in reducing the amount of cross-border 
litigation; the paving of the way for consensual agreement through a series of bilateral 
agreements with insolvency practitioners in relevant jurisdictions would have played a 
huge part in reducing the costs of the insolvency.  The US Court had to deal separately 
with LBIE (because the Administrators refused to sign up to the Lehman Protocol) but the 
parties nonetheless successfully avoided litigation and pursued a settlement.224  The 
second reason is that certain statutory and regulatory protections provided a degree of 
protection for counterparties involved in transactions with Lehman entities, either because 
they determined the proprietary effect of the transaction or because they preserved 
counterparty rights and interests in intermediated securities by avoiding the automatic 
                                                          
221 Trustee’s Investigation Report (n 212) 116. 
222 Ibid. 
223 Ibid 121. 
224 Chapter 4, 42. 
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stay.  As the role played by PRIMA and UCC Article 8 in determining the law that governs 
the proprietary effect of a transaction involving intermediated securities has already been 
considered, the next step is to consider the role played by the SFD225 and the US 
Bankruptcy Safe Harbour provisions226 in the event of a counterparty insolvency. 
 
Settlement Finality and Safe Harbour provisions 
One of the major risks faced by the global financial system is that of settlement risk; what 
happens if a counterparty to a financial contract goes into insolvency proceedings after 
the instruction to make a transfer has been given?  Will the counterparty be paid in full?  
Even if the trade is completed despite the insolvency, or is completed moments before the 
insolvency proceedings began, what then?  The risk remains that the transaction could be 
set aside as a preference or a transaction at an undervalue under relevant insolvency 
legislation.  To provide certainty for those entering into financial markets contracts, the 
EU settlement finality rules ensure that trades are completed.227  A similar effect is 
achieved by the US Bankruptcy Code Safe Harbour provisions through the disapplication 
of the automatic stay on proceedings228 to swap transactions, so that they can be 
liquidated, terminated or accelerated, enabling the counterparty to offset or net any 
amounts due to it as a consequence229 in circumstances where there has been a default in 
an executory contract.230 
 
As a matter of English law, the SFRs prevent a transaction that has been completed from 
being set aside as a preference or a transaction at an undervalue in relation to a disposition 
of property or the transfer of collateral security.231  The SFRs and the FCARs respectively 
prevent a collateral security transfer232 and a charge under the financial collateral 
arrangements from being set aside.  In the US, as was discussed in the FirstBank case, it 
is extremely difficult to trace.  It is not possible, in the absence of fraud, to set aside a 
transaction; further, it is also necessary to show collusion on the part of the third party, 
making it almost impossible to follow the money.   
Conclusion 
                                                          
225 SFD and SFRS (n 200). 
226 11 US Bankruptcy Code § 559 – 560 <https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/11/559> accessed 2 May 
2016. 
227 SFD (n 200) Art 3; in the UK SFRS (n 188) Regs 16-19. 
228 11 US Bankruptcy Code. 
229 11 US Bankruptcy Code § 559 -560. 
230 11 US Bankruptcy Code § 365(e). 
231 SFRS (n 200) Reg 17(1). 
232 SFRS (n 200) Reg 16(3); FCARS (n 13) Reg 10(1).  
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As has been seen from the discussion in this Chapter, the determination of location for the 
purposes of determining the proprietary effect of a transaction involving intermediated 
securities is something of a fudge.  Established legislation in the EU and the US has, to a 
large extent, proved effective in providing certainty in the financial markets, both by 
setting rules on applicable jurisdiction in the settlement of transactions and by determining 
outcomes in the event of counterparty default.  These provisions are designed to make 
the markets work efficiently and to ensure that parties to financial contracts have sufficient 
certainty in the legal consequences of their transactions.  Even so, the adoption of PRIMA 
within the EU has its shortcomings.  Yeowart and Parsons consider the difficulties of 
establishing “the country in which the relevant account is maintained” for the purposes of 
Article 9 of the FCD, bearing in mind that the account itself is intangible.  They suggest 
that it is still necessary to identify the “physical associations” of the account; if these are 
found in one country, the matter is straightforward, but if not, which country’s attributes 
should prevail? 233  As Yeowart and Parsons point out: 
 
“this approach does not appear to yield a rule that provides ex ante certainty for 
all or even the majority of cases involving the use of intermediated securities as 
collateral.”234 
 
Another issue raised by the Safe Harbour provisions is that of fairness.  Although close out 
netting arrangements provided certainty for the counterparties following the insolvency of 
LBHI (which triggered a default in LBI’s transactions), the SIPA Trustee considered that 
LBI was significantly disadvantaged by the actions of its counterparties.  A particular 
problem for LBI was that it went into liquidation four days after LBHI’s Chapter 11 
proceedings began.  The SIPA Trustee lacked access to LBI’s information systems during 
this point and various counterparties held onto and/or failed to segregate customer assets.  
Although the SIPA liquidation order implemented a temporary stay, it did not apply to all 
counterparties (specifically the clearing banks).235   
 
Having considered some of the difficulties that clearly still remain in the current regime, it 
is now necessary to explore it and critique it in more detail.  
 
                                                          
233 Yeowart and Parsons (n 198) 318. 
234 Ibid. 
235 Trustee’s Investigation Report (n 212) 123-127. 
76 
 
Chapter Seven 
Analysis and evaluation: answering question three  
 
Introduction 
The third question posed at the outset of this Thesis was to understand how far the current 
legal framework for determining conflicts of law issues in respect of intermediated 
securities helped to resolve any of the Lehman issues.  In the event that there had been 
no practical application of the rules in the Lehman cases (as has proved to be the case), 
the question was posed in the alternative, that is, to be addressed from a theoretical 
perspective.  The analysis and evaluation in Chapter Six indicates that the unease felt by 
practitioners in relation to the existing conflict of laws rules at the outset of this study236 
remains and has been articulated most recently by Yeowart and Parsons.237  Parallels may 
be drawn with recent EU case law involving tort claims, which have highlighted the 
difficulties that occur when trying to establish a location for financial losses for the 
purposes of determining jurisdiction.238 
 
As discussed in Documents 1-4, the issues raised in this study stem from the fact that 
much of the world’s wealth is held in the form of securities.  These securities are not 
directly held by their investor owners, but are held through a series of intermediaries.  As 
a matter of English law, they would be understood to be held on trust, with the ultimate 
investor holding an equitable proprietary interest in the intermediated securities.  The 
particular problem identified is that England is just one of many jurisdictions in the chain 
of intermediaries between the investor and the holder of the asset and there is no certainty 
that English law will apply to such an arrangement to ensure that the ultimate investor’s 
rights are upheld on that basis. 
 
Intermediated securities play a critical function in the financial markets in the management 
of credit risk.  In addition, intermediated securities can, in certain circumstances, be re-
used (rehypothecated) by an intermediary for their own ends.239  In other words, 
                                                          
236 Moss (n 41) in 2010 and Norris J (n 2) in 2012. 
237 Yeowart and Parsons (n 198). 
238 It is not possible to address these in any detail other than to note the potential uncertainty caused by the 
decision determining jurisdiction in the case of Harald Kolassa v Barclays Bank plc (C-375/13), a matter which 
concerned securities held by an intermediary.  The more recent decision of Universal Music International Holdings 
BV v Schilling (C-12/15) may serve to limit the effect of the Kolassa decision, although the cases are 
distinguishable. 
239 Yeowart and Parsons (n 198) Chapter 11. 
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intermediated securities (which are generally debt securities)240 can be used as financial 
collateral to generate income for a finance house or an institutional investor.  The use of 
financial collateral in this way is important for wealth generation and has an impact on the 
wealth of many members of society to the extent that the generation of wealth increases 
the value of pension and insurance funds.  Getting the law right in this area is, therefore 
vital for the global economy. 
 
The discussion thus far has focused on the failure of a large financial institution, such as 
Lehman, that undertakes investment banking activities for clients.  Issues relating to the 
settlement and clearing of transactions have, therefore, been considered in that context.  
It is beyond the scope of this Thesis to consider in detail the role played by central 
counterparties (“CCPs”) in maintaining the stability of the financial markets and in their 
use of financial collateral, other than to note the following.  The extensive use of over-the-
counter (“OTC”) derivatives was considered to have had a de-stabilising effect on the 
financial markets and resulted in a great deal of legislation to shore up the risks associated 
with OTC derivatives.241  Within the EU, this included the introduction of EMIR242 and within 
the US, the Dodd-Frank Act.243  Through this legislation, it is ultimately intended (amongst 
other things) that standard OTC contracts are cleared and that other OTC contracts are 
reported to ensure greater transparency in financial transactions.244  Whilst there is much 
to be admired in the new, global regulatory architecture, it must not be forgotten that 
much of it has been in response to the problem caused by institutions like Lehman which 
were considered “too big to fail”.  Although EMIR establishes stringent prudential 
requirements, it is submitted that the creation of these extremely large trading platforms 
introduces a different form of systemic risk.  Certainly within the EU work is being done 
on resolution and recovery regimes for financial market infrastructures, but one wonders 
what institution will be of sufficient size to take on their obligations should such a CCP 
fail.245 
                                                          
240 Ibid Chapter 19. 
241 Note that Schyler Henderson disagrees with this analysis in his paper ‘Unintended Consequences of 
Misconceived Reforms: Part III’ (2013)8 JIBFL 480. 
242 Council Regulation EU/648/2012 of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade 
repositories [2012] OJ L201/1. 
243 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2010. 
244 For a fuller understanding of this topic, see Yeowart and Parsons (n 198) Chapter 20 and Changmin Chun 
‘Cross-Border Transactions of Intermediated Securities’ Chapter 1 for a consideration of the application of Geneva 
Securities Convention to CCPs. 
245 This is a risk that Henderson (n 241) has also raised.  The foreword to the Bank of England March 2016 report 
on Financial Market Infrastructures indicates that it is “actively involved” in developing proposals for the CCP 
resolution and recovery <www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/fmi/annualreport2016.pdf>. 
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Existing frameworks 
When Lehman failed, LBIE had to go into administration under the Insolvency Act 1986 
because, at that stage, there was no special resolution regime for a failing investment 
bank in the UK which enabled its business to be transferred to another financial institution 
and, at that time, the possibility of bail in did not exist.  One of the major concerns for 
investors was that it took so long before their funds were released as the administrators 
had to unravel so many complex transactions.  As Yeowart and Parsons observe, the US 
SIPA process was perceived to be much more efficient, as much of LBI’s prime brokerage 
activity was immediately transferred to Barclays.246  In addition to the delays caused by 
the administration, the problems of identification associated with the failure of LBIE to 
comply with the CASS rules caused further delays as it was not possible simply to pay out 
a pro rata share of the assets to all the interested investors, whether secured or unsecured, 
as shares had to be allocated by reference to proprietary claims, which came first.247  
Whilst many investors may ultimately not have experienced a shortfall in receiving the full 
amount of their claim (as discussed in Chapter Six, both in the US and the UK it appears 
that those with proprietary interests have been paid in full; in the UK, unsecured creditors 
have also been repaid in full and it is now a matter of determining how the surplus should 
be addressed248), they will have experienced a cash flow problem which, at the very least, 
would have damaged their own business. 
 
The English insolvency system did not easily lend itself to an insolvency of the magnitude 
and complexity of the Lehman case.  Despite this, it is probably fair to say that it was as 
well managed as it could have been and that great pains were taken by the administrators 
to apply to the court where necessary for directions to ensure fairness to creditors.  This 
has been evidenced most recently in the Waterfall judgments, which deal with the priority 
of payments.249  It is also fair to say that the Lehman insolvency would not happen in the 
same way again.  This is for a whole number of reasons, including increased transparency 
in relation to securities financing transactions within the EU,250 increased regulatory 
                                                          
246 Yeowart and Parsons (n 198) 497.  Although this may be perception rather than reality as litigation 
subsequently ensued. 
247 Hence the suggestion to seek the sanction of the English court for a scheme (n 54). 
248 <www.pwc.co.uk/services/business-recovery/administrations/lehman/update-entitlements-to-surplus-28-
march-2014.html> accessed 6 June 2016). 
249 Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in administration) [2015] EWCA Civ 485, although a number of 
issues will be taken to the Supreme Court in October 2016. <www.pwc.co.uk/services/business-
recovery/administrations/lehman/update-waterfall-i-application-supreme-court-of-the-united-kingdom-appeal-
listing-5-may-2016.html>. 
250 Securities Financing Regulation (n34). 
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scrutiny and accountability, changes to capital and liquidity requirements through the 
introduction of CRD IV,251 changes to the CASS rules and the introduction of a specific 
investment bank resolution framework which includes bail in.   
 
More specifically to the conflict of laws question, as has been seen, this has been discussed 
in the context of the existing approach taken in the SFD, the FCD and in UCC Article 8.  
Broadly, the jurisdiction for the determination of proprietary interests in relation to 
intermediated securities is determined by the jurisdiction of the place of the account 
holder.  This is not the only approach, however.  As discussed in Document 4, there are 
two other approaches to this issue, in the Hague Convention252 and Geneva Securities 
Convention.  The Hague Convention recommends that the parties to a transaction agree 
the choice of law for that transaction.  Although this approach is similar to that adopted 
under UCC Article 8, there are a number of criticisms of this approach (identified by Ooi).253  
The first is that there is a lack of transparency, since the agreement is made between 
intermediary and investor.  The second is that, should an unconnected jurisdiction be 
chosen, it would lead to difficulties on enforcement.  Finally, within in EU context, there 
was a concern that if non-European laws were chosen, this could affect the stability of EU 
settlement systems.254  The Geneva Securities Convention addresses substantive law 
issues through becoming part of the substantive law of a contracting state.  Where a 
conflict of laws issue arises, the applicable law would be determined by reference to the 
law of the state in question; if the state had adopted the Geneva Securities Convention 
then it would be applied.255  
 
 
 
                                                          
251 Comprising Directive 2013/36/EU of 26 June 2013 on the prudential supervision of credit institutions [2013] 
OJ L176/338 and Regulation EU/575/2013 of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions 
[2013] OJ L321/6. 
252 The Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Certain Rights in respect of Securities held with an 
Intermediary.<www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=72> accessed 5 March 2015.  
253 Ooi (n 199) 225. 
254 The debate about choice of law is similar to that surrounding Article 14 of the Rome Regulation, where the 
boundaries between contract and property are blurred in the context of assignment, with different jurisdictions 
taking different approaches as to whether the law governing the assignment carries the proprietary aspects too.  
Various suggestions have been made as to which is the proper law to govern the proprietary aspects.  In The 
Proprietary Aspects of Assignment and Choice of Law (2009) 125 LQR 671, 697, Michael Bridge suggests either 
that the proper law should be that of the assignor and assignee or, in view of the artificiality of ascribing 
intangibles a lex situs, that the parties should choose.  Fentiman points out the pitfalls of the latter approach as 
does Kieninger.  See Richard Fentiman, Assignment and Rome I: Towards a Principled Solution in Law and 
Financial Markets Review July (2010) 405 and Eva-Maria Kieninger Collateralisation of Contracts European 
Review of Contract Law (2013) 9(4): 430-454.   
255 Article 2 (n 35). 
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Fairness and effectiveness 
What does all this mean for fairness and, further, fairness to whom in this context?  It is 
submitted that fairness to investors encompasses fairness to consumers, bearing in mind 
the role played by institutional investors such as pension funds and insurance companies 
in the financial markets.  There are three elements to this.  First, protecting owners of 
intermediated securities from identification problems; second, protecting owners of 
intermediated securities from shortfall problems and third, ensuring a fair pay out.  As has 
already been identified, improvements in the process for managing failing investment 
banks should prevent them going into insolvency proceedings and, to the extent that 
payouts have to happen, they will be made on a pro-rata basis.256  This is consistent with 
the approach taken in the Geneva Securities Convention.257 
 
Insofar as protecting investors from the consequences of a shortfall, a little more 
consideration needs to be given to the re-use financial collateral.  It is submitted that the 
re-use of financial collateral is essential to the efficient functioning of the financial markets 
and enables growth in financial assets which is to the advantage of all.  What is also 
essential, is that the risks posed by this market function are properly understood by those 
participating in the market place and that the necessary regulation is in place to protect 
participants from market failure.  The use of “haircuts” by which additional amounts of 
collateral are placed at one side of a transaction to protect against their devaluation on 
the return leg were not always sufficient to protect counterparties at the height of the 
financial crisis.  In such extreme circumstances, it seems unlikely that much more could 
have been done.  Increased transparency in securities financing transactions has already 
been addressed within the EU. 
 
The role of solicitors in ensuring the fairness of financial transactions 
It is submitted that the calibre of the legal argument in the English Lehman litigation was 
second to none.  Combined with the judgments, it serves to demonstrate how hard working 
and erudite the solicitors, barristers and judges involved in the cases were.  But there are 
some areas of uneasiness associated with the Lehman case, specifically in relation to the 
issue of the English law Repo 105 opinion.  It is submitted that this cannot be ignored in 
considering the “fairness” of our existing system bearing in mind the nature of this 
doctorate and the importance of reflection in professional practice.  
                                                          
256 SI 2011/245 (n 122). 
257 Article 26 (n 35). 
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Kershaw and Moorhead note two important points about the issuing of legal opinions.  
First, they note the “gatekeeper” function of the legal opinion.  Behind the legal opinion 
that is issued stands not just the partner who signed it, but stand all the partners of the 
firm.  This gives the opinion weight and, when it is provided to a regulator, confidence that 
the company in respect of which the opinion is given, is compliant with the regulator’s 
requirements.  There is, thus, a delegation of regulatory power given to lawyers through 
the opinion process.258  The second point that they make is that lawyers are trained to act 
in their client’s interests and their notion of “zeal” in the client’s interest supports the 
contention of this Thesis that commercial lawyers use their creativity to drive innovation.  
They note that: 
 
“Zeal may provide intellectual, commercial and economic benefits”259 
 
but also share the author’s concern that the legitimacy of zeal may be questioned, citing 
examples of lawyers helping their clients to avoid taxes, or to avoid complying with 
environmental regulation or supporting their clients in arguing that torture may be 
lawful.260  Such approaches damage the view of lawyers as adhering to the rule of law and 
acting in the public interest. 
 
Kershaw and Moorhead argue that current rules of professional conduct are not enough to 
protect society from the work of transactional lawyers,261 as no rules or guidelines are set 
out for them.  They contend that rules setting out the consequential responsibility of 
transactional lawyers should be drafted to set limits on their activities.  They recognise 
that these would be worthless without proper enforcement by the Solicitors Regulation 
Authority (“SRA”).  They are right to argue that lawyers should be prepared to take 
consequential responsibility but it is submitted that most lawyers take their responsibilities 
extremely seriously.  Existing professional regulation requires solicitors to (amongst other 
things) uphold the rule of law and the administration of justice; act with integrity and 
behave in a way that maintains the trust the public holds in them.262  Equally, solicitors 
know that they are protected from their mistakes through the extremely expensive 
professional indemnity insurance that they are required to take out.  Whilst this helps to 
                                                          
258 (2013) 76(1) MLR 26-61, 41-42. 
259 Ibid 46. 
260 Ibid. 
261 The majority of whom are solicitors regulated by the SRA. 
262 http://www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/handbook/code/content.page  
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give them the confidence to take action in their client’s interest at a time when the lines 
of demarcation on ethical matters are less than clear and so possibly take a risk, it is 
submitted that no solicitor would ever wish to have a professional conduct claim brought 
against them in view of the serious consequences it could have for their career. 
 
The majority of lawyers are honest and hard-working; if a party is driven to draft an 
opinion that, like the Repo 105 opinion, ultimately serves to support a transaction that 
misleads the market, then there is either a problem with the individual or the system.  
Whilst questions must be asked about what the partner who wrote the Repo 105 opinion 
knew when he wrote it,263 it must equally be recognised that, if he had not written it, it is 
highly likely that another Magic Circle law firm would have done.  Hilary Sommerlad argues 
that there is a paradox between relying on market mechanisms and maintaining justice as 
a public good and asks how professional regulation can: 
 
“be effective against the amorality of the economic logic of the market”.264 
 
This issue forms part of the discussion raised at the end of Document 4: namely, how far 
can lawyers support a financial system in which they play a key role but which may be 
damaging social stability?   
 
Kershaw and Moorhead may overstate the case in seeking additional regulation for 
transactional lawyers, but it is essential that the SRA is diligent in enforcing the current 
rules of professional conduct.  There is a danger that, if the SRA does not, lawyers could 
be accused of protecting their vested interests in the international market place (an issue 
touched on Document 4).  In this case, the issue of the legal opinion would have satisfied 
the client and perhaps help to have ensured that the (English) law firm maintained a 
lucrative relationship with a wealthy (US) financial institution.  As an aside, by giving 
legitimacy to the transaction in exercising the “gatekeeper” function ascribed to legal 
opinions by Kershaw and Moorhead, the lawyers in question clearly played a role in the 
development of financial transactional law.   
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Lawyers, it is contended, have been subject to less ethical criticism than bankers following 
the financial crisis, but then their roles are very different.  Post 2008, the financial services 
industry has been attacked for its lack of ethical behaviour.  This has led to a re-thinking 
of the regulatory framework for financial services and the introduction of a Senior 
Managers Regime265 to try and change the culture of the industry as well as to ensure that 
individuals are aware of their personal responsibilities so that they know what they are 
accountable for.266  It is too early to tell whether these changes will make a difference, but 
at least an attempt has been made to try and correct what are clearly systemic failures 
within the governance mechanisms hitherto employed by the financial services industry.  
It is beyond the scope of this Thesis to explore the regulation of legal practitioners in any 
serious degree of detail, but it is critical that practitioners take seriously their rules of 
professional practice at all times and, more specifically, the guidance issued by the City of 
London Law Society on the issuing of opinions.  This guidance identifies a “Golden Rule”, 
namely that in writing an opinion, a firm should be mindful of the rules of professional 
conduct and never ask another firm to provide a legal opinion that it would not have been 
prepared to provide itself.267  One criticism that may be made of the guidance is that it 
does not, perhaps, go far enough in that it deliberately does not seek to advise on a 
number of specific types of financial transaction.  Nonetheless, the general principles 
provide a clear ethical direction. 
 
It has been submitted in this Thesis that the law in this area has developed pragmatically, 
in the sense that the law has tended to adapt to achieve an outcome that “works”.  Lord 
Hoffmann’s remarks on avoiding judgments that suggest that an area of commercial 
practice is conceptually impossible have previously been cited in support of this 
submission.268  In his papers on the Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 
Pound produced a classification of schools of jurists and methods of jurisprudence, 
observing in the first of these the blurring of the distinction between analytical, historical 
and philosophical jurisprudence.269  In his discussion of analytical jurisprudence and the 
imperative theory of law, Pound recognised that meeting new situations only by making 
deductions from established principles results in a neglect of the ends to be served by the 
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law.270  For Pound, the “pragmatic criterion” that considers not only how the law is to be 
made and exercised but also how its purpose is best achieved is “sound”:  
 
“The true juristic theory, the true juristic method, is the one that brings forth good 
works”.271 
 
And that, it is submitted, is the point; in this context, good works should be (it is 
submitted) synonymous with the practice of law that both upholds the law and is evidenced 
by high standards of professional conduct.  A pragmatic approach to the law has many 
advantages, but without the necessary checks and balances, it can lead to unhappy 
outcomes.   
 
Conclusion 
From the analysis that has gone before, it is reasonable to conclude that the insolvency 
regime applied post the Lehman failure was as fair as it could be within the constraints of 
the systems in place in September 2008.  Great pains were taken by the US court to 
negotiate with parties in other jurisdictions to achieve a satisfactory outcome.  Within the 
UK, the Administrators worked extremely hard to negotiate with the SIPA Trustee to 
achieve the best outcome for the LBIE administration and took pains to get directions from 
the court to ensure that the interests of creditors, both secured and unsecured, were 
protected as far as possible.  Having said that, the UK administration could have been 
more effective, as evidenced by the delays caused in returning assets to creditors.  As 
discussed earlier in this chapter, it is likely that, were the Lehman failure to happen again, 
it would be better handled, largely us a result of the changes to the regulation of the 
segregation of client accounts and the legislation relating to the resolution of a failing bank 
which would now ensure the transfer of its functions to a solvent entity.  
 
Mindful of the standpoint of the legal practitioner taken in this study and also mindful that 
this is a professional doctorate, the role of the legal practitioner must be considered in any 
discussion of fairness.  The Repo 105 legal opinion should make lawyers pause for thought 
for the impact that it had, albeit that the circumstances of the reliance placed upon it were 
not necessarily anticipated by the firm that issued it.  It is imperative that practitioners 
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ensure that they abide by rules of professional conduct synonymous with taking a 
pragmatic approach that brings forth good works. 
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Chapter Eight 
Recommendations and Conclusions: Answering Question Four 
 
Introduction 
As has been concluded at the end of Chapter 6, the adoption of PRIMA, whilst going some 
way towards establishing sufficient certainty in the market place in the context of 
intermediated securities, remains inadequate.  A problem highlighted by, amongst others, 
Haentjens272 in 2006 remains a problem for practitioners as noted by Yeowart and Parsons 
in 2016.273  That this problem requires resolution is evident not just from their work, but 
from the responses to the European Commission’s 2015 Green Paper on Building a Capital 
Markets Union.274  As the responses to question 22 of the Green Paper make clear, the 
equal treatment of all parties whether within the EU or in third countries is critical to the 
economy of the EU.275  Questions 26 and 27 of the Green Paper dealt specifically with 
issues relating to the harmonisation of securities ownership rules and conflict of laws issues 
within the EU.  Many respondents advocated harmonisation of the securities ownership 
rules whilst some specifically advocated the proposals of the Geneva Securities 
Convention.276  There was also considerable support for harmonisation of the rules relating 
to financial collateral and settlement finality.277  Further work on this within the EU is 
ongoing at the time of writing.278 
 
But are changes to the existing regime that seek a uniform approach to the determination 
of which national law should govern cross-border holdings of securities really necessary?  
McFarlane and Stevens contend that they are not.  For them, the introduction of legislation 
will not only stifle legal innovation, but may also lead to unanticipated consequences; 
further, it may result in costly litigation on marginal issues and ultimately increase 
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transaction costs as market participants will require legal advice.279  The fact that no major 
conflict of laws issues arose in the Lehman case might suggest that their arguments are 
well founded.  In fact, in his 2012 Denning Lecture, Briggs J observed that: 
 “the peace between potentially rival insolvency jurisdictions had been achieved 
without blood letting”.280  
 
Briggs considered that this was due to the fact that the contracting parties involved had 
agreed which jurisdiction governed the transactions between them and therefore that 
jurisdiction had determined the legal effect of the transaction.  To the extent that the case 
in question had involved the distribution of property, it had been managed by the 
jurisdiction in which the property had been situated.281  This approach harks to that of the 
Hague Convention and might suggest that it is a sound one. 
 
But a caveat should be attached to this view, as this happy outcome may not be replicated 
in every circumstance.  Not all jurisdictions are as sophisticated as the US and the various 
EU Member States.  Moss was concerned as to what might happen if an issue arose where 
the counterparty was based in China.282  More tellingly, the lead US judge in the Lehman 
proceedings, the Hon James M Peck has recently remarked that: 
. 
“Judges and former judges, academics and practitioners can all strive for universal 
procedures, like the Lehman Protocol, that will extend to cross-border insolvency 
cases, but I am convinced that economic actors seeking to maximise recoveries 
inevitably will revert to what is in their own self-interest.  Such actors will choose 
to co-operate across borders only where it serves their goals to do so.  That leads 
to a grim recognition.  We do business globally but resolve insolvency claims 
locally.” 283 
 
Judge Peck’s assertion is an argument for doing nothing, suggesting that whatever is done 
will ultimately prove to be irrelevant.  On the other hand it must be better to try to attempt 
a degree of co-ordination or harmonisation to try to overcome such nationalistic 
                                                          
279 Ben McFarlane and Robert Stevens ‘Interests in Securities: Practical Problems and Conceptual Solutions’ in 
Louise Gullifer and Jennifer Payne (eds) Intermediated Securities; Legal Problems and Practical Issues (Hart 
Publishing 2010) 59. 
280 <www.bacfi.org/files/Denning%20Lecture%202012.pdf> accessed 5 May 2016, 20. 
281 Ibid. 
282 Moss (n 41) 64. 
283  Peck (n 125) 133. 
88 
 
approaches and do our best, as Pound suggests, to achieve “good works”.  This is 
increasingly important in a world where major elections loom in the US and the UK.  Whilst 
a successful Brexit campaign in the UK is unlikely to result in the bonfire of financial 
regulation that those voting for it might wish (certainly in the short term), a less certain 
political landscape may cause problems in cross-border transactions involving insolvent 
entities in the future.  McFarlane and Stevens have argued that legislative intervention will 
increase transaction costs and the costs of litigation, but it is hard to see how these costs 
could possibly be worse than the costs incurred in the Lehman case.284 
 
So what approach should be taken to addressing the problems posed by potential cross-
border legal conflicts relating to intermediated securities?  Although it has not been 
possible to explore the globalisation literature in any detail in a study of this brevity, there 
are one or two observations that might usefully be made by reference to this discipline.  
Lehavi notes the tension that the implementation of cross-border instruments imposes on 
states where they have to rescind a degree of their sovereignty in yielding to a proposed 
supranational mechanism as well as the “normative complexity in harmonising national 
arrangements”.285  He goes on to suggest that “Different property issues may call for 
different models along a local/global continuum”286 although noting the difficulties of 
establishing harmonised property norms.287 
 
With so much work having been done on the Geneva Securities Convention, it would make 
sense to adopt its provisions.  Yet no country other than Bangladesh has ratified it to date.  
As it requires three ratifications before it comes into force and has already been on the 
books for the last six years, it seems unlikely that this will happen any time soon.  It is 
submitted that some practitioners think it of little relevance.288  But does this mean that 
the work has been in vain?   
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Mooney contends that there are a number of ways to illustrate the success of a convention 
and one of these can be whether the ideas behind it are adopted by the EU.289  Whilst it is 
possible that the EU will take on some of the thinking behind the Geneva Securities 
Convention in new Capital Markets legislation, it is not clear that this will make any real 
difference to practitioners.  The EU system works well enough; as discussed in Document 
4, the proprietary interests of investors are protected through Euroclear and Clearstream 
under the laws of Belgium and Luxembourg respectively290 and much of the new EU post-
crisis legislation has been directed at resolving some of the problems that arose in 
managing the cross-border protectionist instincts of Member States.  Forward planning 
and greater information sharing across borders are key components of the new 
arrangements.291  The real problem, as is the case in respect of bank failures more 
generally, is the unpredictability of third countries.  As Judge Peck’s remarks indicate, no 
amount of EU legislation can assist with that.   
 
But whilst is it recognised that the wholesale adoption of the Geneva Securities Convention 
is highly unlikely, it is nevertheless submitted that the adoption of some of its principles 
within the EU would go some way toward “calibrating the optimal scope of supranational 
ordering”, expressing what Lehavi describes as “both bottom-up and top down 
preferences”.292  Such an approach reflects both the pragmatic development of the law in 
this area (which might be seen as one of Lehavi’s “grassroots drivers of change”)293 and 
the recognition at Member State level that some action is required to address a cross-
border problem.  Rather than dealing with this issue on a “universalist” basis, it instead 
goes some way along Lehavi’s “continuum”. 
 
This approach might beg the question “why bother”?  There are two main grounds for 
asking this question.  First, as already identified, the European system seems to work 
reasonably well at the moment.  Second, this approach will not assist with regard to 
dealings with third countries.  The answer to the first question is that, whilst the European 
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system may well work at the moment, it is not clear what the future holds.  It would, 
therefore, be better to have a legislative consensus across the EU that is based on what 
have been rationally and carefully thought through principles, than not.  This is the case 
even if transactions involving key jurisdictions such as Belgium and Luxembourg are 
currently working effectively.  This contention is supported by the work of Moss, who was 
directly involved with the English law Lehman litigation and who roundly (and it is 
submitted correctly) rejected McFarlane and Stevens’ proposition that substantive rules 
within the EU are unnecessary as long as a Member State understands each other Member 
State’s choice of law rules. 294  The answer to the second question is that it makes sense 
to take action that will enhance legal certainty in many of the jurisdictions that do matter 
to the UK; as this will lead to an outcome that is neutral in respect of third countries, the 
third country perspective is irrelevant in taking this action.  
 
With regard to the position of third countries, Moss advocates an approach beyond the EU; 
for him only a global solution would “provide certainty… safeguard investors’ rights [and]… 
fortify confidence in financial markets”.295  Whilst this may be the most desirable outcome, 
as already stated, it remains unrealistic.  This means that it becomes necessary to look at 
two sub-questions: first, which third countries are the most important in this debate; and 
second, how important is it to establish substantive rules for those countries?  The main 
country of concern must be the US.  As the Lehman litigation has been resolved between 
the UK and the US apparently amicably and competently (albeit slowly), there is an 
argument that co-operation could be expected in future similar cases rendering legislative 
harmonisation unnecessary,296 although caveats remain.  A particular issue arose in the 
BNY Trustee case, which led to a general principle of insolvency law being applied to the 
same facts in the US and the UK to produce entirely opposing decisions.  Such an outcome 
may bode less well for future co-operation, particularly as increasing amounts of business 
are now conducted under the control and supervision of the US court.  Indeed, it begs the 
question as to whether the US regime can truly be considered a common law system as 
the extent of codification increases.297  A second caveat is the real possibility that a future 
US government will pursue a more isolationist approach.   
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The legal regimes adopted by other major economies will also be important.  The emerging 
economies such as Brazil, India and China will be significant; none is currently a signatory 
of the Geneva Securities Convention and none has a similar track record of co-operation 
to that of the US on a major insolvency.  Perhaps, in line with Lehavi’s “continuum”, it is 
worth looking beyond a harmonised approach for these jurisdictions and the aim should 
be to try and achieve alternative means of protection at a local level.  One potential model 
for this local approach is the legislative protection offered through Belgian and Luxembourg 
law to investors whose assets are held in Euroclear and Clearstream.298   
 
It may be that a radical new design can be taken to the holding of securities that moves 
the debate away from the need to harmonise regulation to protect investors.  Micheler has 
recently contended that many of the problems caused by the indirect holding of securities 
can be avoided through the use of new technology.  She argues that the platform used for 
Bitcoin may provide investors with the level of certainty combined with the flexibility of 
the financial markets. 299  It is certainly a very interesting suggestion and to be welcomed 
as a truly innovative approach to a difficult problem.  Unhappily, it is not a suggestion that 
Thesis can explore in any serious detail on account of having insufficient understanding of 
the technology Bitcoin, let alone how it could be applied in practice. 
 
Conclusion 
Hindsight is a wonderful thing and, as Document 5 ends and Document 6 begins, it is 
apparent from the iterative nature of this doctoral study that the questions and 
assumptions framed at the outset did not result in the answers that might have been 
anticipated.  But that does not mean that they were wrong or irrelevant: this Thesis is as 
interesting for what it did not discover as for what it discovered.  In retrospect, it might 
seem naïve to think that the Lehman litigation considered in this Thesis would have raised 
significant conflict of laws issues when it was largely brought by the Administrators and 
SIPA Trustee seeking directions whilst they entered into settlement arrangements behind 
closed doors.  But it was not an unrealistic approach to have taken in view of the remarks 
of practitioners such as Moss and Norris J at the time that it was chosen as a subject for 
study (albeit that it only really tested the English law regime).300  The parties who suffered 
losses appear, to a large extent, to have “waited out” the formal insolvency proceedings 
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and a number of jurisdictions entered into a settlement protocol for the purposes of the 
US proceedings.  This may have been a pragmatic decision based on the cost of pursuing 
claims and a recognition from sophisticated market players that the management of the 
insolvency on both sides of the Atlantic was being undertaken with rigour.  To that extent, 
they were rewarded by the ultimate recoveries, albeit that they lost the “time value” of 
their funds.  This supports the contention that the processes were, broadly, both 
substantively and procedurally fair and, other than the delay in returning funds (which 
was attributable to the great complexity of the case) essentially effective. 
 
The original contribution of this Thesis is, however, to demonstrate definitively that there 
were no major issues conflict of laws issues that arose in the English or US Lehman 
litigation, based on a thorough collation and analysis of data in the form of the relevant 
English and US Lehman cases.  In addition, it has shown that despite this, it remains a 
real possibility that conflict of laws issues will arise in the future in transactions involving 
intermediated securities where an intermediary fails and that the law, as it currently 
stands, is unclear as to how this should best be addressed.   
 
Whilst it is perfectly legitimate to take a laissez faire attitude to this issue and argue that 
things have been managed well enough in the Lehman case so that it does not matter, it 
is submitted that with so much global wealth tied up in intermediated securities, it behoves 
governments to legislate to protect the systems that the world relies on, as effectively as 
possible. As the next market failure may result from a different kind of financial institution 
from Lehman, the Lehman model of dealing with financial institution failure is unlikely to 
be sufficient.  Much excellent work has already been undertaken in the field of 
intermediated securities, with some of the best legal minds having applied themselves to 
producing the Geneva Securities Convention.  The approach of the Geneva Securities 
Convention is a functional and neutral one that deliberately seeks to avoid the pitfalls 
associated with drawing on the standard terminology and principles associated with 
different legal systems.  The EU has failed to achieve consensus on any property law norms 
to date,301 but it is submitted that the minimalist approach taken to harmonisation in the 
Geneva Securities Convention acknowledges the challenges of harmonisation; harmonised 
rules are adopted only “if clearly required to reduce legal or systemic risk or to promote 
market efficiency” and to the extent that an issue is not addressed by the harmonising 
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law, then local law will be applied.302  It is submitted that, the best outcome would be for 
the Geneva Securities Convention to be adopted as it has the advantage of providing a 
“bottom up” solution.  As there has been limited appetite globally for this Convention to 
be adopted thus far, this may be hard to achieve.  The next best thing must be for any 
future EU law on intermediated securities to draw on this work.  Undoubtedly, tensions 
will arise in any future EU discussions, not least because of the possibility that different 
rules may develop for intermediated securities that are not consistent with rules for other 
forms of property, as envisaged by McFarlane and Stevens.303  Further, the “top down” 
approach that comes from the imposition of an EU Regulation or Directive would require a 
degree of consensus across the EU that is likely to be difficult to achieve. In the absence 
of any clearer guidelines, the Geneva Securities Convention must be an excellent starting 
point for the discussion. 
 
The Thesis has also provided evidence to support the proposition that the pragmatic 
approach taken by transactional lawyers to their work has led to its evolution.  It is 
submitted that it is unlikely that this is true philosophical pragmatism, but an 
unconsciously pragmatic approach to their work in trying to ensure that client instructions 
are followed; such pragmatism leading to innovation in structuring transactions.  There is 
a danger in this approach, however, if it means that the focus on getting the job done is 
at the expense of ethical considerations.  The role of the legal opinion in providing a 
regulatory “gateway” is one area where practitioners need to special care.  It is critical to 
the integrity of the financial system that lawyers maintain their own integrity in their 
transactional work and are not seen to be manipulating the outcomes of transactions to 
promote vested interests.304  This is essential if society is to have the confidence in the 
legal profession in an ever more complex and fragmented world. 
 
Paula Moffatt 
1 November 2016 
 
The law is stated as at 30 April 2016. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Schedule of English law Lehman cases 
No. Case Issue  Decision Relevance for 
Thesis 
1 RAB Capital Plc v Lehman 
Brothers International 
(Europe) (in administration) 
[2008] EWHC 2335 (Ch) 
Application for 
directions for return 
of assets. 
Refused. Limited; provides 
context. 
2 Four Private Investment 
Funds v Lomas and others 
[2008] EWHC 2869 (Ch) 
Application for 
disclosure (in 
relation to 
securities). 
Dismissed. Possibly for 
discussion of 
“unfair” (para 37) 
in context of 
stat.disclosure. 
3 Perpetual Trustee Co. Ltd v 
BNY Corporate Trustee 
Services Ltd, Lehman 
Brothers Special Financing 
Inc. [2009] EWHC 1912 
(Ch) 
Application for stay 
pending outcome of 
case in New York 
court; interpretation 
of “flip” clause (anti-
deprivation). 
Held that British 
Eagle International 
Airlines v Compagnie 
Nationale Air France 
[1975] 1 WLR 758 
not engaged.  Case 
adjourned. 
Limited.  A matter 
of contractual 
interpretation.  
Assets were held in 
UK based and 
claimed by a US-
based Lehmans 
entity.  
4 Re Lehman Brothers 
International (Europe) (in 
administration) (No 2) 
[2009] EWHC 2141 (Ch) 
Application for 
directions (scheme 
of arrangement). 
 
Scheme refused.  
Court did not have 
jurisdiction. 
Limited.  Explains 
LBIE’s function as 
prime broker. 
5 In the Matter of Lehman 
Brothers International 
(Europe) (in 
administration) and RAB 
Market Cycles (Master) 
Fund Limited (1) Hong 
Leong Bank Berhad (2) 
[2009] EWHC 2545 (Ch) 
 
 
Application for 
directions (whether 
cash should be 
treated as trust 
money or made 
available to 
unsecured creditors) 
under terms of 
charge in standard 
form International 
Prime Brokerage 
Agreement (“IPBA”). 
The IPBA charge did 
not impose a trust 
or grant the Lehman 
counterparties a 
proprietary interest. 
Useful discussion 
of alteration in 
status of assets 
held. See para 20: 
MCF was beneficial 
owner of securities 
worth US$50m; on 
their conversion to 
cash MCF became 
the holder of an 
unsecured debt.   
6 Perpetual Trustee Company 
Limited, Belmont Park 
Investments Pty Limited v 
N+BNY Corporate Trustee 
Services Limited, Lehman 
Brothers Special Financing 
Inc. [2009] EWCA Civ 1160 
Appeal from anti-
deprivation case 
(see No. 3). 
Appeal dismissed. Limited as issues 
relate to questions 
of contractual 
interpretation. 
7 Re Lehman Brothers 
International (Europe) (in 
administration) (No 2) 
[2009] EWCA Civ 1161 
Whether the judge 
at first instance had 
erred in finding that 
the court had no 
jurisdiction to 
sanction a scheme. 
Appeal dismissed. Possibly of interest 
in considering 
notions of fairness 
(e.g. in changing 
(or not) rights of 
secured parties) 
8 Re Lehman Brothers 
International (Europe) (in 
administration) [2009] 
EWHC 3228 (Ch) 
 
Application for 
directions 
(application of the 
CASS rules). 
 
No proprietary 
interest where 
money had not been 
segregated. 
Limited, as issues 
relate to questions 
of statutory 
interpretation. 
95 
 
9 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v 
BNY Corporate Trustee 
Services [2009] EWHC 
2953 
Allocation of 
jurisdiction; comity. 
Content of letter to 
be sent to Judge 
Peck in New York 
agreed. 
None. 
10  In the matter of Lehman 
Brothers International 
(Europe)(in administration) 
and CRC Credit Fund 
Limited and others [2010] 
EWHC 47 (Ch) 
Supplementary 
written submissions 
on CASS 7 
judgment. 
Approved judgment 
on a number of 
technical points.  
None. 
11 Re Lehman Brothers 
International (Europe) (in 
administration) [2010] 
EWCA Civ 917 
Appeal on the CASS 
7 judgment.  
Broadly upheld 
(some nuances as to 
specific issues). 
Useful discussion 
of pari passu and 
fairness; 
contribution vs 
claims approach. 
12 Lehman Brothers 
International v CRC Credit 
Fund Ltd & others  
[2010] EWCA Civ 1001 
 
Ruling on costs and 
permission to appeal 
in relation to the 
CASS7 judgment. 
Appropriate costs 
order made; 
possible appeal to 
Supreme Court 
discussed. 
None. 
13 Re Lehman Brothers 
International (Europe) (in 
administration); Pearson 
and others v Lehman 
Brothers Finance SA and 
other companies [2010] 
EWHC 2914 (Ch) 
Application for 
directions (beneficial 
ownership of 
securities)  
Judgment for the 
administrators. 
 
Useful discussion 
of (1) how 
Lehmans ran its 
business and (2) 
Hunter v Moss.  
Much goes to the 
contractual basis 
on which LBIE 
acquired and held 
securities. 
14 Re Lehman  Brothers 
International (Europe) (in 
administration) [2010] 
EWHC 3044 (Ch) 
Application for 
directions (costs of 
RASCALs). 
Some departure 
from normal costs 
rules. 
None. 
15 Re Nortel GMBH and others; 
Re Lehman Brothers 
International (Europe) (in 
administration) and others; 
Bloom and others v 
Pensions Regulator and 
others [2010] EWHC 3010 
(Ch) 
Ranking of FSDs 
(provable debt or 
expenses of 
administration?). 
 
FSDs were expenses 
of the 
administration. 
None. 
16 Lomas & others v JFB Firth 
Rixson [2010] EWHC 3372 
(Ch) 
Application for 
directions 
(construction and 
effect of ISDA on 
five interest rate 
swaps).  
Payment obligations 
of counterparties 
suspended because 
of Lehman default. 
Useful discussion 
of swaps, but 
otherwise just 
raised issues of 
contractual 
interpretation. 
17 Spencer v Lehman Brothers 
Ltd [2011] EqLR 319 
Employment tribunal 
case. 
Transcript 
unavailable. 
None. 
18 Lehman Brothers Special 
Financing Inc v Carlton 
Communications Ltd [2011] 
EWHC 718 (Ch) 
Application for 
directions (swaps).  
Same principle as 
Firth Rixson. 
None.  Raised 
issues of 
contractual 
interpretation. 
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19 In the Matter of Lehman 
Brothers International 
(Europe) (in administration) 
[2011] EWHC 1233 (Ch) 
 
Application for 
directions (second 
client money). 
application  
Adjourned pending 
Supreme Court 
decision on first 
client money case.  
No protective costs 
order made. 
None. 
20 Lehman Brothers 
Commoditv Services Inc 
and Credit Agricole 
Corporate and Investment 
Bank (formerly Calyon) 
[2011] EWHC 1390 Comm 
Consideration of 
various preliminary 
issues as to whether 
set-off possible. 
Various; English law 
would determine the 
effect of the 
contractual 
agreement. 
Limited; raised 
issues of 
contractual 
interpretation. 
21 Anthracite Rated 
Investments (Jersey) Ltd v 
Lehman Brothers Finance 
SA (in liquidation); 
Fondazione Enasarco v 
Lehman Brothers Finance 
SA and another [2011] 
EWHC 1822 (Ch)  
Construction and 
effect of early close-
out provisions. 
LBF not entitled to 
receive payment 
under contractual 
agreement. 
None; raised 
issues of 
contractual 
interpretation. 
22 Re Lehman Brothers 
International (Europe) (in 
administration) [2011] 
EWHC 2022 (Ch) 
Application for 
directions 
(disclosure). 
Refused. None. 
23 Belmont Park Investments 
Pty Ltd v BNY Corporate 
Trustee Services Ltd and 
Lehman Brothers Special 
Financing Inc [2011] UKSC 
38 
Anti-deprivation 
case. 
Appeal dismissed; 
anti-deprivation 
principle not 
offended. 
Ultimately a 
question of 
contractual 
interpretation. 
24 Re Nortel GMBH (in 
administration) and other 
companies; Re Lehman 
Brothers International 
(Europe) (in administration) 
and other companies 
[2011] EWCA Civ 1124 
Treatment of FSD. Appeal dismissed 
unanimously.  ”  
None. 
25 Pearson & ors v Lehman 
Brothers Finance SA & 
others [2011] EWCA Civ 
1544 
Appeal against 
beneficial interests 
being given in favour 
of LBIE.  
Appeal dismissed 
unanimously. 
Useful discussion 
of processes of 
book entry 
transfers/street 
trades/title 
transfers. 
26 Lomas and others (together 
the Joint Administrators of 
Lehman Brothers 
International (Europe)) v 
JFB Firth Rixson Inc and 
others; Lehman Brothers 
Special Financing Inc v 
Carlton Communications 
Ltd; Pioneer Freight Futures 
Co Ltd (in liquidation) v 
Cosco Bulk Carrier Co Ltd; 
Britannia Bulk plc (in 
liquidation) v Bulk Trading 
SA [2012] EWCA Civ 419. 
Appeal against the 
decision that the 
non-defaulting 
parties were not 
obliged to pay. 
Appeal dismissed 
unanimously. 
Discusses the 
Belmont decision, 
but essentially an 
issue of contractual 
interpretation. 
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27 Lehman Commercial 
Conduit (in administration) 
& Anor. v Gatedale Limited 
(in CVL) 2012 EWHC 3083 
(Ch) (2012 EWHC 848) 
Application for 
directions (as to 
validity of a third 
party charge). 
The remedy of 
subrogation was 
available. 
None. 
28 Re Lehman Brothers 
International (Europe) (in 
administration) and another 
[2012] UKSC 6 
Appeal to Supreme 
Court on CASS 7 
ruling. 
Various issues; 
some allowed, some 
dismissed. 
Discussion of 
contributions 
versus claims; 
Court of Appeal 
and Supreme 
Court both split.. 
29 Lehman Brothers 
International (Europe) (in 
administration) Lehman 
Brothers Finance SA [2012] 
EWHC 1072 (Ch) 
Application for 
directions (side 
letter to ISDA Master 
Agreement). 
Side letter formed 
no part of the 
valuation of loss. 
None. 
30 Trustees of the Lehman 
Brothers Pension Scheme v 
Pensions Regulator and 
others [2012] All ER (D) 11 
(Jul); [2012] Lexis Citation 
47 
Application to strike 
out service of FSDs. 
Application 
dismissed. 
None. 
31 Re Lehman Brothers 
International (Europe) (in 
administration) and others 
[2012] EWHC 2997 (Ch) 
This case discussed 
a wide range of 
issues relating to the 
appropriate 
construction of 
security interests, 
the Financial 
Collateral Directive 
and the FCARs. 
Various – including 
the characterisation 
of the “General Lien” 
as a floating charge. 
A number of issues 
already discussed 
in Document 4 
(see para 163 for 
analysis of how 
dematerialised 
securities are 
held).  Questions 
of contractual 
interpretation. 
32 Lehman Brothers Bankhaus 
AG I Ins v CMA CGM [2013] 
EWHC 171 (Comm) 
An application by the 
administrators to 
determine (amongst 
other things) 
whether the English 
proceedings should 
be stayed until the 
outcome of the 
French proceedings. 
Stay granted. None. 
33 The Joint Administrators of 
Lehman Brothers 
International (Europe) v 
Lehman Brothers Finance 
SA In the matter of Lehman 
Brothers International 
(Europe) (in administration) 
[2013] EWCA Civ 188 
Whether the side 
letter formed part of 
contract. 
Appeal allowed. None. Discussion 
of the “value 
clean” principle in 
the context of 
close-out netting. 
34 Commonwealth Ave. Inc v 
Lehman Brothers 
International & Ors [2013] 
EWCA Civ 458 
 
Commonwealth Ave 
applied for 
permission to appeal 
from the judgment 
of Briggs J on the 
general liens case. 
Leave to appeal 
granted. 
None. 
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35 In the matter of Lehman 
Brothers International 
Europe (in administration) 
[2013] EWHC 1664 (Ch) 
The administrators 
applied to the court 
for an order that 
they could execute 
the settlement 
agreement. 
Granted. None. 
36 Nortel GmbH (in 
administration) and related 
companies; In re Lehman 
Bros International (Europe) 
(in administration) and 
related companies [2013] 
UKSC 52 
Appeal as to whether 
FSDs were expenses 
of the 
administration.   
Liabilities under FS 
regime, even if CN 
not served prior to 
administration, were 
provable debts;  
None. 
37 Re Financing No 1 Ltd and 
others v Trustees of the 
Lehman Brothers Pension 
Scheme and another [2013] 
EWCA Civ 751 
Certain Lehmans 
companies wished to 
strike out application 
of pension trustees 
to issue them FSDs 
on various grounds. 
Unanimous 
judgment, upholding 
decision of the 
Upper Tribunal. 
None. 
38 In re Lehman Bros 
International (Europe) (in 
administration) (No 4) 
[2014] EWHC 704 (Ch) 
 
Applications for 
directions as to the 
correct order of 
priorities  
Claims against LBIE 
were subordinated 
to provable debts 
and statutory 
interest on non-
provable liabilities. 
Limited; significant 
for up to date 
jurisprudence on 
the order of 
priorities on 
insolvency. 
39 Fondazione Enasarco v 
Lehman Brothers Finance 
SA and another [2014] 
EWHC 34 (Ch) 
Whether English 
proceedings should 
be stayed (main 
proceedings in 
Switzerland). 
Refused. None. 
40 Contrarian Funds LLC v 
Lomas and others; Re 
Lehman Brothers 
International (Europe) (in 
administration) [2014] 
EWHC 1687 (Ch) 
Application for a 
time extension to 
finalise proof of 
debt. 
Refused. None. 
41 Lehman Brothers Finance 
SA (in liquidation) v SAL 
Oppenheim JR & Cie KGAA 
[2014] EWHC 2627 (Comm) 
Miscalculation of the 
balance of early 
termination. 
 
Claim allowed. None. 
42 Lehman Brothers Finance 
AG (in liquidation) v Klaus 
Tschira Stiftung GmbH and 
another  
[2014] EWHC 2782 (Ch) 
Application for stay 
of English 
proceedings. 
Stay would have 
been granted had 
Swiss proceedings 
not been dropped. 
None. 
43  Re Lehman Brothers 
International (Europe) (in 
administration) [2015] 
EWCA Civ 485 
Appeal on order of 
priorities.  
Various conclusions. Some; for order of 
priorities. 
44 Fondazione Enasarco v 
Lehman Brothers Finance 
SA and another [2015] 
EWHC 1307 (Ch) 
 
 
 
 
Claim for sum 
following incorrect 
calculation of loss. 
Claim allowed. None. 
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45 The Joint Administrators of 
Lehman Brothers 
International (Europe) (in 
administration) v Burlington 
Loan Management Limited 
and others [2015] EWHC 
2269 (Ch) 
Application for 
directions (payment 
of post-
administration 
interest) 
Clarification on 
payment of post-
administration 
interest. 
None. 
46 Lomas and others v 
Burlington Loan 
Management Ltd and 
others; subnom Lehman 
Brothers International 
(Europe) (in administration) 
[2015] EWHC 2270 (Ch) 
Application for 
directions 
(construction and 
effect of standard 
form claim resolution 
agreement on 
currency 
conversion). 
Currency conversion 
claims not affected 
by claim resolution 
agreements. 
None. 
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APPENDIX 2 
Classification of English law Lehman cases 
1.Cases concerning matters of contractual/statutory interpretation 
The anti-deprivation case 
Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd, Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. 
[2009] EWHC 1912 (Ch) 
 
Perpetual Trustee Company Limited, Belmont Park Investments Pty Limited v BNY Corporate Trustee 
Services Limited, Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc [2009] EWCA Civ 1160 
 
Belmont Park Investments Pty Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd and Lehman Brothers Special 
Financing Inc [2011] UKSC 38 
The International Prime Brokerage Agreement Charge case 
In the matter of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in administration) (the Administrators of Lehman 
Brothers International (Europe) (in administration) and RAB Market Cycles (Master) Fund Limited (1) Hong 
Leong Bank Berhad (2) [2009] EWHC 2545 (Ch) 
 
The CASS rules case 
Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in administration) [2009] EWHC 3228 (Ch)  
 
Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in administration) [2010] EWCA Civ 917 
 
Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in administration) and another [2012] UKSC 6 
 
The RASCALS case 
Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in administration); Pearson and others v Lehman Brothers 
Finance SA and other companies [2010] EWHC 2914 (Ch) 
 
Pearson & others v Lehman Brothers Finance SA & others [2011] EWCA Civ 1544 
 
The ISDA Master Agreement cases 
Lomas & Others v JFB Firth Rixson [2010] EWHC 3372 (Ch) 
 
Lomas & others v JFB Firth Rixson Inc and others; Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc v Carlton 
Communications Ltd, Pioneer Freight Futures Co Ltd (in liquidation) v Cosco Bulk Carrier Co Ltd; Britannia 
Bulk plc (in liquidation) v Bulk Trading SA [2012] EWCA Civ 419 
 
Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc v Carlton Communications Ltd [2011] EWHC 718 (Ch) 
 
Lehman Brothers Commodity Services Inc and Credit Agricole Corporate and Investment Bank (formerly 
Calyon) [2011] EWHC 1390 Comm 
 
Anthracite Rated Investments (Jersey) Ltd v Lehman Brothers Finance SA (in liquidation); Fondazione 
Enasarco v Lehman Brothers Finance SA and another [2011] EWHC 1822 (Ch) 
 
Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in administration) v Lehman Brothers Finance SA [2012] EWHC 
1072 (Ch) 
 
The joint administrators of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in administration) [2013] EWCA Civ 
188  
 
The General (Extended) Liens case 
Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in administration) and others [2012] EWHC 2997 (Ch) 
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2.Hearings on minor matters 
RAB Capital Plc v Lehman Brothers International (Europe) [2008] EWHC 2335 (Ch) 
 
Four Private Investment Funds v Lomas and others [2008] EWHC 2869 (Ch) 
 
Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee Services [2009] EWHC 2953 (Ch) 
 
In the matter of Lehman Brothers International (Europe)(in administration) and CRC Credit Fund Limited 
and others [2010] EWHC 47 (Ch) 
 
Lehman Brothers International v CRC Credit Fund Limited and others [2010] EWCA Civ 1001 
 
Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in administration) [2010] EWHC 3044 (Ch) 
 
Spencer v Lehman Brothers Ltd [2011] EqLR 319 
 
In the Matter of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in administration) [2011] EWHC 1233 (Ch) 
 
Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in administration) [2011] EWHC 2022 (Ch) 
 
Lehman Commercial Conduit (in administration) & Anor. v Gatedale Limited (in CVL) 2012 EWHC 3083 
(Ch) (2012 EWHC 848) 
 
Lehman Brothers Bankhaus AG I Ins v CMA CGM [2013] EWHC 171 (Comm) 
 
Commonwealth Ave.Inc v Lehman Brothers International & Others [2013] EWCA Civ 458 
 
Fondazione Enasarco v Lehman Brothers Finance SA and another [2014] EWHC 34 (Ch) 
 
Contrarian Funds LLC v Lomas and others; Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in administration) 
[2014] EWHC 1687 (Ch) 
 
Lehman Brothers Finance SA (in liquidation) v SAL Oppenheim JR and Cie KGAA [2014] EWHC 2627 
(Comm) 
 
Lehman Brothers Finance AG (in liquidation) v Klaus Tschira Stiftung GmbH and another [2014] EWHC 
2782 (Ch) 
 
Fondazione Enasarco v Lehman Brothers Finance SA and another [2015] EWHC 1307 (Ch)  
 
 
3.Schemes of arrangement and settlement cases 
Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in administration) (No 2) [2009] EWHC 2141 (Ch) 
 
Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in administration) (No.2) [2009] EWCA Civ 1161 
 
In the matter of Lehman Brothers International Europe (in administration) [2013] EWHC 1644 (Ch) 
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4.Pensions cases 
Re Nortel GmbH and others; Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in administration) and others; 
Bloom and others v Pensions Regulator and others [2010] EWHC 3010 (Ch) 
 
Re Nortel GmbH (in administration) and other companies; Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in 
administration) and other companies [2011] EWCA Civ 1124 
 
Trustees of the Lehman Brothers Pension Scheme v Pensions Regulator and others [2012] All ER (D) 11 
(Jul) 
 
Nortel GmbH (in administration) and related companies; Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in 
administration) and related companies [2013] UKSC 52 
 
Re Financing No 1 Ltd and others v Trustees of the Lehman Brothers Pension Scheme and another [2013] 
EWCA Civ 751 
 
 
Priorities  
Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in administration) (No 4) [2014] EWHC 704 (Ch) 
 
Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in administration) [2015] EWCA Civ 485 
 
The Joint Administrators of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) v Burlington Loan 
Management Limited, CVI GVF (Lux) Master Sàrl, Hutchinson Investors LLC, Wentworth Sons Sub-Debt 
Sàrl, York Global Finance BDH LLC [2015] EWHC 2269 (Ch) 
 
Lomas and others v Burlington Loan Management Ltd and others; subnom Lehman Brothers International 
(Europe) (in administration) [2015] EWHC 2270 (Ch) 
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APPENDIX 3 
English law MF Global cases 
No. Case Issue  Decision Relevance for 
Thesis 
1 Re MF Global Overseas Ltd 
(in administration); Re MF 
Global Finance Europe Ltd 
(in administration) [2012] 
EWHC 1091 (Ch) 
Whether special 
administrators 
correctly appointed. 
They were. None. 
2 Heis and others v MF Global 
Inc, Re Global UK Ltd (in 
special administration) 
[2012] EWHC 3068 (Ch) 
Whether the 
appointment of 
administrators 
constituted an event 
of default under the 
Global MRA. 
Held that it did not 
(although liquidation 
would have done). 
None. 
3 Mirador International LLC v 
MF Global UK Ltd [2012] 
EWCA Civ 1662 
Appeal against 
making payments to 
a broker. 
Appeal dismissed. None. 
4 Re MF Global UK Ltd [2013] 
EWHC 1655 (Ch) 
Administrators 
sought directions 
regarding payments. 
Directions given. None. 
5 Melzer v MF Global UK Ltd 
C-228/11 EU  
German domiciled 
individual claimed 
damages for failure 
to inform him of 
risks of investments. 
German court would 
not be granted 
jurisdiction on the 
facts and basis of EU 
Regulation 44/2001. 
None. 
6 Re MF Global UK Ltd (in 
special administration) 
[2013] EWHC 92 (Ch) 
Application of CASS 
rules.  
Followed the claims 
basis from Lehmans; 
rejected the 
hindsight principle. 
None. 
7 Heis and others (as joint 
administrators) of MF 
Global UK Ltd v Attestor 
Value Master Fund LP and 
anor (as representatives) 
Re MF Global UK Ltd (in 
special administration) 
[2013] EWHC 2556 (Ch) 
Application of CASS 
rules. 
Followed the 
decision in LBIE v 
CRC Credit Fund 
[2012] UKSC 6. 
Possibly: a client’s 
provable debt 
would be reduced 
to the extent of a 
payment from the 
client money 
account; if there 
was still a shortfall, 
the client could 
prove for the 
remainder. 
8 Re MF Global UK Ltd (in 
special administration) 
EWHC 2222 (Ch)  
Application to court 
for client money pool 
trustee to enter into 
a settlement 
agreement. 
Allowed. None. 
9 MF Global UK Ltd (in special 
administration) sub nom 
Heis and others v MF Global 
UK Services Ltd (in 
administration) [2015] 
EWHC 833 (Ch) 
Was the service 
company entitled to 
pensions indemnity 
from the principal 
operating company. 
Held that it was. None. 
10 Re MF Global UK Ltd [2015] 
EWHC 2319 (Ch)  
Request for 
directions under 
s236 Insolvency Act. 
Refused. None. 
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APPENDIX 4 
Schedule of US Lehman cases 
No. Case Issue  Decision Relevance for 
Thesis 
1 In re Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc. 
544 BR 62 (2015) 
Damages claim for 
failure to fund.  
Agreement had 
damages waiver. 
Damages waiver 
upheld. 
Not relevant. 
2 In re Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc. 
544 BR 16 (2015) 
Jurisdiction. Expunged claims did 
not provide personal 
jurisdiction over 
claimant. 
Possibly: cross-
border case 
involving 
Australian entity. 
3 In re Lehman Brothers Inc. 
61 Bankr Ct Dec 220 
Motion for summary 
judgment by 
Firstbank Puerto 
Rico. 
Claim expunged. Possibly: cross-
border element.  
Bank sought return 
of securities. 
4. In re Lehman Brothers Inc. 
541 BR 45 (2015) 
Employee claim. Disallowed. Not relevant. 
5. In re Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc. 
535 BR 608 (2015) 
Jurisdiction. Bankruptcy court 
lacked personal 
jurisdiction over 
foreign swap 
participant. 
Yes: judgment 
discusses location 
of assets “Shield 
responds that 
LBSF’s in rem 
theory fails 
because the 
property is not 
property of the 
estate, the 
property is not 
physically situated 
in the forum and…” 
6 In re Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc.  
530 BR 601 (2015) 
Claim for contractual 
indemnification 
following purchase of 
allegedly defective 
mortgage loans. 
Not known. Not relevant. 
7 In re Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc. 
Slip Copy (2014) 
WL8274868 
Determination of 
plan to deal with 
mortgage backed 
securities. 
Administrative Not relevant. 
8 In re Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc. 
519 BR 47 (2014) 
Claim based on 
restricted stock 
units. 
Claim had to be 
subordinated. 
Not relevant. 
9 In re Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc. 
515 BR 171 (2014) 
Claims. Parties lacked 
standing. 
Not relevant. 
10 In re Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc. 
513 BR 624 (2014) 
Claims about 
residential backed 
mortgage securities. 
Not securities of the 
debtor. 
Not relevant. 
11 In re Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc. 
Slip Copy (2014) 
WL2766164 
458th Omnibus 
objection. 
Administrative. Not relevant. 
12 In re Lehman Brothers Inc. 
503 BR 778 (2014) 
Claims made by 
junior underwriters. 
Claims subject to 
mandatory 
subordination. 
Not relevant. 
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13 In re Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc. 
502 BR 375 (2013) 
Set-off and court’s 
jurisdiction. 
Pre-insolvency set-
off allowed. 
Not relevant. 
14 In re Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc. 
502 BR 383 (2013) 
Consideration of ipso 
facto clauses. 
Prohibition protected 
swap. 
Relevant: 
considered the BNY 
Trustee case. 
15 In re Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc. 
Not reported in BR (2013) 
WL6283572 
 
Barclays brought 
civil contempt 
proceedings against 
Firstbank Puerto 
Rico for violation of 
bankruptcy order. 
Not known. Not relevant. 
16 In re Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc. 
Slip Copy (2013) 
WL5908057 
Motion to set aside 
claims as being 
covered by Omnibus 
Agreement. 
Upheld.  
Administrative. 
Not relevant. 
17 In re Lehman Brothers Inc. 
493 BR 437 (2013) 
Late filing of SIPA 
claims. 
Not known. Not relevant. 
18 In re Lehman Brothers Inc. 
492 BR 379 (2013) 
Whether 
counterparties to 
repos had 
“customer” claims 
under SIPA. 
They did not. Possibly relevant 
for discussion of 
repos/possession. 
19 In re Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc. 
492 BR 191 (2013) 
Claim against bona 
fide purchaser for 
value. 
Claim could not be 
asserted. 
Not relevant. 
20  In re Lehman Brothers Inc. 
Slip copy (2013) 
WL1618029 
Settlement 
Agreement amongst 
LBI Trustee, LBIE 
and the LBIE 
Administrators. 
Administrative. Not relevant. 
21  In re Lehman Brothers Inc. 
Slip copy (2013) 
WL1618023 
Settlement 
Agreement between 
LBI Trustee and the 
LBHI entities. 
Administrative. Not relevant. 
22 In re Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc. 
Slip copy (2013)  
WL819734 
Concerned a party to 
whom a Lehman 
loan was made. 
Not known. Not relevant. 
23 In re Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc. 
487 BR 181 (2013) 
Issue of 
administrative 
expenses. 
Administrative. Not relevant. 
24 In re Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc. 
474 BR 139 (2012) 
Whether certain 
claims were 
“customer” claims 
under SIPA. 
Claims were not 
customer claims. 
Not relevant. 
25 In re Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc. 
474 BR 441 (2012) 
Motion to strike 
portion of claim 
objection. 
Motion was 
premature. 
Not relevant. 
26 In re Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc. 
Slip copy (2012) 
WL1933806 
 
 
 
Claim bought by 
individual. 
Not known. Not relevant. 
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27 In re Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc. 
469 BR 415 (2012) 
Avoidance following 
demands from 
counterparties for 
additional collateral 
in run up to 
Lehmans insolvency. 
Transfers were 
made “in connection 
with” securities 
contracts for “Safe 
Harbour” purposes. 
Not really relevant 
other than to 
validate discussion 
in Valukas report 
as to what 
happened pre-
insolvency. 
28 In re Lehman Brothers Inc. 
462 BR 53 (2011) 
Whether certain 
claims were 
“customer” claims 
under SIPA. 
 
Claims were not 
customer claims. 
Not relevant. 
29 In re Lehman Brothers Inc. 
458 BR 134 (2011) 
UBS AG sought pre-
petition set-off. 
Pre-petition set-off 
denied. 
Although case 
involved a Swiss 
company, no 
cross-border issues 
arose as case 
governed by NY 
law. 
30 In re Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc. 
456 BR 213 (2011) 
Whether debtor had 
claim against asset 
purchaser for 
shortfall in payments 
to ex-employees. 
Debtor did not have 
a claim. 
Not relevant. 
31 In re Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc. 
Slip copy (2011) 
WL2006341 
HR personnel 
claimed for post-
petition work. 
Not known. Not relevant. 
32 In re Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc. 
452 BR 31 (2011) 
Alleged 
unenforceability of 
swap termination 
payment clause as 
ipso facto clause 
Swap agreement’s 
defaulted 
termination payment 
did not fall within 
Safe Harbour (sic) 
provisions.in 
bankruptcy statute. 
Possibly relevant 
for discussion of 
ipso facto clauses. 
33 In re Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc. 
445 BR 143 (2011) 
Relief sought from 
sale order due to 
failure to disclose 
material information. 
Not granted. Not relevant. 
34 In re Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc. 
Not reported in BR (2011) 
WL722601 
Claims brought by 
two former 
employees of LBI to 
recover bonuses. 
Not known. Not relevant. 
35 In re Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc. 
Not reported in BR (2011) 
WL722582 
Claim to recover 
possession of shares 
allegedly improperly 
transferred by 
Lehmans on 
insolvency. 
Not known. Not relevant. 
36 In re Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc. 
439 BR 811 (2010) 
Whether automatic 
stay exception for 
netting 
arrangements 
applied to bank set-
off. 
 
Exception did not 
apply to bank set-
off. 
Not relevant. 
107 
 
37 In re Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc. 
Not reported in BR (2010) 
WL4818173 
Memo explaining 
how 66,000 proofs 
were being whittled 
down by means of 
objections to claims. 
Administrative. Not relevant. 
38 In re Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc. 
Not reported in BR (2010) 
WL2889527 
Claim in respect of 
unfulfilled funding 
obligations. 
Claim dismissed. Not relevant. 
39 Securities Investor 
Protection Corp v Lehman 
Brothers Inc. 
433 BR 127 (2010) 
Clarification of 
correct date for 
purposes of 
calculating a 
customer’s net 
equity claim 
Date of filing of SIPA 
liquidation.  
Not relevant. 
40 In re Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc. 
433 BR 113 (2010) 
Whether late claims 
could be allowed on 
basis of “excusable 
neglect” theory. 
They could not. Not relevant. 
41 In re Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc. 
433 BR 101 (2010) 
Whether Safe 
Harbour provisions 
did away with 
mutuality 
requirement for set-
off. 
They did not. Possibly relevant 
because case 
involved ISDA 
Master Agrt and 
the payment of 
outstanding sums 
in Swedish KR. 
42 In re Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc. 
422 BR 407 (2010) 
Whether a clause 
was a prohibited 
ipso facto clause. 
It was. Relevant as the US 
side of the BNY 
Trustee case. 
43 In re Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc. 
416 BR 392 (2009) 
Whether bank had 
assumed funding 
obligations. 
It had not. Not relevant. 
44 In re Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc. 
Not reported in BR (2009) 
WL6057286 
Request to court to 
compel contractual 
performance and 
enforce automatic 
stay. 
Order made. Not relevant. 
45 In re Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc. 
404 BR 752 (2009) 
Determination of 
when bank’s debt 
arose for set-off. 
Debt arose post-
petition for set-off 
purposes. 
Not relevant. 
46 In re Lehman Brothers Inc. 
Not reported in BR (2008) 
WL5423214 
Application of 
Federal Rules of 
Bankruptcy 
Procedure for 
discovery purposes. 
Administrative. Not relevant. 
47 In re Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc. 
Not reported in BR (2008) 
WL4902202 
Permissions given to 
debtors to use cash 
management 
processes subject to 
certain modifications 
and conditions. 
Administrative. Not relevant. 
48 In re Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc. 
Not reported in BR (2008) 
WL4902179 
Permissions given to 
debtors to pay 
employees, maintain 
insurances and pay 
pre-petition 
obligations. 
Administrative. Not relevant. 
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APPENDIX 5 
Classification of US Lehman cases 
 
 
1 Cases with a cross-border element and/or which considered issues relating to 
intermediated securities. 
In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. 544 BR 16 (2015) 
 
In re Lehman Brothers Inc. 61 Bankr Ct Dec 220 
 
In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. 535 BR 608 (2015) 
 
In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. 502 BR 383 (2013) 
 
In re Lehman Brothers Inc. 492 BR 379 (2013) * need hard copy of this case * 
 
In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. 452 BR 31 (2011) 
 
In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. 433 BR 101 (2011) 
 
In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. 422 BR 407 (2010) 
 
2.Claims hearings on non-relevant matters 
In re Lehman Brothers Inc. 541 BR 45 (2015) 
 
In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. 530 BR 601 (2015) 
 
In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. 519 BR 47 (2014) 
 
In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. 515 BR 171 (2014) 
 
In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. 513 BR 624 (2014) 
 
In re Lehman Brothers Inc. 503 BR 778 (2014) 
 
In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. 502 BR 375 (2013) 
 
In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Not reported in BR (2013) WL6283572 
 
In re Lehman Brothers Inc. 493 BR 437 (2013) 
 
In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. 492 BR 191 (2013) 
 
In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Slip copy (2013) WL5908057 
 
In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Slip copy (2013) WL819734 
 
In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. 474 BR 139 (2012) 
 
In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. 474 BR 441 (2012) 
 
In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Slip copy (2012) WL1933806 
 
In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. 469 BR 415 (2012) 
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In re Lehman Brothers Inc. 462 BR 53 (2011) 
 
In re Lehman Brothers Inc. 458 BR 134 (2011) 
 
In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. 456 BR 213 (2011) 
 
In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Slip copy (2011) WL2006341 
 
In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. 452 BR 31 (2011) 
 
In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. 445 BR 143 (2011) 
 
In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Not reported in BR (2011) WL722601 
 
In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Not reported in BR (2011) WL722582 
 
Securities Investor Protection Corp v Lehman Brothers Inc. 433 BR 127 (2010) 
 
In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. 433 BR 113 (2010) 
 
In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. 433 BR 101 (2010) 
 
In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. 422 BR 407 (2010) 
 
In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. 416 BR 392 (2009) 
 
In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Not reported in BR (2009) WL6057286 
 
In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. 404 BR 752 (2009) 
 
3.Cases on administrative matters/ settlements 
In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Slip Copy (2014) WL8274868 
 
In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Slip Copy (2014) WL2766164 
 
In re Lehman Brothers Inc. Slip copy (2013) WL1618029 
 
In re Lehman Brothers Inc. Slip copy (2013) WL1618023 
 
In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. 487 BR 181 (2013) 
 
In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Not reported in BR (2010) WL4818173 
 
In re Lehman Brothers Inc. Not reported in BR (2008) WL5423214 
 
In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Not reported in BR (2008) WL4902202 
 
In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Not reported in BR (2008) WL4902179 
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APPENDIX 6 
Schedule of US MF Global Inc. cases 
No. Case Issue  Decision Relevance for 
Thesis 
1 In re MF Global Inc. 
Slip Copy (2016) 
WL 270180 
Trustee objection to 
general creditor 
claim. 
Not known. Not relevant. 
2 In re MF Global Inc. 
535 BR 596 (2015) 
Proposed sale of 
Chapter 11 debtors’ 
assets. 
Approved. Not relevant. 
3 In re MF Global Inc. 
531 BR 424 (2015) 
Whether debtor had 
breached customer 
agreement by 
liquidating 
customer’s under-
margined account 
without notice. 
It had not. Not relevant. 
4 In re MF Global Inc.  
Slip Copy (2015)  
WL 1239102 
Trustee’s seventy-
fifth objection to the 
general creditor 
claims.  
Not known. Not relevant. 
5 In re MF Global Inc. 
Slip Copy (2015)  
WL 3507342 
Trustee filed 
objection to claim of 
general creditor in 
relation to whether 
Morgan Stanley was 
selling positions on 
the market. 
Not known. Not relevant. 
6 In re MF Global Inc.  
515 BR 434 (2014) 
 
Damages claim. Customers of failed 
broker-dealers were 
not entitled to 
recover position 
losses as 
contractual 
damages. 
Not relevant. 
7 In re MF Global Holdings 
Ltd. 
515 BR 193 (2014) 
Motion to authorise 
certain payments 
out of directors and 
officers liability 
policies. 
Not known. Not relevant. 
8 In re MF Global Inc. 
512 BR 757 (2014) 
Employee claims. Rule governing class 
actions could be 
applied to claims 
process. 
Not relevant. 
9 In re MF Global Inc. 
Slip Copy (2014) 
WL 1320094 
 
Period for filing a 
SIPA claim. 
Administrative. Not relevant. 
10 In re MF Global Holdings 
Inc. 
Not reported in BR (2014) 
WL 3536977 
 
 
 
Plan administrator 
objected to 
plaintiff’s claim. 
Not known. Not relevant. 
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11 In re MF Global Inc. 
506 BR 582 (2014) 
 
Whether court 
needed to approve 
compensation of 
SIPA trustee’s non-
attorney 
professionals. 
Administrative. Not relevant. 
12 In re MF Global Inc. 
Slip Copy (2014) 
WL 657321 
Discussion of time 
limit for filing SIPA 
claims. 
Administrative. Not relevant. 
13 In re MF Global Inc. 
Slip Copy (2014) 
WL 657321 
Application for a late 
filed claim. 
Not known. Not relevant. 
14 In re MF Global Holdings 
Ltd  
Slip Copy (2014) 
WL 3882363 
Employee claim. Subject to 
mandatory 
subordination. 
Not relevant. 
15 In re MF Global Inc. 
Slip Copy (2013) 
WL5232578 
Valuation case. Not known. Not relevant. 
16 In re MF Global Inc. 
Slip Copy (2013) 
WL 1686666 
Trustee’s objection 
to a claim filed by 
an individual. 
Not known. Not relevant. 
17 In re MF Global Inc. 
Slip Copy  
WL 5232578 
Motion for 
distribution. 
Administrative. Relevant. 
18 In re MF Global Inc. 
Slip Copy (2013) 
WL 74580 
Motion for Rule 
2004 Examination. 
Not known. Not relevant. 
19 In re MF Global Inc. 
Slip Copy (2013) 
WL 364207 
Motion approving 
settlement 
agreement. 
Administrative. Not relevant. 
20 In re MF Global Holdings 
Ltd. 
Slip Copy (2013) 
WL2352440 
Order to show cause 
why sanctions 
should not be 
imposed against an 
individual. 
Not known. Not relevant. 
21 In re MF Global Inc. 
Not reported in BR (2013) 
WL4511863 
 
Motion to dismiss 
amended class 
action complaint; 
employee issue. 
Not known. Not relevant. 
22 In re MF Global Inc. 
492 BR 407 (2013) 
Whether claimant 
was entitled to 
“customer” status 
under SIPA. 
Claimant was not, 
following In re 
Lehman Bros Inc. 
492 BR 379 (2013) 
Relevant for 
discussion of 
ownership/possession 
of the repos. 
23 In re MF Global Inc. 
491 BR 355 (2013) 
Claimants sought to 
establish that they 
were protected 
under SIPA. 
Claim failed. Not relevant. 
24 In re MF Global Holdings 
481 BR 268 (2012) 
 
Whether SIPA 
trustee was an 
employer subject to 
certain federal laws. 
SIPA was not. Not relevant. 
25 In re MF Global Inc. 
478 BR 611 (2012) 
Whether SIPA could 
assign potential 
malpractice claims. 
 
It could. Not relevant. 
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26 In re MF Global Inc. 
Slip Copy (2012) 
WL 3242533 
Establishment of 
partial settlement 
agreement with a 
customer. 
Administrative. Not relevant. 
27 In re MF Global Holdings 
Ltd 
Slip Copy (2012) 
WL5499847 
Trustee’s objection 
to claim filed by 
individual. 
Not known. Not relevant. 
28 In re MF Global Inc. 
Slip Copy (2012) 
 
Proposed protective 
order between MF 
Global Inc Trustee 
and MF Global 
Holdings Ltd 
Trustee. 
 
Not known. Not relevant. 
29 In re MF Global Holdings 
Inc. 
Slip Copy 
(2012)WL3260393 
Motion seeking 
order authorising 
SIPA trustee to file 
exhibit under seal. 
Not known. Not relevant. 
30 In re MF Global Inc. 
Slip Copy (2012) 
WL 3242533 
Objection filed to 
motion seeking 
authorisation to file 
exhibit under seal.  
Not known. Not relevant. 
31 In re MF Global Holdings 
Inc. 
Slip Copy (2012) 
WL 1424670 
 
Motion in respect of 
Stipulation Order 
between Trustee 
and statutory 
creditors committee. 
Not known. Not relevant. 
32 In MF Global Holdings Ltd. 
Slip Copy (2012) 
WL 1438262 
Motion requesting 
commodity 
customers to take 
priority in the MF 
Global Inc Chap 11 
Not known. Not relevant. 
33 In re MF Global Inc. 
Slip Copy (2012) 
WL734195 
Motion to approve 
first interim 
distribution for 
commodity futures 
claims. 
Not known.  
Administrative. 
Not relevant. 
34 In re MF Global Inc. 
Slip Copy (2012) 
WL 769501 
Issue of discovery. Discovery was 
unnecessary. 
Not relevant. 
35 In re MF Global Inc 
Slip Copy (2012) 
WL2202978 
Supplement to order 
regarding rejection 
of lease. 
Not known. Not relevant. 
36 In re MF Global Inc. 
Slip Copy (2012) 
WL 763170 
Extension of bar 
date sought. 
Not known. Not relevant. 
37 In re MG Global Inc. 
Slip Copy (2012) 
WL2202973 
Motion to uphold 
certain claims filed 
by an individual. 
Not known. Not relevant. 
38 In re MF Global Inc 
Slip Copy (2012) 
WL 734175 
Commodity 
customer sought 
relief on basis of 
domestic relations 
and child support 
sections of the 
bankruptcy code. 
Not known. Not relevant. 
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39 In re MF Global Holdings 
Ltd 
469 BR 177 (2012) 
Whether automatic 
stay should be lifted 
for insurance 
purposes. 
It should. 
Administrative. 
Not relevant. 
40 In re MF Global Inc. 
467 BR 726 (2012) 
How customer’s 
physical property 
should be dealt 
with. 
As estate property 
eligible for pro rata 
distribution in SIPA 
liquidation. 
Not relevant. 
41 In re MF Global Inc. 
466 BR 244 (2012) 
Issue as to 
ownership of gold 
and silver bars. 
Not known. Not relevant. 
42 In re MF Global Inc. 
Slip Copy (2012) 
WL5386101 
Motion for stay 
pending appeal 
against an order 
assigning certain 
claims. 
Not known. Not relevant. 
43 In re MF Global Holdings 
Ltd  
466 BR 239 (2012) 
Trustee’s proposals 
for dealing with 
leases and 
contracts. 
Did not comply with 
bankruptcy rules. 
Not relevant. 
44 In re MF Global Holdings 
Ltd  
465 BR 736  (2012) 
Application of 
Chapter 7 statute 
applicable to 
commodity brokers 
to Chapter 11 non-
commodity broker 
debtors. 
Not applicable. Not relevant. 
45 In re MF Global Holdings 
Ltd  
464 BR 619 (2012) 
Whether class action 
claim be dismissed 
or consolidated. 
Dismissed. Not relevant. 
46 In re MF Global Inc. 
Slip Copy (2012) 
WL 769519 
Motion to compel 
the Trustee to avoid 
using futures 
commissions 
merchants and 
clearing exchanges. 
Not known. Not relevant. 
47 In re MF Global Inc. 
464 BR 594 (2011) 
Appointment of 
trustee in 
satisfaction of SIPA 
disinterestedness 
requirements. 
Administrative. Not relevant. 
48 In re MF Global Holdings 
Ltd 
462 BR 36 (2011) 
Basis for election of 
creditors committee 
in SIPA liquidation. 
Basis was not the 
Bankruptcy Code. 
Not relevant. 
49 In re MF Global Holdings 
Inc 
Slip Copy (2011) 
WL 6210374 
 
Order sought to 
enable debtor to use 
cash collateral. 
Unknown.  
Administrative. 
Not relevant. 
50 In re MF Global Inc. 
Slip Copy (2011) 
WL5357959 
Trustee sought to 
establish procedures 
for issuance of 
subpoenas etc 
Not known.  
Administrative. 
Not relevant. 
51 In re MF Global Inc. 
Slip copy (2011) 
WL 6792758 
Application for 
assuming and 
assigning an 
unexpired lease. 
Not known.  
Administrative. 
Not relevant. 
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